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I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions by the
Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals. Due to the
volume of cases, not all cases decided by the courts have been reviewed.
The authors have attempted to highlight decisions representing a departure
from prior law or resolving issues of first impression.
For easy reference, the opinions have been grouped into eleven
categories, according to the general subject matter and import of their
holdings rather than the nature of the underlying claims: administrative
law, business law, constitutional law, employment law, family law, fish and
game law, procedure, property law, tax law, tort law and criminal law. The
criminal law section has been placed last because of its sheer volume of
cases. In some instances, the eleven categories have been further divided
into subcategories representing more specific areas of the law.
Appendix A lists the cases that were omitted from this year's Review
because they either applied well-settled principles or involved narrow
holdings of limited import. Appendix B notes which Court of Appeals
decisions have been granted certiorari by the Alaska Supreme Court.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In the area of administrative law, the Alaska Supreme Court decided
ten cases challenging agency actions or regulations on a variety of
procedural, statutory and constitutional grounds. In particular, the court
was guided by a precise approach to statutory language in those cases
involving agencies that exceeded the boundaries of their rulemaking
authority or that sought to avoid certain statutorily prescribed
responsibilities.
In FairbanksNorth StarBorough School Districtv. NEA-Alaska, Inc.,'
the supreme court held that a Department of Education regulation that
entitles teachers employed for only fractions of a school year "which equal

Copyright © 1992 by Alaska Law Review
1. 817 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1991).

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

two ful school terms ' to tenure conflicts with a statute that requires
teachers to be employed "in the same district continuously for two full
school years" 3 in order to be considered for tenure.4 The superior court
granted NEA-Alaska's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
Department's regulation is valid.5
On appeal, the supreme court found that the language in the statute -"continuously (employed) for two full school years" 6 -- unambiguously
precludes those who have only worked for a fraction of the school year.7
The court distinguished State v. Redman,8 which had held that a teacher
working part-time could qualify for tenure under the statute because that
teacher had been employed for two full school years.9 "The use of the
word 'full' in the Alaska statute indicates the Alaska Legislature's intent
to preclude a teacher from counting a portion of a year toward the two-year
probationary period required for tenure."10
Warner v. State," a consolidation of three appeals dismissed by the
superior court and the Alaska Real Estate Commission for untimely filing,12
declared section 64.295 of title 12 of the Alaska Administrative Code
invalid "because it was not promulgated pursuant to a legislative grant of
authority."' 3 Section 64.295 purported to establish a one year statute
of
4
limitations for filing claims under the Real Estate Surety Fund Act.'
The supreme court reversed the dismissals, holding that the Real Estate
Commission lacked the authority to promulgate Section 64.295.'s The
court opined that neither Alaska Statutes section 08.88.0816 nor section

2. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 18.900(b)(2) (Jan. 1991).
3. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.150(a)(2) (1987) (emphasis added).
4. NEA-Alaska, 817 P.2d at 925. Teachers may be employed for only fractions of a
school year for various reasons. For example, the student population may be different than
what was originally predicted, or term teachers may leave because of illness or maternity
leave. Id.
5. Id.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.150(a)(2) (1987).
7. NEA-Alaska, 817 P.2d at 926.
8. 491 P.2d 157 (Alaska 1971), aff'd on othergrounds, 519 P.2d 760 (Alaska 1974).
9. NEA-Alaska, 817 P.2d at 926.
10. Id. In addition, the court opined that although interpreting the statute less strictly
might attract a higher quality of teachers to Alaska, this decision is properly in the domain
of the legislature, not the courts or the Department of Education. Id.
11. 819 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1991).
12. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, § 64.295 (July 1991).
13. Warner, 819 P.2d at 29, 33-34.
14. Id. at 29-30; see ALASKA STATuTES §§ 08.88.450-.495 (1991).
15. Warner, 819 P.2d at 33.
16. Alaska Statutes section 08.88.081 provides: "the commission shall adopt regulations
necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter." ALASKA STAT. § 08.88.081 (1991).
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08.88.111'" authorizes the institution of the one-year statute of limitations
provision because neither statute actually appears in the Real Estate Surety
Fund Act and both statutes relate only to the licensing powers of the
Commission.' The court further noted that the Real Estate Surety Fund
Act only sets forth the procedures to be followed in adjudicating surety
fund claims, and that "the surety fund statutes do not confer a broad grant
of rulemaking authority."'19
In the Matter of E.A.O.' defined the scope of certain administrative
duties. The supreme court held that the Department of Health and Social
Services ("DHSS") continues to have a responsibility for the medical
expenses of children in its custody, even when the children are placed in
their parents' homes. E.A.O., a child born prematurely due to her mother's
alcohol abuse, was in the temporary legal custody of DHSS because of her
parents' inability to pay her extensive medical expenses. 2' Although
E.A.O.'s medical problems classified her as a "special needs case," the
superior court nonetheless released E.A.O. to the custody of her parents,
subject to the supervision of DHSS and ruled that DHSS would no longer
be responsible for E.A.O.'s medical expenses.22 E.A.O.'s mother
appealed only on the question of whether DHSS had the burden of paying
E.A.O.'s medical expenses for the nine-month period when E.A.O.
remained legally in the custody of the state, although residing at her
parents' home.'
In reversing the superior court, the supreme court noted "[w]e think it
clear that the department is responsible for the medical costs of children in
its custody, whether the children are placed at home or in a foster
home."24 The court relied on Alaska Statutes section 47.10.084(a), which
expressly states that the legal custodial relationship imposes the duty of
paying medical costs on the department.'s
The next two decisions in this area involved questions of the functional
definition of an administrative appeal and when such an appeal will be
deemed exhausted. In Diedrich v. City of Ketchikan,2 the plaintiff

17. Alaska Statutes section 08.88.111 provides: "the commission shall adopt procedural
regulations describing (1) how it conducts an examination; (2) how a person applies to take
an examination.... ." ALASKA STAT. § 08.88.111 (1991).
18. Warner, 819 P.2d at 31.
19. Id. at 32.
20. 816 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1991).
21. Id. at 1353.
22. Id. at 1354.

23. Id.
24. Id. at 1356.
25. Id. at 1356-57; see ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.084(a) (1990).
26. 805 P.2d 362 (Alaska 1991).
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claimed that the City of Ketchikan had deleted funding for his position of
Utilities Engineer, resulting in his discharge, in retaliation for an appeal he
had previously made to the City Personnel Board.27 Upon a second
appeal, the Board upheld his termination. Fifteen months later, the plaintiff
initiated suit in superior court, claiming breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and violation of his substantive due process
rights. 28 The superior court granted the city's motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint was untimely under Alaska Rule of Appellate
Procedure 602(a)" and therefore was the equivalent of an administrative
appeal.
On appeal, the supreme court rejected the plaintiff's first three claims.
The court upheld the superior court's finding that the plaintiff's claim
required the court to consider the propriety of an agency determination and
thus was functionally an administrative appeal.30 The court also held that
the non-section 1983 claims were properly dismissed as untimely since
"[a]ny claim which is functionally an administrative appeal must be
brought within the thirty day limit. 3 The court further reasoned that the
grievance procedures enumerated in the plaintiff's employment contract
with the city undermined his claimed deprivation of the right to a jury
32
triai.
The court also rejected the contention that "requiring public employees
to bring a timely administrative appeal as a prerequisite to invoking the
appellate jurisdiction of the superior court" denies equal protection of the
laws.33 The court noted that both private and public employees must
exhaust administrative remedies before obtaining judicial review.'
The supreme court next addressed the plaintiff's fourth claim, that he
need not comply with Appellate Rule 602(a) prior to filing a section 1983
action in Alaska state court. Although the supreme court agreed that Rule
602(a) was inapplicable under Felder v. Casey,35 a recent United States

27. Id at 364.
28. Id at 364-65. The plaintiff based his due process claim partially on 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (1988). Id

29. Id. at 365. Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 602(a)(2) provides in part: "[t]he
time within which an appeal may be taken to the superior court from an administrative
agency shall be 30 days from the date that the order appealed from is mailed or delivered
to the appellant." ALASKA R. APP. P. 602(a)(2) (1989).
30. Diedrich, 805 P.2d at 366.
31. Id.at 365.
32. Id. at 367. The court noted that "[w]hen Diedrich agreed to accept employment
with the City, he waived any residual right he had to demand a jury trial for an alleged
breach of the employment contract." Id.
33. Id.at 368.
34. Id.
35. 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust state
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Supreme Court case, the court dismissed Diedrich's 1983 claim under the
principle of issue preclusion.36 Relying heavily on a Ninth Circuit
decision, Eilrich v. Remas,37 the court concluded that issue preclusion
would bar the claim because the allegations were essentially the same as
those presented to the City Personnel Board.38 The court went on to state
that although the section 1983 action in Eilrichhad been brought in federal
court, the principle of collateral estoppel was equally applicable to
Diedrich's claim brought in a state court.3 9
Finally, the court addressed the city's cross-appeal for attorneys' fees
under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82. 40 The court determined that
because the action was treated as an administrative appeal, the Alaska
Rules of Appellate Procedure, rather than the Alaska Rules of Civil
Procedure, governed the award of attorneys' fees related to the non-section
1983 claims.4 The court thus remanded the question of attorneys' fees
to the lower court to determine whether an award should42be granted to the
City under Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 508(e).
Morgan v. State Department of Revenue43 involved the issue of
exhaustion of administrative remedies in appealing a denial of a permanent
fund dividend. Morgan, a state prisoner," claimed that he appealed to the
Department of Revenue ("DOR") after the March 2, 1988 denial of his
application for a permanent fund dividend. The DOR claimed that Morgan
never filed an administrative appeal and that his appeal rights had
expired.45 Morgan filed notice of appeal in the superior court, but the

administrative remedies before filing a section 1983 action in state court).
36. Diedrich,805 P.2d at 369-70.

37. 839 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819 (1988). The plaintiff in
Eilrich administratively appealed his dismissal and lost. He filed a section 1983 action in
federal court without appealing the administrative decision. The Ninth Circuit held that
"collateral estoppel barred consideration of the section 1983 claim because the same issues
were resolved in a prior unreviewed administrative proceeding." Diedrich,805 P.2d at 369
(interpreting Eilrich, 839 F.2d at 635).
38. Diedrich, 805 P.2d at 370.

39. let
40.
fees to
41.
42.

Id. at 370-71; see ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82 (setting a schedule for awarding attorneys'
a prevailing party).
Diedrich, 805 P.2d at 371.
Id. Rule 508(e) gives the court discretion to award attorneys' fees in appeals.
ALASKA R. APP. P. 508(e).
43. 813 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1991).
44. Although Alaska Statutes section 43.23.005 currently holds that a prisoner cannot
receive a Permanent Fund Dividend, at the time of Morgan's application in 1987 this
provision did not apply. Id. at 295 n.1.

45. Id. at 295-96.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

DOR's motion to dismiss was granted because of Morgan's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and file a timely appeal.46
On Morgan's appeal from the superior court's dismissal, the supreme
court held that the superior court abused its discretion in dismissing
Morgan's appeal because a factual dispute existed as to whether Morgan
had filed an appeal.47 The court further held that it was an abuse of
4s
discretion for the superior court to dismiss Morgan's appeal as untimely.
The court reasoned that timeliness is only an issue after a "final
determination" has been made and that the denial of a dividend is not a
"final determination" under the relevant agency rule.49 Rather, the "final
determination" is a determination at the formal hearing level."
Finally, the court characterized Morgan's appeal in superior court as
occurring "within a reasonable time" and after he "exhausted what he
reasonably could have believed were his remedies within DOR."' The
court remanded to the superior court for further findings of fact as to
whether Morgan exhausted his administrative remedies.5 2
The remaining five decisions in this section address questions
concerning the propriety of various agency actions and interpretations of
governing statutes. In McGrath v. University of Alaska, 3 the supreme
court held that the adjudicative provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA") 5 4 are applicable to grievance proceedings for University of
Alaska employees. In 1987, the community college system merged with
the University of Alaska system55 and all faculty became subject to the
same rank and tenure system. Former community college faculty members
filed a formal grievance, requesting a change in the rank assignments and6
claiming that as a result of the merger they were wrongly denied tenure.

46. Id. at 296.
47. Id. at 297. The court noted that the superior court "should have taken Morgan's
statements as true for purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss, just as a plaintiff's
allegations must be viewed as true in determining a dismissal motion based on the failure
to state a claim under Civil Rule 12(b)." Id. at 297 n.5 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 298.
49. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 05.040 (Oct. 1988 & Supp. 1992).
50. Morgan, 813 P.2d at 298 (citing Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing & Control Bd.,
627 P.2d 616, 622 (Alaska 1981). Section 05.030(i) of title 15 of the Alaska Administrative
Code reads in part: "Upon adoption by the commissioner, the written decision of the hearing
officer is the final administrative decision of the department for purposes of appeal to the
superior court under... [section 05.040 of title 15 of the Alaska Administrative Code]."
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 05.030(i) (Oct. 1988 & Supp. 1992).
51. Morgan, 813 P.2d at 298.
52. Id.
53. 813 P.2d 1370 (Alaska 1991).
54. ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.330-.630 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
55. McGrath, 813 P.2d at 1370.
56. Id. at 1370-71.
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After being advised that their hearing would take place before an
interim council57 but would not be governed by the APA, 8 the plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment and injunction to require the University to
conduct proceedings in accordance with the APA. The superior court held
that the APA did not apply in this case.59
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the University is required by
statute to conduct the hearing in accordance with the APA.
The
University countered that its rules were reasonable and that the APA
procedures were extensive and costly, and thus inconsistent with the
University's statutory right to adopt reasonable rules of governance and
with the Board of Regents' authority to manage the University. 61 The
supreme court rejected the University's argument, holding that there is no
inconsistency between the power to appoint and supervise faculty, and the
APA procedures designed to guarantee
due process to those adversely
62
affected by administrative action.
The University also argued that the APA adjudication procedures were
inapplicable because the plaintiffs were grieving legislative facts rather than
adjudicative facts.63 The supreme court agreed, noting that although the
APA does not explicitly limit adjudicatory hearings to adjudicative facts,
the court had previously recognized this distinction6 and furthermore, the
structure of the APA suggests that Alaska has implicitly limited
adjudicatory hearings to adjudicative facts and rulemaking to legislative
facts. 65 The court reversed and remanded so that any claims made by the
plaintiffs based on legislative facts could be excluded from the adjudicatory
hearing under the APA.6

57. The University had not yet established grievance procedures for the newly
structured administration. The chancellor adopted interim procedures and appointed an
interim council to administer them. Mdat 1371.
58. Id.
59. ld.
60. Id. at 1371-72. Alaska Statutes sections 44.62.330-.630 govern the adjudicative
procedures of the University "except to the extent that its inclusion is inconsistent with the
provisions of [Alaska statutes section] 14.40." ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.330(a)(45) (1989 &
Supp. 1991). Alaska Statutes section 14.40 provides that the Board of Regents may "adopt
reasonable rules, orders and plans.. . for the good government of the university...
ALASKA STAT. § 14.40.170(b)(1) (1987).
61. McGrath, 813 P.2d at 1372.
62. Id. (agreeing with Aden v. University of Alaska No. 3AN-85-17179 Civil (Alaska
Super., Feb. 2, 1987)).
63. a at 1374.
64. Id. (citing Wickersham v. State Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 680 P.2d
1135 (Alaska 1984)).
65. Ia at 1374-75; see Wickersham, 680 P.2d at 1143-47 (refusing to apply the more
lenient notice requirements of rulemaking procedures involving individual rights).
66. McGrath, 813 P.2d at 1375.
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In Borrego v. Alaska,67 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court's administrative revocation of Harold Borrego's driver's license based
on a finding that he had been driving while intoxicated.6 Borrego was
arrested for driving while intoxicated and his license was immediately
revoked. Although the jury later acquitted Borrego on the charge, his
69
license revocation was affirmed following administrative review.
Borrego then filed an appeal in both the district court and superior court
pursuant to daska Statutes section 28.05.141(d) and section 28.15.166(m).
The superior court affirmed both the district court's dismissal and the
administrative decision.70
First noting that Graham v. State71 governs situations in which the
defendant has the right to file an appeal in both district and superior court,
72
the supreme court held that Alaska Statutes section 28.15.166(m)
governs cases of license revocations due to driving while intoxicated, thus
allowing Borrego a single avenue of appeal in the superior court.73 The
court recognized that "allowing appeals under both provisions would result
in duplicate appeals and needless waste of judicial resources." 74
The court further held that Borrego's acquittal did not bar
administrative revocation of his driver's license.75 The court held that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply because the standard of proof
in a civil licensing case is different from that of a criminal action.76
Higgins v. Municipality of Anchorage ("Higgins 11")T involved an
appeal from the denial of a new trial of a wrongful job reclassification
action against a municipality.7 On appeal after remand for failing to

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

815 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1991).
Id at 362, 366.
Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 363.
633 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1981).
This section provides:
Notwithstanding [Alaska Statutes section] 28.05.141(d)... a person aggrieved
by the determination [of the police] may file an appeal in superior court for judicial
review of the hearing officer's determination. . . . The court may reverse the
department's determination if the court finds that the department misinterpreted the
law, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or made a determination
unsupported by the evidence in the record.
ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.166(m) (1989).
73. Borrego, 815 P.2d at 364.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id (citing Avery v. State, 616 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1980)).
77. 810 P.2d 149 (Alaska 1991) ("Higgins I1").
78. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Higgins, 754 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1988) ("Higgins
T'), appeal after remand, Higgins v. Municipality of Anchorage, 810 P.2d 149 (1991). In
Higgins I the superior court denied the municipality's motion for summary judgment and

1992]

YEAR IN REVIEW

exhaust administrative remedies, Higgins argued that newly discovered
evidence showed that the municipality misrepresented its policy on the
availability of arbitration for reclassification disputes. 9 Although the
court agreed that the municipality had misrepresented its position on
arbitration,"0 it noted that Higgins could have discovered the
misrepresentation two years earlier through due diligence. Thus, according
to the court, the lower court had not abused its discretion in denying
Higgins' motion for a new trial.8
Nevertheless, the court pointed out that at a certain level
misrepresentation to the court "offends the integrity of the judicial system
itself." 2 Finding that the municipality was "at least reckless in
misrepresenting its policies on arbitration in Higgins I...
[and] clearly
violated its duty of honest dealing with [the] court," 3 the court set aside
the judgment in Higgins I for "fraud upon the court,"" reinstating the
original denial of the municipality's motion for summary judgment and
remanding the case.85
Homer ElectricAssociation, Inc. v. City of Kenai 6 involved a dispute
over who was responsible for the costs of relocating a utility's equipment
in a municipal right of way. The dispute arose when some of the city's
light facilities needed to be relocated because of municipal construction
projectsY Homer Electric Association ("HEA"), which operated and
managed the city of Kenai's electrical system, demanded reimbursement
from the city for the relocation, but the city refused. HEA then petitioned
the Alaska Public Utilities Commission ("APUC") for a ruling that the city
had breached its contract with HEA.88 APUC dismissed the petition,
suggesting that BEA apply for a rate surcharge to pay for the relocation

the supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that Higgins had not exhausted his
administrative remedies in light of the availability of arbitration. Id.at 747-48.
79. Higgins II, 810 P.2d at 150.
80. Id. at 151-53. The municipality's position before the court in Higgins I was that
arbitration was available and even a "preferred means of resolving disputes like Higgins's
.... Id.at 152. The court noted that the most favorable reading of the municipality's
position in Higgins IIwas that "Higgins has a duty to test our refusal to arbitrate before he
has recourse to the courts." Id.
81. Id.at 153.
82. Id.at 154.
83. Id.
84. See ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 60(b) (authorizing such set asides).
85. HigginsII, 810 P.2d at 154.
86. 816 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1991).
87. IM at 183.
88. Id.
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expenses. BlEA then filed a tariff request with the APUC to obtain the
surcharge.8 9
In support of its request for a rate surcharge, HEA challenged the
traditional common law rule that "absent a statute or specific agreement to
the contrary, a public utility accepts the right to use public rights of way
subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities when necessary to
make way for public improvements."'
APUC concluded that the
common law rule was unreasonable. 91 The city appealed the APUC
finding to the superior court, which dismissed the appeal because the city
had not been a party to the APUC hearing and thus lacked standing.92
The city appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, which held that the city
did have standing, vacated the dismissal and remanded the case.93 On

remand, the superior court found in favor of the city, holding that the
APUC lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, and awarded

attorney's fees to the city.'
The supreme court reviewed the case de novo and considered only the
question of whether the APUC had jurisdiction under the Alaska Public
Utilities Commission Act 9 to issue the order.' The court discussed two
guiding principles that determine APUC's jurisdictional authority: "a
principle of limitation, restricting the APUC's power to the specific
jurisdictional areas of its 'stated purposes.' and "a principle of expansion,
mandating that the APUC's power to act within its specific areas of

89. Id
90. Id at 184.
91. Id
92. Id.
93. City of Kenai v. State Public Utilities Comm'n, 736 P.2d 760, 763 (Alaska 1987).
94. Homer Electric, 816 P.2d at 184.
95. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 42.05.010-.721 (1989 & Supp. 1991). The relevant provision
was Alaska Statutes section 42.05.251 which pertains to public utilities' use of streets in
cities and boroughs. The statute provides in part:
Public utilities have the right to a permit to use public streets, alleys, and other
public ways of a city or borough, whether homerule [sic] or otherwise, upon
payment of a reasonable permit fee and on reasonable terms and conditions and with
reasonable exceptions the municipality requires. A dispute as to whether fees, terms,
conditions, or exceptions are reasonable shall be decided by the commission.
Act of 1970, ch. 113, § 6, 1970 Alaska Sess. Laws 6 (current version at ALASKA STAT. §
42.05.251 (1989)). This section was amended in 1986, but the amendments are not relevant
to this case. Homer Electric, 816 P.2d at 185 n.ll.
The court rejected the city's argument that HEA had no "permit" and thus Alaska
Statutes section 42.05.251 was not implicated, noting that the written agreement between
the city and HEA expressly provided for a permit for HEA to use streets, alleys, and rights
of way. Furthermore, the court rejected the city's argument that HEA's relocation expenses
could not be construed as a permit "fee" under the same statutory provision. The court
explained that the city's requirement that HEA pay its own relocation expenses was plainly
a condition of HEA's permit. Id. at 187.
96. Homer Electric, 816 P.2d at 185-86.
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125

The court reviewed its
jurisdiction 'is to be liberally construed."'"
precedent on APUC's jurisdictional authority,98 and concluded that APUC
clearly had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute between the city and HEA. 9
The court then reversed and remanded the case for a review of the
substance of APUC's order and vacated the city's award of attorney's
fees.1°°
Stepanov v. Homer Electric Ass'n... involved contracts between
Homer Electric Association ("HEA") and housing developers for extending
electrical lines to newly developed land. HEA's policy at the time
provided that the cost of overhead line extensions would be paid primarily
by HEA; developers would incur substantial costs only if they wanted the
lines installed underground.0'2 In Stepanov, the developers wanted
underground lines and agreed to prepay the cost differential. 3 However,
several years after these contracts were signed, BEA successfully petitioned
the Alaska Public Utilities Commission ("APUC") for permission to begin
charging for extending overhead lines."° The developers remained
unaware of this change of policy until purchasers of lots in their
subdivisions complained that HEA had assessed fees for overhead line
extensions. 0 5
The developers petitioned the APUC for review of HEA's new tariff.
The APUC hearing officer characterized the contracts as "special contracts"6
under section 48.820(36) of title 3 of the Alaska Administrative Code'0

97. Id. at 186 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.141(a)(1) (1989 & Supp. 1991)). The

statute provides that APUC shall "regulate every public utility engaged or proposing to
engage in such a business inside the state, except to the extent exempted by [Alaska Statutes
section] 42.05.711, and the powers of the commission shall be liberally construed to
accomplish its stated purposes . . . ." ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.141(a)(1) (1989 & Supp.
1991).
98. B-C Cable Co., Inc. v. City & Borough of Juneau, 613 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1980)
(holding that a challenge to a franchise tax clearly fell under the APUC's authority to
determine reasonableness of use permit fees); Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. City of
Anchorage, 504 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1972) (holding that a dispute between two municipalities
did not clearly fall under the APUC's authority to resolve disputes between competing
utilities), overruled on other grounds by City & Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d
626, 629 (Alaska 1979).
99. Homer Electric, 816 P.2d at 187 (determining that it has "construed [Alaska
Statutes section] 42.05.141(a)(1) to mean that the actual areas in which the APUC may
exercise its adjudicatory authority are quite narrow," but that the APUC's authority within
those areas "are plenary, and as broad as the specific provisions of the Act permit").
100. Id
101. 814 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1991).
102. Id. at 732-33.
103. Id. at 733.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. A "special contract" is defined in the Alaska Administrative Code as:

126
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and approved them for the period prior to when the developers received
actual notice that the new tariff applied to their property." Both parties
appealed, objecting to the characterization of the agreement as a "special
contract." The superior court affirmed on alternate grounds.'08
The supreme court concluded that the contracts were indeed "special
contracts,"" requiring prior APUC approval." 0 The court held,
however, that the developers were unaware of this requirement and had
reasonably relied upon BEA to have knowledge of and comply with any
statutory and regulatory requirements."' The court further concluded
that the harm developers would suffer if the tariff were applied to the
property sold before the developers had actual notice of the increased fees

would be remedied by APUC's decision to exempt the developers from the

new tariff until they had received actual notice." 2
After the superior court awarded actual attorneys' fees and costs to the
developers for the appellate proceedings," 3 the developers claimed that
they should have been awarded additional fees for the proceedings before
the APUC. The supreme court concluded that the APUC did not have the
authority to award the fees without specific authorization." 4 Similarly,
the court relied on Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Cook Inlet Region,
Inc.," holding that fee awards should be partial -- limited to those fees
incurred in court, not in prior administrative proceedings
-- unless
16
otherwise authorized by statute or in frivolous cases."

a written agreement between a utility and a customer which contains rates, tolls,
rentals or charges, or terms and conditions that deviate substantially from those
contained in the same utility's effective tariff for like service offered to the general
public under comparable conditions, but excludes contracts that deviate from the
serving utility's effective tariff only in respect to incidental matters....
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 48.820(36) (Oct. 1988). Section 48.390 provides that special
contracts do not take effect without the prior approval of APUC. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE
tit.
3, § 48.390 (Oct. 1988).
107. Stepanov, 814 P.2d at 733-34.
108. Id at 734. The superior court concluded that the agreements were not special
contracts and that they were enforceable without APUC approval. The court held that due
process required that HEA give the developers actual notice of the APUC hearing. Policy
concerns, however, compelled the court to conclude that the due process violation did not
negate the validity of the new tariff and that it was applicable from the time actual notice
was recieved. Id. at 734 n.8.
109. Id. at 735.
110. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 48.390 (Oct. 1988).
111. Stepanov, 814 P.2d at 735.
112. Id. at 736.
113. Id. at 737.
114. Id.
115. 807 P.2d 487, 501 (Alaska 1991). See infra page 209.
116. Stepanov, 814 P.2d at 737. The court also relied on Kenai Peninsula Borough in
concluding that it was an abuse of discretion for the superior court to award actual
attorney's fees to the developers; in the absence of frivolousness or undue delay, only partial
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III. BUSINESS LAW
In 1991, the bulk of the cases decided by the Alaska Supreme Court
in the area of business law were contracts cases. The court decided seven
such cases in 1991, addressing the issues of indemnity, implied ratification,
foreclosure, damages, exclusive listing agreements, exclusions in damage
waivers and promissory estoppel. The court also issued opinions in cases
involving insurance, the duty of good faith and fair dealing in settlement
negotiations and the propriety of late fees charged by a federally chartered
credit union. The contracts cases will be reviewed first, followed by the
other business law cases.
In FairbanksNorth Star Borough v. Kandik Construction, Inc.," 7 the
Alaska Supreme Court for the first time extended the traditional role of
implied non-contractual indemnity to an instance of implied contractual
indemnity. The case involved a rehearing of a case decided in 1990 by the
Alaska Supreme Court. The court vacated part of its earlier opinion and
remanded for a new trial on the question of Roen Design Associates (a codefendant's) liability to its cross-defendant, the Borough. In the prior
decision, the supreme court did not address the jury verdict denying
indemnity to the Borough because it found the claim to be redundant given
the Borough's alternative cross-claims against Roen for tort and breach of
contract. The court ordered a new trial to determine whether
Roen was
8
liable to the Borough under a theory of tort or contract."
On rehearing, the supreme court first concluded that the tort and
contract claims should not have gone to the jury. The court held that a
promise for indemnity gives rise only to a claim for indemnity and not to
claims in tort or contract." 9 The Borough did not actually plead any tort
or contract claims against Roen, and the Borough did not make any
showing that it tried discrete claims of tort and contract independently of
the indemnity claim.' 2
The court concluded that the jury was not properly instructed on
indemnity.' 2 ' Alaska follows a version of the traditional rule of
indemnity: "an indemnitee jointly liable in tort with the indemnitor may

attorney's fees were appropriate. Id.
117. 823 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1991) (rehearing Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Kandik
Construction, Inc., 795 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1990)).
118. Id. at 633-34.
119. Id. at 636-37.
120. Id. at 637. Although one element of the indemnity and negligence actions does
coincide, failure to exercise reasonable care in the preparation of the plans, the focus of
causation and the damages that would flow from the two actions are different. Id. at 636.
121. Id. at 637.
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recover implied non-contractual indemnity only if the indemnitee is not in
any degree also jointly at fault."'" More importantly, the court stated for
the first time that this rule applies to implied contractual indemnity.Iu
The dissent argued that the majority's decision is inconsistent with
Alaska's adoption of comparative negligence."2 The dissent did not
believe that any fault should bar all recovery, and argued that loss should
be shared in proportion to the fault of each party."z
In S&B Mining Co. v. Northern Commercial Co., 126 the supreme
court faced the issue of whether S&B Mining Company was bound by a
promissory note that it did not sign. The court concluded that the company
was bound, reflecting the court's continuing recognition of ratification by
inaction. In 1980, William Swayne II and Baird & Williams Investment
Advisors, Inc. ("B&W") formed S&B as general partners. B&W was a
Texas corporation whose principals were Baird and Williams.' 27 In
1984, Williams signed a promissory note to Northern Commercial
Company ("NCC") in return for dismissal of a suit against S&B for failure
to make rental payments on equipment. 2 1 In 1986, NCC filed suit
against S&B because the payments on the promissory note were not
made. 1'29 S&B argued that it was not bound by the note signed by
Williams. The superior court granted NCC's motion
for summary
3
judgment, however, and the supreme court affirmed. 1
The supreme court held that Williams' execution of the 1984 note
bound S&B and its partners, Swayne and B&W. 3 1 The court based its
holding on two alternative lines of reasoning. First, the court found that
Swayne impliedly ratified the 1984 note, and in so doing bound S&B
under the note. 32 The court noted that there are two requirements for
finding ratification by silence. Initially, the act "'must be done by someone
who held himself out to be the third party as an agent for the
principal.""'
The court reasoned that it was clear that Williams was

122. I4 at 638.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 639-40 (Matthews, J., dissenting) (citing Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037
(Alaska 1975)).
125. Id. at 641 (Matthews, J.,dissenting).
126. 813 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1991).
127. Id at 265.
128. I&
129. Id. NCC also filed suit against Swayne, Baird, Williams, B&W, and Chena Mining.
U,
130. Id. at 269.
131. Id. at 267.
132. Id.
133. IU (quoting Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, 787 P.2d 109, 116-17

1992]

YEAR IN REVIEW

acting as an agent for S&B because NCC dropped the suit against S&B in
return for the note."M Second, the principal must fail to act or respond
to the circumstances as one would expect a reasonable person to respond
if he or she objected. 3 According to the court,
Swayne had full notice
13 6
and knowledge of the debt and did not object.
The court alternatively focused on S&B's partnership agreement,
noting that the amended partnership agreement, dated one month befor&
Williams signed the note, specified that Williams could bind the business
of the partnership.137 S&B argued that the document was not in effect
when Williams signed the note, as Baird had not yet signed the partnership
agreement. The court disagreed, finding that by signing a document that
was predated January 1, the document had a retroactive effect. 3 8
The final issue involved exclusion of evidence that NCC agreed not to
sue on the promissory note until the collateral had been sold. 139 The
supreme court determined that such evidence would violate the parol
evidence rule because it contradicted the terms of the note.14 The
completeness and specificity of the note convinced the supreme court that
it was an integrated document, and so the proffered evidence violated the
presumption "that a creditor may proceed on the note without
first
14
foreclosing on the collateral, unless the note states otherwise." '
Yang v. Yoo"'4 involved the sale of an inn in downtown Anchorage.
The Yoos sold the Inlet Inn to the Yangs, who subsequently defaulted on
their payments to the Yoos. The Yoos sought foreclosure and the Yangs
counterclaimed, alleging that there was an additional oral agreement that
provided that the Yoos would return the Yang's down payment if the
43
Yangs did not earn at least one million dollars per year in revenues.1
The jury found in favor of the Yoos on their foreclosure claim but did not
award any damages. The superior court entered judgment for the Yoos and
ordered foreclosure and sale of the property. 44

(Alaska
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

1990)).
I
d (citing Sea Lion, 787 P.2d at 116-17).
I& at 268.
Id. at 266, 269.
1d at 268.
I&at 269-70.
Id. at 270.
IdM
812 P.2d 210 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 211.
Id. at 213.
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On appeal, the supreme court rejected the Yangs' argument that the
jury's verdict of foreclosure and zero damages meant that the Yangs owed
nothing to the Yoos.' 45 Since the jury had awarded a foreclosure on the
basis that there was no excuse for the Yangs' failure to make payments on
the deed of trust held by the Yoos, the court found that it was possible to
reconcile the jury's award of zero damages and the foreclosure. 46 The
court then reasoned that the underlying obligation, the note, was
enforceable against the property but not against the Yangs personally, thus
accomplishing the goal of putting "the plaintiffs in as good
147 a position as
they would have had the defendants kept their promise."'
The court rejected the argument that every foreclosure judgment must
specify an exact amount of indebtedness, 4noting
that the existing debt of
8
the Yangs was a matter of math, not law.'
The dispute in Hancock v. Northcutt149 centered around an oral
contract between the owner-builders of a house and certain concrete
contractors who agreed to construct an underground house consisting of
seven joined concrete pods. After delays in construction, the owners
claimed that the completed construction was defective and sued the
contractors for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 15 They sought damages
associated with the cost of repairing the house, and emotional distress, and
punitive damages. The contractors counterclaimed for the amount
allegedly due under the terms of the oral contract and for extra work
performed.15 1 The jury found for the owners, awarding them certain
prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys' fees, and compensatory damages
which included the cost of demolishing
and rebuilding the house as well
52
as an award for emotional distress.

145. Id. at 214-15. The jury did not believe that "an enforceable oral side agreement
existed." Id. at 214.
146. Id. at 215-16 (When "a plausible theory exists to reconcile the jury's answers on
a special verdict form, we will do so.").
147. Id. at 216. This goal was what the instruction on damages to the jury stated. The
court noted that the question on damages on the verdict form was unnecessary because the
Yoos did not request any damages in addition to the note amount. Once the jury awarded
foreclosure, there was no reason to calculate the exact amount owed under the note since
there was no dispute as to the payments made on the note. Id.
148. Id. (distinguishing Jones v. North American Acceptance Corp., 442 S.W. 2d 492,
493-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969) (invalidating a foreclosure decrec for uncertainty, but did so
on the basis that there was a clear dispute regarding the amount of indebtedness)).
149. 808 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1991).
150. Id. at 252-53.
151. IdMat 253.
152. The jury also awarded compensatory damages for the costs of moving, storage, and
temporary housing during construction, for costs incurred by construction delays, and for
past lost use of portions of the house. Id.
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The supreme court vacated the damage award for demolition and
rebuilding, holding that the trial court's jury instruction concerning such
costs was a misstatement of Alaska law."' The trial court had instructed
the jury on alternate methods of computing damages for the house. Under
the first method, if the jury found that repair was feasible, then the measure
of damage should have been cure costs, i.e., the cost of completing the
house to the condition promised in the contract. Alternatively, if repair
was not feasible or would have created unreasonable waste, then the
measure of damages should have been differential value costs, that is, the
difference between the value the house would have had if the contract was4
fulfilled as promised and the actual value of the house as completed.'The trial court also instructed the jury that even if repair is impractical and
grossly wasteful, the jury can award cure costs if they find any one of the
following: "(1) that the house has a special significance to the [owners]; (2)
that the [owners] were more likely than not to demolish and rebuild the
house; or (3) that the house creates a dangerous condition. ' 55
56
The supreme court held that the third instruction was erroneous.
In order to avoid unjust enrichment of the plaintiffs, the court held that
repair costs greatly exceeding the value differential measure may be
awarded only if it appears likely to the jury that the plaintiffs will actually
rebuild the house.157 Because the conditions in the instruction were
stated in the disjunctive, the instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to
award repair costs based on any one of the three conditions, with no
required finding that the plaintiffs were more likely than not to demolish
the house and rebuild it. 8 The court vacated the award of rebuilding
costs and remanded for a1 new
trial to determine damages based upon the
59
differential value method.
The court also reversed the award of damages for emotional distress,
relying on the "general rule.., that where a tortfeasor's negligence causes
emotional distress without physical injury, such damages may not be
awarded."' 6" The court rejected the plaintiffs' alternative argument that
emotional distress damages can be awarded under a breach of contract

153. Id. at 255.
154. Id. at 254.
155. Id (emphasis added).
156. Id at 255.
157. Id. at 256.
158. Id
159. Id. at 261. The court also vacated the award for storage costs and temporary
housing as that award was based on the assumption that the house would be rebuilt. Id. at
257.
160. Id at 257 (citing W. PAGE KEETON E r AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 54, at 361 (5th ed. 1984)).
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theory when emotional disturbance is likely to result from the breach of
that type of contract.'
In the court's view, "breach of a house
construction contract is not especially likely to result in serious emotional
disturbance. .... Further, the typical damages for breach of house
construction
contracts can appropriately be calculated in terms of monetary
162

loss."'

Finally, the court reversed the trial court's denial of prejudgment
interest with respect to the demolition and moving costs. The contractors
claimed that the costs were calculated in 1989 dollars and, therefore,
awarding interest from the date of breach in 1982 would effectively grant
double recovery due to inflation. 63 The court held that because
prejudgment interest is the norm in Alaska law, the burden of proving an
unusual situation such as double recovery falls on the party opposing the
award. 164 The court concluded that the contractors had failed to meet this
burden.
In Frontier Companies of Alaska v. Jack White Co.,' 65 Frontier
Companies of Alaska entered into an exclusive listing agreement with Jack
White Company for the sale of commercial property owned by
Frontier.1'6 Frontier arranged a sale of the property a few days before the
expiration of the listing agreement, but, in agreement with the buyer, chose
to postpone closing and signing the transaction until after the listing
agreement with Jack White Company expired.' 67 The broker, Jack
White, brought an action claiming he was entitled to his commission and
alleging that Frontier had breached its implied obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. The superior court denied Frontier's motion for a directed
verdict and submitted the case to the jury. The jury found for the broker
168
and a judgment was entered for six percent of the sale price.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the term "sold or transferred"
used in the listing agreement was broad enough to cover the oral agreement
for the sale of the property made while the listing agreement was in effect,
69
but not consummated until after the listing agreement had expired.
Therefore, the superior court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict on

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 253.
Id. at 253-59.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
818 P.2d 645 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id. at 649.
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the issue."' ° The court also concluded that the buyer did not tortiously
interfere with the exclusive listing agreement between Frontier and Jack
White," noting that the buyer's conduct was only an acquiescence in
Frontier's breach of contract and therefore
did not rise to the level of
172
intentional interference with a contract.
In Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales and Service, the supreme court refused
to enforce an exclusion in a collision damage waiver contained in a
contract for car rental.'7 4 Lauvetz rented a van from National Car Rental
and had an accident while he was intoxicated. Despite Lauvetz's purchase
of the waiver, National filed suit against him, invoking the waiver's
exclusion for driving while intoxicated. The court phrased the relevant
question as "whether the purchaser of the damage waiver reasonably
expected the waiver to be subject to any exclusion."'7 Reasoning that
the average car renter would expect a waiver to relieve him of
responsibility 17
regardless
of fault, the court refused to enforce the exclusion
6
to the waiver.
James v. State'" involved a highly fact-specific promissory estoppel
claim against the state by winners of the Potlach Ponds Land Lottery,
which was later invalidated by the state.'
After the invalidation, three
letters were drafted by the state indicating its intention to reoffer the land
to compensate for potential inequities caused by the invalidation. 179 The
appellants based their promissory estoppel claim on the third letter from the
Director of the Division of Land and Water Management, which stated in
pertinent part:
Requested Action: To hereby grant preference rights to all people whose
names were drawn in the 1980 lottery for Potlach Ponds parcels and, as of
the date of this decision, have not relinquished their parcels ....[I]t is
my decision to allow each individual... the right to apply for a preference

170. IML at 650.
171. Id. The elements of an intentional interference claim are: "'[P]roof that (1) a
contract existed, (2) the defendant ...knew of the contract and intended to induce a breach,
(3) the contract was breached, (4) defendant's wrongful conduct engendered the breach, (5)
the breach caused the plaintiff's damages, and (6) the defendant's conduct was not
rivileged or justified."' Id. (quoting Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d
88, 793 (Alaska 1986)).
172. 1L at 650-51.
173. No. S-4025, 1991 Alas. LEXIS 132 (Alaska Nov. 15, 1991).
174. Id. at *12-13.
175. Id. at *11.
176. Id. at *9-10.
177. 815 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1991).
178. Id. at 353. The lottery was invalidated for noncompliance with a local subdivision
ordinance. State v. Widener, 684 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1984).

179. James, 815 P.2d at 353-54.
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right of purchase for the... parcel each originally claimed, or another
parcel of similar size or value, pursuant to [Alaska Statutes section]
38.05.035(b)(2).l"
The supreme court affirmed the superior court's grant of the state's
motion for summary judgment, stating that the appellants' promissory
estoppel claim failed because the state did not and could not have
reasonably foreseen the appellants' reliance on the letter 81 because the
letter written to the lottery winners referenced Alaska Statutes section
38.05.035(b)(2), which requires express approval of a preference right by
the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources in order to
make it binding." The court also noted that because of the statute, the
letter could not, as a matter of law, grant the appellants a preference right,
since such a grant requires the commissioner's approval. 83
Alternatively, the court found that the letter granted only "the right to apply
for a preference right."'"
Atlas Assurance Co. of America v. Mistic s5 involved an innocent coinsured's right to be paid for a loss resulting from the intentional burning
down of a house by the other co-insured.' 86 Mistic and Rutzebeck,
spouses, owned as tenants in common a house that was insured by Atlas
Assurance Company for $42,000.'
Mistic refused to concede that
Rutzebeck had intentionally burned the house and sued Atlas for breach of
the insurance agreement.'88
The supreme court first held that Mistic could recover because her
rights under the insurance contract were severable. 8 9 The court limited

180. Id. at 357.
181. Id. at 356. The court identified the four elements of promissory estoppel:
"l)The action induced amounts to a substantial change of position;
2)it was either actually foreseen or reasonably foreseeable by the promisor;
3)an actual promise was made and itself induced the action or forbearance in reliance
thereon; and
4)enforcement is necessary in the interest of justice."
Id. (quoting Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1284 (Alaska 1985)).
182. Id. at 357.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 358.
185. 822 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1991).
186. Id. at 898. The trial judge entered summary judgment that Rutzebeck intentionally
burned down the house. Id.
187. Id. The damage to the house was estimated to be $100,000. First Interstate Bank
was the mortgagee of the house, and the loss payee on the policy. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 900 (basing its conclusion on the weight of modem authority which favors
recovery unless the insurance policy clearly states otherwise).
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her recovery, however, to half of the damages or half of the contract limits,
whichever was less."9
Regarding Atlas' contractual right to subrogation against the coinsureds, the court noted that according to the terms of the insurance
contract the insurer could not seek subrogation against Mistic where it had
not denied her claim. 9' Thus, by paying the co-insureds, Atlas could not
be subrogated for the $21,000 of the sum that was attributable to Mistic's
obligation on the deed of trust note. 92 Accordingly, the court found that
Atlas, which had received an assignment of the deed of trust note upon
paying the mortgage, stood in the mortgagee's position only as to half of
the $42,000 which it paid. 93
Finally, the court held that the parties' divorce and division of property
had no effect on Mistic's rights against Atlas because Mistic's "rights were
fixed as of the time of the insured loss."'' Thus, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision that Atlas had breached its contract with Mistic
when it accepted her husband's full payment of the deed of trust note
without paying her or crediting her with the value of the claim. 95
196
In Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v. FirstNational Bank of Anchorage,
the supreme court reversed the superior court's dismissal of Hagans, Brown
& Gibbs' ("Hagans") claim that the First National Bank breached an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when it refused to accept a
$175,000 settlement on behalf of Seair Alaska Airlines. The settlement
was to be used to satisfy a First National loan to Seair and pay the
attorneys' fees Seair owed Hagans 97
During settlement negotiations between First National, as Seair's
secured creditor, and Husky Oil Operations,198 First National requested
Hagans to reduce its legal fee from $70,000 to $25,000.99 When Hagans
refused, First National declined the Husky Oil $175,000 settlement

190. Id. at 901.
191. Id. at 902.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 903.
195. Id.
196. 810 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1991).
197. Id. at 1015-16. Hagans was representing Seair on a contingency basis when First
National began negotiating settlements. Id.
198. Seair and Husky Oil Operations were involved in a contract dispute in which the
superior court awarded Seair a $220,000 judgment. Seair later granted First National a
security interest in that $220,000 in return for a loan. Husky was in the process of
appealing the award during the settlement negotiations in question. Id. at 1016.
199. Id.
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offer.2 The Seair-Husky Oil appeal subsequently went to court, and the
court reversed judgment against Seair, leaving First National, Seair and
Hagans empty-handed.' °1
In holding that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case, the
supreme court opined that First National might be liable to Hagans if a jury
found that it acted in bad faith in refusing to accept the settlement offer in
order to coerce Hagans into lowering its fees. 2' The court further stated
that a duty of good faith and fair dealing would arise if First National
assumed the position of Seair in its pursuit of a settlement.0 3 The court
found evidence that First National assumed the position of Seair by taking
advice from Hagans, by tacitly approving the contingency fee agreement
of Hagans when deciding to accept Hagans' advice, and by treating its own
claim to the settlement as primary, rather than collateral. 20 4 The coilrt
found that these same facts led Hagans to believe that First National was
acting as a client, thus leading Hagans to believe that First National was
acting on behalf of Seair.2°5 As a result, the court held that Hagans had
produced sufficient evidence to defeat First National's motion for summary
judgment on Hagans' alternative claims of intentional and negligent
representation, and it reversed and remanded the case to the superior
court. 2°6

In Criss6y v. Alaska USA Federal Credit Union,2 7 credit union
members brought an action against a federally chartered credit union
alleging that the late fees charged on delinquent loan payments were
unlawful and were a form of interest that made the total interest charged
usurious." The supreme court held that federal law on the permissibility
of late charges preempted the plaintiff's state law claims on the issue for
a federally chartered credit union.m In analyzing the usury claim, the
court held that the members had again overlooked the preemptive effect of
federal law on the issue of the maximum allowable interest rate.21 0
However, the court stated that even if it was to consider the claim under

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 783 P.2d
1164, 1168 (Alaska 1989)).
203. Id. at 1018.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1018-19.
206. Id. at 1019.
207. 811 P.2d 1057 (Alaska 1991).
208. Id. at 1059.
209. Id. at 1058.
210. ld at 1060-61.
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the applicable federal law, a claim of usury would not be established.2 '
The court also noted that the issue of whether late fees might qualify as
interest was2 one
of first impression, and declined to address it in the
12
present case.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In 1991 the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals
decided constitutional law cases arising in many areas. The cases are
divided into the following categories: equal protection, double jeopardy,
Fourth Amendment search and seizure, due process and miscellaneous.
A. Equal Protection
The Alaska Supreme Court decided only one equal protection case in
1991. In State v. Anthony,13 the supreme court reversed the superior
court's finding that Alaska Statutes section 43.23.005(d), 1 4 which
renders incarcerated felons ineligible for permanent fund dividends,
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution.215 In
reversing the superior court, the supreme court evaluated three issues: the
constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment; the purposes
of the challenged statute; and the state's interest in pursuing its goals. 6
The court initially rejected the claimant's argument that the receipt or
denial of permanent fund dividends should be subjected to enhanced
scrutiny because the dividends constituted not just the right to receive a
check, but a protected interest in the natural resources of Alaska, as
well. 7 The court reasoned that the dividend was entitled only to
minimum protection under Alaska equal protection analysis because it was
merely an economic interest.2 '

211. Id. at 1061-62. The court noted that "[t]he Crisseys did not proffer any material
...to indicate that... the total amount of interest and late fees Alaska USA charged them
could possibly amount to a compensation rate greater than" the maximum allowable federal
compensation rate. Id. at 1062.
212. Id.
213. 810 P.2d 155 (Alaska 1991), reh'g granted, 816 P.2d 1377 (Alaska 1991).
214. ALAsKA STAT. § 43.23.005(d) (1990).
215. Anthony, 810 P.2d at 157.
216. Id. (applying a three-part test established in Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown,
687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984)).
217. Id. at 157-58.
218. Id. at 158. In distinguishing Gilman v. Martin, 662 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1983), which
held that a more stringent review may be required when use or disposal of natural resources
are concerned, the court stated: "[n]o constitutional provision elevates the status of a
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The court also ruled that because the individual interests at stake here
were minimal, the state needed only show that its objectives were
legitimate when it enacted the statute.219 The court held that denying
dividends to felons bore a fair and substantial relation to the state's goal of
funding the crime victim compensation fund and defraying the felon's
incarceration expenses.'
The court also held that distinguishing between felons who actually
serve jail time and those who do not bore a rational relation to the
compensation of crime victims because felons who serve time usually have
caused more harm than those receiving suspended sentences.22'
Upon rehearing, 2 the supreme court held that Alaska Statutes
section 43.23.005(d) did not violate the ex post facto clause of the Alaska
Constitution or the United States Constitution.2" The inmates argued
that the statute "makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after
its commission. 22 4 However, the court reasoned that a simple
disadvantage to a felon, if caused by a statute, does not automatically

invalidate the statute as an ex post facto law.2 5 The court reasoned that
because the purpose of the challenged statute is to raise funds for crime
victims rather than to punish felons, the statute does not violate the ex post
facto clause.226 The court found further evidence of the 227
statute's nonpunitive nature in that it did not affect the felon's sentence.

dividend entitlement to the level of a disposal of a state natural resource." Anthony, 810
P.2d at 158.
219. Anthony, 810 P.2d at 158.
220. Id. at 159-60. Since 1976, only two cases successfully invalidated enactments based
on a violation of the fair and substantial relation test. See Gilman, 662 P.2d 120; Turner
Constr. Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988).
221. Anthony, 810 P.2d at 161-62 (reiterating dicta that Alaska's Equal Protection Clause
is more protective than its counterpart in the United Stated Constitution and therefore there
was no violation of the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause). See
Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702, 706 (Alaska 1990). Alaska Statutes section
43.23.005(d) provides that only convicted felons who serve jail time are ineligible for
permanent fund dividends. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(d) (1990).
222. 816 P.2d 1377 (Alaska 1991).
223. Id. at 1378.
224. Id. (citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S.
167, 169-170 (1925)).
225. Anthony, 816 P.2d at 1378.
226. Id. (relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in De Veau v. Braisted,
363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960), which stated that "a statute enacted for valid regulatory purposes
rather than simply to punish individuals for their past conduct does not violate the ex post
facto clause").
227. Id. at 1379.
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B. Double Jeopardy
The Alaska Court of Appeals addressed double jeopardy issues in three
cases decided in 1991. In Whiteaker v. State, 2 a mistrial was declared
when the jury was unable to reach a verdict in the defendant's first-degree
murder trial. 9 At the defendant's retrial for first-degree murder, the jury
found her guilty of second-degree murder. The defendant appealed on
double jeopardy grounds, and the court of appeals reversed her
23
conviction. 0
In the first trial, the jury had been instructed, in accord with Dresnek
v. State,231 that it had to return a verdict on the greatest charge before it
returned a verdict on any of the lesser charges and that it could deliberate
on the charges in any order.2 The trial judge polled the jury to
determine if they were truly deadlocked, but refused to repoll the jury
about whether they had reached a decision on the most serious charge,
233
even after a juror asked the judge a question indicating that possibility.
The court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to a verdict on the
greater charge where the jury has decided that charge but is deadlocked on
the lesser-included offenses.'
The state argued that such a "partial
verdict" may represent merely a tentative agreement to acquit on the
greater charge, such agreement being subject to change upon further
discussion of lesser offenses. 5 The court rejected the state's argument,
noting that the state's concern was adequately met by the Dresnek
procedure 5 The court also rejected the state's arguments that partial
verdicts intrude on the province of the jury and increase the number of
mistrials. The court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in
concluding that a unanimous verdict could not be reached, and thus held

228. 808 P.2d 270 (Alaska CL App. 1991).
229. Id. at 271.
230. Id.
231. 697 P.2d 1059 (Alaska CL App. 1985), aff'd, 718 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1021 (1986).
232. Whiteaker, 808 P.2d at 271-72. The jury was instructed on all the lesser offenses
included in the charge for first-degree murder: second-degree murder, manslaughter and
criminally negligent homicide. Id. at 271.
233. Id. at 272-73. Immediately after the judge stated that he discharged the jury, one
of the jurors asked: "When you gave us instructions to come ... up with a verdict, we are
faced with the charge of first-degree and we considered many degrees. Is it possible to be
hung on one charge and not hung on another?" Id. at 273.
234. Id. at 274.
235. Id. at 275 (citing A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 465 N.E.2d 240, 243-44 (Mass.
1984); People v. Hickey, 303 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Mich. 1981)).
236. Id. at 276 (citing Stone v. Superior Court, 646 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1982); State v.
Pugliese, 422 A.2d 1319 (N.H. 1980)).
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that there was no manifest necessity to justify the trial judge's declaration
of a mistrial. 7
In determining the remedy, the court of appeals discussed Price v.
Georgia,'~8 which held that "when a defendant is improperly tried for a
jeopardy-barred offense, the error is not cured if the jury convicts the
defendant of only a lesser-included offense."' 9 Applying Price to the
instant case, the court concluded that the defendant cannot face trial on a
more serious offense than negligent homicide.m The court reasoned that
because the record was unclear about the charges on which the jury was
deadlocked, it must be presumed to be the least serious charge.241
Finally, the court held that the trial court may enter a conviction for the
least serious offense unless the defendant demonstrates a reasonable
probability that she would not have been convicted of the offense if she
had been tried on it without inclusion of the jeopardy-barred charge. 242
The court therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court with
instructions to enter judgment on the least serious offense unless the
defendant could demonstrate prejudice. 243
In Cross v. State,2' the court of appeals held that a mistrial should
not have been granted where the defendant's counsel had merely a
potential conflict of interest. The court held that the defendant's conviction
in a subsequent trial, therefore, was a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the federal and state constitutions. The fact that a defense
attorney's colleague had previously represented a defense witness did not
amount to a "manifest necessity," the standard for a mistrial.245
Moreover, the court distinguished Wheat v. United States.2 6 The
court of appeals noted that the defendant in Wheat sought to engage new

237. Id. at 278.
238. 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
239. Whiteaker, 808 P.2d at 278.
240. Id. at 279.
241. Id. (citing Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 374 (1963) (holding that doubts
about which offense is double jeopardy-barred must be resolved in favor of the citizen)).
242. Id. (citing Morris v. Matthews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986)).
243. Id. In dissent, Judge Coats argued that the majority of courts considering this issue
have adopted the rule that a court has no duty to accept a partial verdict on a greater offense
when a jury is unable to agree on the lesser-included offenses. Although the defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder at retrial, in the instant matter she could only be
convicted of negligent homicide: a windfall for this defendant. Although Judge Coats
favored the rule adopted by the majority, he did not believe, in the interests of fairness, that
it should be applied retroactively. Id. at 279-80. (Coats, J., dissenting).
244. 813 P.2d 691 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
245. Id. at 694-96.
246. 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (finding an actual conflict of interest where the defendant's
proposed counsel was concurrently representing co-defendants in a conspiracy charge).
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counsel, and did not involve interfering with an ongoing attorney-client
relationship. Further, Wheat did not involve the declaration of a
mistral.247 The court of appeals opined that the conflict of interest
question in this case "could in large measure have been addressed by a
thorough, on-record inquiry to assure that Cross fully understood his
situation and was nonetheless willing to proceed," rather than by a
declaration of a nistrial 2. 8
In Mitchell v. State,249 the court of appeals rejected the defendant's
challenge to her conviction on double jeopardy grounds. Mitchell lied on
an unemployment benefits application, and when this falsification was
discovered, she repaid the benefits she had received plus the fifty percent
penalty specified by law.2 0 Relying on the double jeopardy clauses of
the federal and state constitutions, Mitchell argued that the fifty percent
civil penalty barred her prosecution for five counts of unsworn
falsification? 5'
Relying on United States v. Halper,5 2 which held that the
government "may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise
formulas... without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment
for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis, ' z 3 the court of appeals
rejected her argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution barred her prosecution. Because the defendant had not
presented an argument based exclusively on the Alaska Constitution in her
brief, at oral argument the court declined to address her contention that the
Double Jeopardy Clause found in the Alaska Constitution provided broader
protection than did the United States Constitution.'
C. Search and Seizure
In 1991, only one conviction was reversed on the ground that a
warrantless search was unjustified. 25 In that case, Justice Moore, in
concurring with the majority, observed that the Alaska Constitution, with
its explicit right to privacy, provides broader protection from searches and

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Cross, 813 P.2d at 695.
Id. at 696.
818 P.2d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
ld. at 1164; see ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.390(f) (1990).
Mitchell, 818 P.2d at 1164.
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Id. at 446.
Mitchell, 818 P.2d at 1165.
Alaska v. Ricks, 816 P.2d 125 (Alaska 1991).
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seizures than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The remaining challenges based on warrantless searches were unsuccessful
in the Alaska Court of Appeals.
In Alaska v. Ricks, 56 the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the reversal
of the defendant's conviction for drug possession because of a warrantless
search of Ricks' jacket when it was out of his immediate reach. Ricks was
arrested, pursuant to a warrant, after three undercover police officers
witnessed the sale of drugs to an informant. Ricks had taken the drugs out
of his jacket during the sale, but was neither wearing nor near his jacket at
the time of his arrest. 7 The officers searched Ricks' jacket without a
search warrant and found drugs. Ricks appealed his conviction on the
ground that the evidence obtained in the warrantless search should have
been suppressed. Although the superior court found that the jacket was
"immediately associated" with Ricks, 8 and the search was therefore
justified, the court of appeals reversed, emphasizing that the jacket was not
in Ricks' "immediate control." 59 The supreme court affirmed the
reversal.2
In a concurring opinion, Justice Moore observed that article I, section
14 of the Alaska Constitution, especially when read in conjunction with the
right to privacy provision of article I, section 22, provides broader
protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 1 He stated that although an exception exists for searches
incident to a lawful arrest, the exception is only "justified in order to
protect the arresting officers' need to find weapons that the arrestee might
use to resist arrest or escape and to prevent the concealment or destruction
of evidence." 2 Therefore, the inquiry to be made is whether the area
in question was conceivably accessible to the arrestee.263 Justice Moore
concluded that since the jacket was not close enough to the arrestee for him
to have access to it, the warrantless search of his jacket was not
justified.2'4

256. 816 P.2d 125 (Alaska 1991).
257. Id.
258. 1& The superior court found "immediate association" of Ricks and his jacket
despite finding that the jacket was not under his "immediate control." Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. (Moore, J., concurring) (citing Wood & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138, 150
(Alaska 1977)).
262. Id. at 127-28 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763 (1969)).
263. Id. at 128 (Moore, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
264. Id. at 128-29 (Moore, J., concurring). However, Justice Moore disagreed with the
court of appeals' dicta that there is no limit on the time and circumstances in which a
warrantless search may be conducted, and therefore joined the court's order vacating the
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In Lord v. Wilcox,20 the supreme court denied a pro se prisoner's
request to overturn a summary judgment ruling and an award of attorneys'
fees in favor of the defendants, who included the police officers involved
in his arrest. 26 Lord, who had been convicted of rape, kidnapping and
assault, claimed that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights
when they arrested him and impounded his car without a search warrant or
probable cause.2 7 The supreme court upheld the superior court's finding
of probable cause because the victim's identification of Lord, Lord's hotel
room and his car "were sufficient for someone of reasonable caution to
believe Lord had sexually assaulted the alleged victim. '26 The supreme
court also determined that the warrant
obtained for Lord's arrest was
269
further evidence of probable cause.
The court further ruled that the impoundment of Lord's car was proper
because the officers had probable cause to believe the car contained
evidence of a crime and had impounded the car solely to preserve the
status quo until a search warrant was obtained. 2 0 With respect to Lord's
challenge to the court's award of attorneys' fees, the court held that Lord's
suit justified an exception to the general rule that attorneys' fees should not
be awarded against a pro se prisoner for bringing an unsuccessful civil
rights suit.27 ' The court ruled that the award was not an abuse of the trial
court's discretion because there was no evidence that Lord's civil rights
claims were brought in good faith.272
In Landers v. State,273 a defendant who was convicted of fourthdegree misconduct involving a controlled substance appealed the denial of
his motion to suppress evidence.274 After the police had received tips
that someone was growing marijuana at a certain house, a police officer
went to the house and walked around the outside.2 75 Later, two officers
returned to the house and talked to Bell, Landers' roommate. When Bell
invited the officers inside they detected an overwhelming odor of
marijuana. Bell told them that the marijuana was downstairs and that

lower court's opinion. Id. at 129 (Moore, J., concurring).
265. 813 P.2d 656 (Alaska 1991).
266. Id. at 657-58.
267. Id. at 658.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 658-59.
270. Id. at 659-60 (citing Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 (1975) (upholding a seizure and search of a vehicle taken to the police station without a warrant)).
271. Id. at 660.
272. Id.
273. 809 P.2d 424 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 424-25.
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Landers lived downstairs. The officers obtained a warrant to search the
house based on the testimony of the officers about the smell of marijuana
and Bell's statements, rather than the observations
the officers made while
z6
walking around the outside of the house. 2

Landers appealed the trial judge's conclusion that, assuming the
exterior search was illegal, that illegality should not result in the
suppression of evidence obtained from the legal search.277 The court of
appeals disagreed,' 8 and relying on Cruse v. State, 9 affirmed the
conviction, reasoning that the trial judge could have concluded that the

search warrant was not the product of any illegal activity.2 '

5
In Moore v. State,8'
the court of appeals upheld Moore's conviction

for cocaine possession.2 2 In affirming the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, the court first reasoned that the
officers had probable cause to conduct the challenged warrantless search
based on Moore's presence in a crack house, 283 the presence of a packet
of cocaine at her feet and her visible anxiety during the premises
search.'
The court also reasoned that the possible destruction of
evidence justified the warrantless search:2 5 "there was ample cause for
police to fear imminent destruction of any drugs or related evidence...
"
People in the house had already tried to escape through windows,
and the defendant knew the police suspected her of possession and easily
could have destroyed the evidence before the police obtained a
warrant.'

276. Id. at 425.
277. Id. at 426.
278. Id. at 427.
279. 584 P.2d 1141 (Alaska 1978) (holding that even assuming that an original search
of the trunk of a car was illegal, the search warrant was not a product of the results of the
illegal search and therefore the evidence obtained thereunder was admissible).
280. Landers, 809 P.2d at 426. There was substantial evidence that the police had made
efforts to investigate the tip before any illegal police activity. Also, once Bell consented
to allow the police into the residence, the information they obtained was not illegal. Id. at
426-27.
281. 817 P.2d 482 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
282. Id. at 484.
283. This factor alone will not establish probable cause. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
90-91 (1979). The court in Moore found that the officers viewed the circumstances in their
totality to find probable cause. Moore, 817 P.2d at 484.
284. Moore, 817 P.2d at 483-84.
285. Id. at 484 (citing Finch v. State, 592 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Alaska 1979) (stating criteria
that would justifyj a warrantless search under the destruction of evidence exception: the
amount of time needed to obtain a warrant, the ready destructibility of the evidence, and the
existence of information which indicates that the suspects are aware that the police are on
their trail)).
286. Id.
287. Id.
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In McGahan v. State,288 the court of appeals held that reasonable
suspicion justified a warrantless canine sniff of the exterior of a warehouse
that was accessible to the public. 9 The combination of suspicions in
this case -- the officers had received a tip that the warehouse owners did
not act as legitimate business people, had noticed that the warehouse was
unusually hot, and had seen that the renovations of the building were
consistent with those necessary to grow marijuana 9° -- were viewed by
the court as reasonable enough to warrant the canine sniff of the outside of
the building.2 9'
In Barrows v. State,2 the court rejected the defendant's appeal of his
conviction for driving while his license was revoked on the ground that the
police officer subjected him to an illegal investigatory stop when the officer
asked him for identification. The court first noted that not all encounters
between officers and private citizens are investigative stops amounting to
seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes.2 93 Only if the officer
somehow restrains the liberty of the person can a person be seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 294 The court found that the
officer had not seized the defendant when he approached his vehicle,
questioned him, and asked him for identification. The court specifically
cited the facts that the encounter took place on a public road, the officer
did not activate his overhead lights or instruct the defendant to stop, and
he did not put his car in such a position so as to block the defendant's
departure. Additionally, the officer posed questions to the defendant in a
conversational manner, did not display a weapon, and did not make any
threats.295

288. 807 P.2d 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
289. Id. at 511. The federal courts almost uniformly hold that sniffs of luggage and
other items (such as a garage, mail, and commercial storage facilities) are not searches. Id.
at 509 n.4. A few federal cases hold that reasonable suspicion will allow the sniff. Id. at
510 n.5. In Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that a luggage sniff was a search. However, it was deemed only a minimally
intrusive type of search, and one that can be used without obtaining a warrant if the officers
have reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1311.
290. McGahan, 807 P.2d at 511.
291. Id. Although the defendants were first-time felony offenders, the size and
sophistication of the operation justified the three-year sentences imposed. Id. at 512-13; see
ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(25) (1990 & Supp. 1991) (allowing a court to aggravate a
sentence when "the offense involve[s] large quantities of a controlled substance").
292. 814 P.2d 1376 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
293. Id. at 1378 (citing Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 363 (Alaska 1983)).
294. Id. The court stated that this is true "only if, in light of all the circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe that he or she was not free to leave or to break off the
questioning." Id. at 1378-79 (citing Waring, 670 P.2d at 364).
295. Id. at 1379.
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In Brown v. State,29 the court of appeals clarified the reach of
Reeves v. State,29' which suppressed evidence on the ground that opening
a balloon to determine its contents during a pre-incarceration inventory
search was illegal absent a warrant. The court of appeals distinguished
Reeves by noting that in Reeves the state never presented any evidence that
the officials who seized and searched the balloon had any cause to believe
the balloon contained contraband,298 whereas the state presented evidence
in Brown that the officer saw the object being passed from the visitor to the
prisoner, observed the defendant swallow the object, and then, after the
prisoner regurgitated the object, obtained a balloon which the officer knew
was of a type frequently used to carry illegal drugs. Thus, in the present
case, the warrantless search of the balloon
was valid under the plain view
299
exception to the warrant requirement.
In Williams v. State,3" the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's
conviction of first-degree murder. The defendant argued on appeal that
evidence obtained when the police entered his apartment should have been
suppressed because the warrantless entry was improper."0 ' The court,
however, found that the police officer's entry was proper under the
emergency aid doctrine because the officer had information that someone
had been assaulted and could be hurt or dead.3°
The defendant argued on appeal that because eight hours had elapsed
between the initial report of a possible homicide and the time when the
officer entered the apartment, the emergency aid doctrine could not be
invoked.3 The court rejected this argument, finding that the passage of
time, though relevant, was not determinative of the existence of an
emergency. 04 The court also rejected the argument that the time lapse

296. 809 P.2d 421 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
297. 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979).
298. Brown, 809 P.2d 422.
299. Id. at 423-24. The court based its decision on precedent involving situations where
an officer's actions were justified by the plain view doctrine since the officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that the object seized contained contraband. See Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730 (1983); Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1985).
300. 823 P.2d 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
301. Id. at 3.
302. Id. Three conditions must be met to invoke the emergency aid doctrine:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an
emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of
life or property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize
evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis approximating probable cause to
associate the emergency with the area or the place to be searched.
Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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prevented the officer from having a reasonable basis to associate the
emergency with the apartment because the officer
observed blood stains
30 5
and clothes around the window of the apartment.
D. Due Process
The Alaska Supreme Court decided two cases in 1991 addressing due
process issues, while the Alaska Court of Appeals decided one such case.

All three decisions reflect a broadening of due process rights under the
Alaska Constitution.
In the case of In re K.LJ., 3° the Alaska Supreme Court held that due
process requires that the court appoint an attorney for an indigent natural
parent who is contesting the termination of his parental rights and refusing

to give consent for the child's adoption.3

When the natural father

refused to consent to the adoption of the child by the mother's new
husband, the mother filed a motion to terminate the father's right to
consent. 3 The father requested the court to appoint counsel due to his
indigency. The court refused his request and later granted the motion to

terminate his parental rights.3

The supreme court began its analysis of what due process was required
under the Alaska Constitution's Due Process Clause310 by recognizing
that "Itihe private interest of a parent whose parental rights may be

305.
306.
307.
308.
Alaska

Id. at 4.
813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 286.
Id.at 277-78. The motion to terminate the father's consent was brought under
Statutes section 25.23.050 which states in part:
(a) Consent to adoption is not required of...
(2) a parent of a child in the custody of another, if the parent for a period of
at least one year has failed significantly without justifiable cause, including but not
limited to indigency,
(A) to communicate meaningfully with the child, or
(B) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or
judicial decree; ....
ALAsKA STAT. § 25.23.050(a)(2) (1991).
309. K.LJ., 813 P.2d at 278.
310. Id. at 279-82; see ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 7. The court applied the balancing test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355
(1976), and adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in Keyes v. Humana Hospital Alaska,
Inc., 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988). In the latter case, the Alaska Supreme Court stated:
Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally involves consideration
of three distinct factors: the private interest affected by the official action; the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that
additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
Id. at 353 (citations omitted).
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terminated via an adoption petition is of the highest magnitude."3 .
Accordingly, "[t]he right to the care, custody, companionship, and control
of one's children 'undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful
3 12
countervailing interest, protection.'
The court also found that the state has an articulated interest both in the
child and in the rights of an indigent parent.31 3 Although the court
conceded that the state has an interest in avoiding the cost of appointed
counsel, it concluded that the interest did not outweigh the private interests
at stake. 314 Tbe court also found that the risk of erroneous deprivation
is high in adoption cases when counsel is not provided.3 5
After balancing these factors, the court held that there existed sufficient

state involvement to require court-appointed counsel. 16 In so doing, the

Alaska Supreme Court noted that it favors a bright-line determination of
the right to counsel as opposed to the case-by-case approach 1 7 taken by
the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social
3 1 8 but extended the right only to indigent parents who are
Services,
defending the termination of their parental rights.31 9

311. K., 813 P.2d at 279.
312. Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
313. Id. at 279-80. Alaska Statutes section 25.23.005 states: "This chapter shall be
liberally construed to the end that the best interests of adopted children are promoted. Due
regard shall be given to the rights of all persons affected by a child's adoption." ALASKA
STAT. § 25.23.005 (1991).
314. K.L.., 813 P.2d at 280 (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28).
315. Id. at 280-81. The court relied on Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979),
which stated the following:
Although the legal issues in a given case may not be complex, the crucial
determination of what will be best for the child can be an exceedingly difficult one
as it requires a delicate process of balancing many complex and competing
considerations that are unique to every case. A parent who is without the aid of
counsel in marshalling and presenting the arguments in his favor will be at a decided
and frequently decisive disadvantage which becomes even more apparent when one
considers the emotional nature of child custody disputes, and the fact that all of the
principals are likely to be distraught.
Id at 896; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30 (observing that parents thrust into distressing
situations are likely to be overwhelmed if they lack the assistance of counsel); In re Jay,
197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that appointing counsel furthers the
state's interest in making the factfinding process more accurate).
In the present case, a lawyer would have been able to inform the natural father that the
superior court had erred when it held that indigency was not a legitimate justification for
failure to support a child. Additionally, the father did not know how to present evidence
or cross-examine witnesses. K.LJ., 813 P.2d at 281. Furthermore, the court noted that the
involvement of the state in the adoption process is continuous; it is not a purely private
dispute. Id. at 283.
316. KUL., 813 P.2d at 283.
317. Id. at 282 n.6.
318. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
319. K.L., 813 P.2d at 282 n.7. The court acknowledged that it was merely following
the trend of numerous court decisions that have recognized the "importance of parental
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In Gudmundson v. State"-° the defendants were convicted of wanton
waste, a misdemeanor, for abandoning the carcass of a Dall sheep ram they
had killed on21Sheep Mountain when they realized the mountain was closed
for hunting.

The defendants sought post-conviction relief, arguing that they were
denied due process because they were placed in a "cruel dilemma" of
committing a crime whether they acted or not on Sheep Mountain: if they
had removed the sheep from the mountain, they would have been

criminally liable for illegal transportation of game; if they had left the
carcass they would have been liable for wanton waste.'
The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's denial of post-conviction relief on the
ground that the defendants' due process claims had been abandoned as a
result of inadequate briefing."
The defendants petitioned for rehearing on the ground that their briefs
were necessarily inadequate because there had been no legal authority for
their position due to their unique factual situation.324 The court of
appeals remanded the case to the district court for determination of whether
the defendants acted on a reasonable mistake of law.32 5 The supreme
court then agreed to hear the case to determine whether the defendants
were entitled to post-conviction relief based on the vagueness or
unconstitutionality of the laws in question.326

rights and finality of terminating them." Id.; see, e.g., V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42, 45
(Alaska 1983); Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska 1979); Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499
F.2d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1974). Finally, the court found that the holding in this case
strengthened similar protections it had previously recognized. K.LJ., 813 P.2d at 284-86.
See In re Adoption of B.S.L., 779 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1989) (holding that a prospective
adoptive parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a natural parent's failure
to communicate with the child was without justifiable cause); Johnson v. Johnson, 544 P.2d
1028 (Alaska 1976) (Individuals who appeal from a divorce proceeding which resulted in
an award of custody of the children to the other party may do so at public expense.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978). The court also noted that in Alaska the court is authorized
to appoint counsel for a juvenile without counsel, for biological parents in adoption cases
pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, for an indigent parent in a minor guardianship
case, and for indigent fathers in actions to establish paternity where the mother has state
representation. K.LJ., 813 P.2d at 285-86.
320. 822 P.2d 1328 (Alaska 1991).
321. Id. at 1329.
322. Id. The state appealed the sentences imposed, arguing that they were less than the
statutory minimum. Id. The court of appeals remanded the case with instructions to impose
the legal sentence. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1330.
326. Id. at 1330 & n.2. The supreme court addressed the court of appeals' denial of
post-conviction relief. Meanwhile, the court of appeals granted rehearing and remanded to
the district court on a mistake of question of law. Id.
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The supreme court first held that a constitutional challenge to a statute
need not be raised before trial under either Alaska Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12 or 16.327 The court also rejected the state's contention that
the defendants had waived their right to challenge their convictions on due
process grounds because of their failure to raise the issue prior to or at
trial."
Instead, the court held that the due process challenge is
jurisdictional and not subject to Criminal Rule 12(b), which mandates the
raising of certain defenses before trial but allows the court to take notice
of jurisdictional objections at any time during the pendency of the
proceedings.3 29
The court agreed with the defendants that the application of the wanton
waste statute and the illegal transportation regulation where the game had
330
been illegally taken impermissibly impinged due process protections,
and directed that the defendants' convictions be vacated. 331 "After a big
game animal has been illegally killed a hunter should not have to
incriminate himself, nor subject himself to liability for further criminal
332
acts.

The defendant in Ahtuangaruak v. State333 was convicted of driving
while intoxicated and appealed the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress the results of his breath test taken following his arrest. 3 4 The
court of appeals initially noted that under Alaska precedent, 335
Ahtuangaruak acquired a due process right to an independent test of the
results once lie submitted to a breath test. 336 The state may honor this
right in at least two different ways, either by preserving a second breath
sample for later testing or by offering the person help in obtaining an
independent test. 337 Once a person has accepted this offer or waived the
right to an independent test, he or she is asked by the police officer to sign
338
a document to that effect.
The officer in this case attempted to advise the defendant of his right
to an independent test, but the defendant refused to sign the document as
327. Id. at 1331 (citing Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 527 (Alaska 1974)).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1332; see ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 12(b).
330. Gudmundson, 822 P.2d at 1333.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 820 P.2d 310 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
334. Id.
335. See Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673 (Alaska 1990);
Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
336. Ahtuangaruak, 820 P.2d at 310.
337. Id. (citing Gundersen, 792 P.2d at 676-77; Serrano, 649 P.2d at 258 n.5).
338. Id. at 311.
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he had minimal ability to understand English and did not understand the
officer's explanation of the blood test option. The district court rejected
the defendant's argument that his inability to understand the officer
deprived him of a "meaningful opportunity to exercise the right granted by
Gundersen and Serrano."339 The court found that the government met
its obligation to make reasonable efforts to offer an independent test to the
arrestee, and therefore denied the defendant's motion to suppress the test
results.mo
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the due process clause of
the Alaska Constitution required suppression of the breath test.34' The
court noted that an arrestee's waiver of the right to an independent test
must be "'knowingly and intelligently made."''4 2 The defendant's lack
of understanding of the English language precluded him from having a
meaningful opportunity to choose an independent blood test. The court
noted that by choosing to offer independent tests, rather than preserving a
second breath sample, the state "[ran] the risk that it will be barred from
introducing evidence of the Intoximeter result if the arrestee, because of
to acquire a basic
intoxication, a language barrier, or any other reason, fails
3
understanding of the right to an independent test.'4
E. Miscellaneous
Five other cases involving constitutional issues were decided by Alaska
appellate courts in 1991. These cases addressed the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial, the right of a defendant to testify on his own behalf,
the constitutional powers of grand juries, the right of a defendant to be
tried only for those crimes presented in the indictment, and governmental
"taking" of property under both the Alaska Constitution and the United
States Constitution.
In State v. Mouser,' the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a
twenty-month delay between the filing of charges against Mouser and his

339. Id.
340. Id. The lower court looked at two factors in determining the reasonableness of the
government's efforts:
(1) the arresting officer had made a good faith, reasonable attempt to explain the

Id.

right to an independent blood test to Ahtuangaruak, and (2) the officer had allowed
Ahtuangaruak to telephone both a relative and the Public Defender Agency in an
attempt to find someone who could explain the test to Ahtuangaruak.

341. I& at 311-12 (citing ALASKA CONST. art I, § 7).
342. Id. at 311 (quoting Gundersen, 792 P.2d at 677).
343. Id.
344. 806 P.2d 330 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

arrest did not constitute unreasonable pre-accusation delay in violation of
the Due Process Clause because the defendant "failed to make an adequate
showing of actual prejudice. ' 3 5 In such a challenge, a defendant must
show "not only '[t]he absence of a valid reason for the delay,' but also the
fact of prejudice."'
The court held that a showing of possible prejudice
was not enough; actual prejudice must be shown, consisting of "a
particularized showing that the unexcused delay was likely to have a
specific and substantial adverse impact on the outcome of the case."
Moreover, the court noted that "generalized claims of lost witnesses and
faded memories" are insufficient to establish actual prejudice. 8
The court then found that although the twenty-month delay before
Mouser's arrest must be deemed to be prejudicial, this alone was not
presumptively a Sixth Amendment violation. 9 The court indicated that
under the Alaska Constitution a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial does not attach until formal accusation. 5 0 Furthermore, even
when this right attaches and the delay is presumptively prejudicial,351 the
court must balance "'the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant.""'52 Furthermore, the court
noted that Sixth Amendment analysis also requires an examination of a
defendant's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial and the extent of
prejudice suffered by the defendant.3 53 The court of appeals remanded
the case for consideration of these issues.3 4
LaVigne v. State 5 involved a criminal defendant who was denied an
opportunity to testify on his own behalf at trial. The lower courts held that
the defendant's rights under the United States Constitution and the Alaska
Constitution had not been violated because the defendant refused to offer
proof of what his testimony would have been, thereby failing to establish

345. Id. at 336.
346. Id. (quoting York v. State, 757 P.2d 68, 70 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)).
347. Id. at 337. The court also noted that the defendant's anxiety does not constitute
prejudice under a due process analysis. Id. at 337 n.3.
348. Id. at 337-38.
349. Id. at 340.
350. Id. at 339. In this case the right attached when the district attorney's office filed
the information against Mouser. Id.
351. The court found the twenty-month delay presumptively prejudicial under both the
United States and Alaska Constitutions. Id. at 340-41.
352. Id. at 340 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
353. Id. at 341-42.
354. Id. at 342. The court distinguished Alaska's seminal speedy trial cases, Rutherford
v. State, 486 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1970), and Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682 (Alaska 1970),
by noting that these cases were decided before the development of Barker's balancing test.
Mouser, 806 P.2d at 340.
355. 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991).
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that he was prejudiced by the violation.356 The Alaska Supreme Court
reversed and remanded holding that "the outcome-affecting harmless error
357
test," should not have been applied.
The court first held that the right to testify is a fundamental
constitutional right grounded in the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.35 8 Since the right may be waived only by the defendant
himself, LaVigne's attorney's unilateral decision to waive the right did not
bind the accused.35 9 Next, the court explained the two-step process
involved in the application of the appropriate "harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. First, after showing that the defendant's right
to testify has been denied, the defendant must show that "he would have
offered relevant testimony had he been allowed to testify . . . . [T]his
preliminary burden is a minimal one.''361 Second, if the initial burden is
met, "the burden will then shift to the state to show that denial of his
constitutional right was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.' 36'
The court noted that there are not likely to be many cases in which the
error can be shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but, in order
to avoid such cases, trial judges should take steps to assure that a
defendant's decision not to take the stand is a knowing and voluntary
362
one.
O'Leary v. Superior Court,363 involved two appeals concerning an
investigative grand jury report subject to prepublication judicial review
under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.1. In O'Leary the supreme
court held that Rule 6.1 does not violate the Anti-Suspension Clause of
article 1, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution, which mandates that the
power of grand juries to investigate and make recommendations may never
be suspended.3 4 In the companion case of In re Special GrandJury, the

356. d at 218.
357. Id. The United States Supreme Court recognized in Chapman v. California that
some rights are so basic that their violation can never be deemed harmless error, and that
for some less significant constitutional violations, the error is only harmless if found
"'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. at 220 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). The Alaska Supreme Court restated the standard for constitutional
errors in Love v. State. Ma (citing Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969)).
358. Id. at 219.
359. 1& at 220.
360. Id.at 221.
361. Id. (citation omitted).
362. Id. at 222. The trial judge should "make an on-the-record inquiry after the close
of the defendant's case, although out of the jury's hearing, into whether a nontestifying
defendant understands and voluntarily waives his right." Id.
363. 816 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1991).
364. Id. at 165. The suspension clause of article 1, section 8 provides: 'The power of
grand juries to investigate and make recommendations concerning the public welfare shall
never be suspended." ALASKA CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
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court held that the superior court erred in ordering the entire report
involved released.30
At the request of Alaska's Attorney General, the grand jury for the
third judicial district investigated the conduct of the Anchorage School
District, Police Department and District Attorney's Office with respect to
the investigation of a Bartlett High School teacher's sexual relationships
with students. 3 " Under Rule 6.1, grand jury reports that may damage the
reputation of a person are subject to judicial review to determine whether
"(1) they concern the public safety and welfare, (2) they improperly
infringe upon a constitutional right of any person, and (3) the factual
findings they contain are supported by substantial evidence. '367 The
supreme court ruled that this procedure did not violate the Anti-Suspension
Clause.3 6 The court reasoned that the grand jury is a part of the judicial
branch and is subject to evidentiary rules and constitutional limitations.369
Moreover, the court found that the Due Process Clause was intended to
protect reputational interests, and thus the requirement that grand jury
recommendations be based on substantial evidence is derived from the Due
Process Clause.370
The court further stated that Rule 6.1 was intended to achieve "a proper
balance between the values inherent in the grand jury's investigative and
recommending function on the one hand and the constitutional rights of
individuals on the other."' The court noted that construing the AntiSuspension Clause to prohibit the review of grand jury reports
would be
37 2
inconsistent with persuasive extra-jurisdictional case law.

365. O'Leary, 816 P.2d at 165.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 166.
368. Id. at 169-70.
369. Id. at 167-68 (citing Stem v. Morgenthau, 465 N.E.2d 349 (N.Y. 1984) (holding
that grand juries must follow procedural and evidentiary rules in New York Criminal
Procedural Law and other statutes); People v. Cirillo, 419 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1979) (holding that
the court has an inherent power to amend a grand jury indictment on a defendant's motion
to protect a constitutional right). The anti-suspension language of the Alaska Constitution
is borrowed from the Missouri Constitution, which in turn is based on the New York
Constitution. O'Leary, 816 P.2d at 167 & n.6.
370. Id. at 169-70.
371. Id. at 171.
372. Id. at 172-73 (citing Wood v. Hughes, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961); Matter of Interim
Report of the Grand Jury, 553 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1977)). The court justified its order
releasing portions of the grand jury report on the basis of their probable effect on an
upcoming municipal election; it justified ordering the release of the names of the interested
parties because of a lack of adverse effect on those parties. The court continued to withhold
the release of the grand jury's discussion of the allegations against two of the teachers
because the allegations were unsubstantiated and release would otherwise "improperly
infringe the constitutionally protected reputational interests of the teachers." Id. at 173-75.
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The defendant in Michael v. State373 appealed his conviction for
second-degree assault, claiming he had been convicted of a crime different
from the offense alleged in the grand jury indictment. Michael was
charged with thirteen counts of assault in the first degree 74 and found
guilty of two counts of second-degree assault.3 75 The court of appeals
noted that a "conviction for an offense different than the one charged is a
fatal variance, and requires reversal, 376 but affirmed the conviction,
holding that Michael had sufficient notice of the state's intention to rely
upon a lesser-included offense theory and that the indictment was
sufficiently clear to allow him to assert double jeopardy if ever charged
with the same offense again.'
The supreme court declined to accept the view of most states that a
fatal variance requires reversal of a conviction "only when it deprives the
defendant of fair notice of the charges against him, or leaves the defendant
open to the risk of double jeopardy., 378 The court noted that article I,
section 8, of the Alaska Constitution 379 is identical to the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and therefore found it
appropriate to follow the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
variance. 380 Following the United States Supreme Court, the Alaska
Supreme Court drew the distinction "'between a departure in the proof
from the indictment sufficiently great to be regarded as a constructive
amendment, which is regarded as a reversible error in itself, and a mere
variance, which
is reversible error only if prejudicial to the
' ' 38 '
defendant.
The court held that the variance in this case was significant enough 3to
83
be fatal. 382 The grand jury made no charge of second-degree assault,
and defendant's conviction resulted from a departure from the indictment

373. 805 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1991).
374. Id.at 372; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.200 (1989).
375. Michael, 805 P.2d at 372; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.210(a)(2) (1989).
376. Michael, 805 P.2d at 373 (citing Michael v. State, 767 P.2d 193, 201 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1988), rev'd, 805 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1991)) (citation omitted).
377. Id.at 373 & n.8.
378. Id.at 373 (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 19.2(h), at 468 (1984)).
379. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury
....
" ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 8.
380. Michael, 805 P.2d at 373.
381. Id (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRMINAL
§ 127, at 418-19 (2d ed. 1982)).
382. Id.at 374.
383. The court noted that the acquittal in this case points out the importance of careful
pleading under the criminal law of the state. Id.at 374 n.13.
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which clearly prejudiced his right to be tried only on the charges presented
in the indictment.3"4 The conviction was reversed and remanded for
entry of a judgment of acquittal.3"
In State Department of Natural Resources v. Arctic Slope,386 the
supreme court held that a statutory requirement that oil drillers submit well
data to the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") 387 is not an
unconstitutional taking of property. The court first established that oil well
data constitutes trade secrets and is protected as property under both the
Alaska Constitution and the United States Constitution. 8 In determining
whether the government action constituted a "taking," the court applied
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.389 which identified three relevant factors:
'the character of the government action, its economic impact, and its
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. ' '
The
court concluded that the action was not a "taking" and that "interference
with reasonable investment-backed expectations" was the determinative
factor in so concluding. 39' In determining that a "taking" had occurred,
the trial court had found that the companies challenging the statute had
reasonable expectations that DNR would use the data only to determine
392
whether to extend confidentiality, not for its own internal purposes.
The supreme court concluded that the assumption was not a "reasonable
investment-backed expectation" because the statute and regulations did not
contain any guarantees or express promises that DNR would not use the
data for internal departmental purposes. 393 Additionally, the court noted
that the companies were on notice that DNR
did use confidential data in
34
its decisionmaking on oil and gas leasing.
The supreme court also rejected the companies' argument that DNR
could exercise only proprietary functions, and that its use of the well data

384. Id. at 374.
385. Id. The court made it clear that the acts alleged in the indictment were entirely
different from those resulting in conviction so that the act under which the defendant was
convicted could not be a lesser-included offense. Id. at 374 n.12.
386. No. S-3400, 1991 Alas. LEXIS 132 (Alaska Nov. 22, 1991) (rehearing petition filed
Dec. 5, 1991).
387. When the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission ("AOGCC") issues a
permit to drill, they may require well drill reports. See ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.035(a)
(1985).
388. Arctic Slope, 1991 Alas. LEXIS 132, at *10-13.
389. 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
390. Arctic Slope, 1991 Alas. LEXIS 132, at *13 (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005).
391. Id. at *14.
392. Id. at *15.
393. Id. at *16.
394. Id.
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was not justified by the police power.395 DNR implemented the
constitutional mandate that the legislature "provide for the utilization,
development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the
'
State... for the maximum benefit of its people."396
The court stated that
DNR's assessment of state oil and gas resources served two legitimate
government objectives: (1) "knowledge of the production potential of state
land... is critical to DNR's determination of where development should
occur and where preservation is appropriate, ' '39 and (2) "knowledge of
the oil and gas production potential of the state's lands promotes the state's
economic welfare by maximizing the amount it receives for the lease of its
lands. ' 398 Therefore, the court held that DNR's purpose to maximize the
income from leasing state land was within the police power.3"
V. EMPLOYMENT LAW
The bulk of the employment law decisions in 1991 concerned the
issues of workers' compensation and disability benefits. For the most part,
these cases preserved or expanded the rights of injured employees, through
doctrines such as the presumption of compensability. 4 The court also
decided a few cases addressing other issues arising out of the employment
relationship. For example, the court issued an important opinion involving
settlement of wage and hour claims! °' The cases involving workers'
compensation will be reviewed first, followed by other employment law
cases.
In Sokolowski v. Best Western Golden Lion Hotel,4 2 the Alaska
Supreme Court "adopt[ed] the special hazard exception to the going and
coming rule 4 3 in workers' compensation cases, and [held] that the
presumption of compensability' applies to the factual determination

395. Id. at *22-23.
396. Id. at *23 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. VI1, § 2).

397. Id.
398. Id. at *24.

399. Id. at *25.
400. See infra note 404.
401. McKeown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 820 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1991). See infra page

170.

402. 813 P.2d 286 (Alaska 1991).
403. The going-and-coming rule states generally that travel between work and home will
be considered a personal activity for workers' compensation purposes. Id. at 290.
404. Alaska Statutes section 23.30.120(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this
chapter it is presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that
(1) the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter;
(2) sufficient notice of the claim has been given;
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necessary to decide whether the claim falls within that exception. '' °0
The claimant, Sokolowski, fell and broke her wrist on her way to the
Golden Lion, her place of employment.4 6 Sokolowski was jaywalking
across thirty-sixth Avenue in Anchorage, from the IRS parking lot in which
most Golden Lion employees parked, and slipped on ice covering the
avenue.407 The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied
Sokolowski relief because it concluded that the "special hazard"
exception 408 to the going-and-coming rule would not apply as
Sokolowski could have taken an alternate route to reach the Golden
Lion.40
On appeal, the supreme court determined that a special hazard
exception would apply in Alaska, as it does in other states, because it
facilitates the purpose of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act: "to
provide injured workers with a simple and speedy remedy to compensate
them for work related injuries. '41 ° The court held that under Alaska law,
a three-prong test would be employed to determine the exception's
applicability: (1) the injury must have a causal relationship to the
employment; (2) the hazard causing the injury must be "'distinctive in
nature or quantitatively greater than risks common to the public"'; and (3)
the employee must be using a normal or usual route to work.41
The court also determined that the presumption of compensability
should apply in determining each of the special hazard exception's three
required elements. In applying this exception, the Board must determine

(3) the injury was not proximately caused by the intoxication of the injured
employee or proximately caused by the employee being under the influence of drugs
unless the drugs were taken as prescribed by the employee's physician;
(4) the injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured
employee to injure or kill self or another,
ALASKA STA'T. § 23.30.120 (1990).
405. Sokolowski, 813 P.2d at 294 (footnote added).
406. Id. at 288.
407. Id. at 289.
408. The "special hazard" exception
has been applied when the "off-premises point at which the injury occurred lies on
the only route, or at least on the normal route, which employees must traverse to
reach the plant, and that therefore the special hazards of that route become the
hazards of the employment."
Id. at 290 (quoting 1 ARTHuR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 15.13, at 4-22, (Desk
ed. 1990) (footnote omitted)).
409. Id.
410. Id. (citing Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Roberts & Babler, 747 P.2d 528, 531
(Alaska 1987)).
411. Id.at 291 (quoting General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Bd., 546 P.2d 1361, 1364 (1976)). The court noted that a risk may be greater to an
employee than to the general public when the employee uses a different route than the
general public, and that route is more dangerous that the general public's route. Id. at 294.
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evidentiary issues and therefore the claimant should be entitled to the
presumption. 1
In Summers v. Korobkin Construction,13 the supreme court held that
a worker was entitled to a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act
even though his employer had paid his outstanding medical expenses.
Henry Summers injured his neck while in the employ of Korobkin
Construction and incurred medical expenses in the amount of $2,000.' 4
Although Korobkin's insurance paid Summers' bills, the company refused
to acknowledge the injury's compensability.4 5 Summers filed his injury
claim with the Board, but the Board refused to hear his claim on the basis
that it had discretionary authority
to refuse to hear claims under Alaska
16
Statutes section 23.30.110(c)
The supreme court reversed, holding that the Board lacked such
discretion under section 23.30.110(c); rather, a hearing must be held after
one is requested.417 The court also found that Alaska Statutes section
23.30.105 required only a work-related injury as a pre-requisite for filing
a claim under the Alaska Workers'
Compensation Act; unpaid medical
418
expenses are not necessary.
In LeSuer-Johnson v. Rollins-Burdick Hunter of Alaska,4 19 the
supreme court held that an employee injured while playing in a companysponsored softball game was entitled to workers' compensation
benefits.4 ° The claimant argued that the injury arose "out of and in the
course of employment" because her employer provided equipment and
uniforms, paid the team's league fee, and encouraged all of its employees
to either play on the team or support the team as spectators. 421
The court held that the game was an employer-sanctioned activity. The
court also ruled that the workers' compensation statute applies to facilities
other than remote job sites, based on the fact that the Alaska Legislature
could have easily restricted the provision if it so intended.42 2

412. Id. at 292.
413. 814 P.2d 1369 (Alaska 1991).
414. Id. at 1370.
415. Id. Unless compensability is acknowledged, compensation for any future claims is
not guaranteed. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1371-72. In so holding, the court implicitly relied on a California court's
holding that lack of current treatment would not bar a claim. Id. at 1372 (citing Zeeb v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 432 P.2d 361 (1967) (en banc)).
419. 808 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1991).
420. Id. at 267.
421. Id.
422. Id. Alaska Statutes section 23.30.265(2) provides: "'arising out of and in the course
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Accordingly, since the company paid the league fee, thereby making the
facility available to its employees, the field was an employer-provided
4
facility, and the company was liable for the employee's injuries. 2
In Lajiness v. H.C. Price Construction Co.,424 the supreme court held
that the Board did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the claimant's
attempt to call an unlisted witness to testify, but that the Board erred in
excluding two weeks' pay from its wage rate determination of the
claimant's damages. 4 5 Lajiness injured his knee while employed by
H.C. Price Construction Company, and sought an adjustment of his claim
of temporary total disability benefits. 4 2 Thereafter, during three of four
prehearing conferences Lajiness attended, the parties' witnesses were
discussed.427 When Lajiness' hearing came before the Board, he
attempted to call an unlisted witness to testify,4 28 but the Board sustained
Price Construction's objection to this call.429
The supreme court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow Lajiness to call this additional witness because the
prehearing conferences did not discuss the possibility of this witness being
called.43 The Board's refusal to allow the witness was a reasonable
exercise of its discretion to control the proceedings before it. 43 1
The court also found that the Board's exclusion of two weeks' pay
from its determination of Lajiness' wage rate was improper because it
unreasonably and speculatively predicted future criminal behavior. 32
The exclusion was initially made based on the fact that Lajiness was
incarcerated in a halfway house for two weeks due to a driving while
intoxicated charge. 33 The court remanded the case to the Board to

of employment' includes... employer-sanctioned activities at employer-provided facilities."
ALASKA STAT. §23.30.265(2) (1990).
423. LeSuer-Johnson, 808 P.2d at 267.
424. 811 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1991).
425. Id. at 1069-70.
426. Id. at 1068.
427. Id. at 1068-69.
428. Id. at 1069.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1069 n.2.
432. Id. at 1070. In holding the Board's exclusion improper, the court stated:
[wihether Lajiness would have violated any laws during 1988, and
whether, as a result of any violation, he would have been incarcerated for
any period of time during 1988, are both uncertain possibilities which
cannot furnish a basis for the Board's exclusion of the two weeks worth
of wages in the case at bar.
Id.
433. Id. One week of the incarceration occurred while Lajiness was absent from work
due to his knee injury; the other week occurred after he was able to return to work. Id.
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recalculate Lajiness' wage rate determination after including the two week
period of incarceration.4
In Adamson v. University of Alaska,435 the supreme court held that
the Board's failure to apply a presumption of compensability to a claim for
continuing chiropractic care was an error,436 but that the error was
harmless because substantial evidence was proffered to rebut the
presumption.437 The court noted that since Municipality of Anchorage v.
Carter4 38 had acknowledged the right to continuing medical care for
palliative treatment, there should be a presumption of compensability for
such care.439 The court also reasoned that the claimant's failure to prove
actual prejudice precluded appellate review of whether "it was prejudicial
to refuse to admit the excluded evidence," because failure to do so
constituted a waiver of this claim of error."
In Olson v. AIC/Martin J.V"4 the supreme court held that the Board
erred in not applying the presumption of compensability when an employer
disputed temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation already
awarded. 4 2 In accord with Bailey v. Litwin Corp.,4 the court
reasoned that an employee remains temporarily totally disabled unless the
employer introduces substantial evidence to rebut the presumption. 4 In
Olson, the court held that the Board erroneously defined temporary total
disability, stating that "the ability to perform any kind of work does not
determine whether [TTD] has ended. Rather ... the Board must consider
Olson's earning potential and the availability of employment.""
The
court concluded that Olson's TTD benefits did not cease due to his
employment in a retread shop.44 The court remanded the issue of
434. Id.
435. 819 P.2d 886 (Alaska 1991).
436. Id. at 894.
437. Id. at 891.
438. 818 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1991). See infra page 163.
439. Adamson, 819 P.2d at 894. Justices Compton and Moore noted in their concurrence
that "[t]o presume that a claim for continuing treatment or care is compensable is quite
different from presuming that continued treatment or care is medically indicated," and that
this portion of the majority opinion should thus be disregarded. Id. at 895-96 (Compton &
Moore, J.J., concurring).
440. Id. at 889. The court also affirmed the Board's finding that Adamson's back injury
was not work-related, noting that the Board has discretionary power to give the testimony
of particular doctors more weight than others. Id. at 893.
441. 818 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1991).
442. Id. at 672.
443. 713 P.2d 249, 252 (Alaska 1986) (where claimant's return to work at a position
with a higher salary than before the injury was sufficient evidence for the employer to
overcome the presumption of continuing compensability).
444. Olson, 818 P.2d at 672-74.
445. Id. at 673.
446. Id. at 674. The court quoted Professor Larson:
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continuing medical benefits to the Board because the Board failed to apply
the presumption. 7
In Kirby v. Alaska Treatment Center, 8 the supreme court reiterated

that the presumption of compensability applies to claims for vocational

rehabilitation." 9 To be eligible for a rehabilitation plan, however, the
court held that an employee must suffer from a permanent disability and
must be precluded by that disability from returning to suitable gainful
employment.4 50 Kirby, a former swimming instructor, received TTD
benefits and applied for rehabilitation benefits after contracting reactive
airway disease due to chlorine exposure."' The Board denied Kirby's
application for rehabilitation benefits because she was found able
to obtain
4 52
"suitable gainful employment" as a secretary or receptionist.
The court agreed with the Board's determination that Kirby suffered
a permanent disability but that the disability. did not preclude her from
returning to "suitable gainful employment. 45 3 The court rejected Kirby's
argument that the twenty-five percent reduction in income did not restore
her "as nearly as possible" to her former earnings because by her third year
of employment she would have been suffering from only a sixteen percent
reduction. 4 4 The court interpreted the words "as nearly as possible" in

former Alaska Statutes section 23.30.265(28) to allow a sixteen to thirty
percent reduction of former earnings.455 This interpretation is consistent
with recent statutory amendments which provide that remunerative

"'The essence of the test is the probable dependability with which claimant can sell
his services in a competitive labor market, undistortedby such factors as business
booms, sympathy of a particularemployer or friends, temporary good luck, or the
superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his crippling handicaps."'
Id. (quoting 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.51, at 10-53 (Desk Ed.
1990) (emphasis added)).
447. Id. at 676.
448. 821 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1991).
449. Id. at 129 (citing Municipality of Anchorage v. Carter, 818 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1991);
Wien Air v. Kramer, 807 P.2d 471 (Alaska 1991)): See infra page 163.
450. Id; see ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(c) (1984).
451. Kirby, 821 P.2d at 128. This prevented her from working anywhere near chlorinetreated pools. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 130. Former Alaska Statutes section 23.30.265(28) defined suitable gainful
employment as:
[E]mployment that is reasonably attainable in light of an individual's age, education,
previous occupation, and injury, and that offers an opportunity to restore the
individual as soon as practical to a remunerative occupation as nearly as possible to
the individual's gross weekly earnings as determined at the time of injury.
Act of 1983, ch. 70, § 13, 1983 Alaska Sess. Laws 9 (emphasis omitted) (repealed 1988).
454. Kirby, 821 P.2d at 130.
455. Id.
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worker is restored to at least
employability is achieved when an4 injured
56
sixty percent of pre-injury earnings.
4" 7 the supreme court determined that
In Wien Air Alaska v. Kramer,
a statutory presumption of compensability that arose in an employee's
claim for TID benefits applies as well to a subsequent claim for continuing
benefits.458
The claimant, Kramer, injured his back and shoulders while in the
employ of Wien Air; Wien Air subsequently paid TTD benefits until
Kramer was released from his therapy and treatment. When Kramer
subsequently worked for another employer, his injury "flared-up." Kramer
then filed suit seeking a continuation of TTD benefits from Wien Air.45 9
The Board denied Kramer's claim, but the superior court reversed.'
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, rejecting the
Board's assertion that Kramer was required to establish the existence of a
continuing disability by a preponderance of the evidence.46 t According
to the court, once an employee establishes an initial link between
employment and injury the presumption of compensability applies unless
countered by substantial evidence to the contrary.462
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Carter, 3 the supreme court again
examined the presumption of compensability and found it applicable to
claims for continuing care as well, even where the care is purely palliative
and offers no hope of a permanent cure as long as the evidence establishes
that such care promotes recovery from individual attacks caused by a
chronic condition. 64

456. Act of July 1, 1988, ch. 79, § 10, 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws 5-13 (codified as
amended at ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041 (1988)). This is also consistent with the recent
court decision in Olson v. AIC/Martin J.V., 818 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1991), where the court
stated that 61-64% of earnings qualified as suitable gainful employment. Kirby, 821 P.2d
at 130. See supra page 162.
457. 807 P.2d 471 (Alaska 1991).
458. Id. at 474.
459. Id. at 472.
460. Id. at 473.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 474.
463. 818 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1991).
464. Id. at 665-66 (noting that other jurisdictions had construed similar statutory
language to permit workers' compensation boards "to require employers to pay -for
beneficial palliative care that offered no hope of a cure"').
The employer's obligation to provide continuing care is defined by Alaska Statutes
section 23.30.095Ca) as follows:
The employer shall furnish medical, surgical, and other attendance or treatment,
nurse and hospital service, medicine, crutches, and apparatus for the period which
the nature of the injury or the process of recovery requires, not exceeding two years
from and after the date of injury to the employee. . . .It shall be additionally
provided that, if continued treatment or care or both beyond the two-year period is
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In this case, the employee suffered from a work-related degenerative
disc disease and sought "as-needed" chiropractic care and a hot tub.465
The Board denied the employee's petition, finding no objective evidence
that the treatments would help the employee recover from the chronic
condition.466 The superior court reversed and the supreme court affirmed
on the ground that the Board erroneously failed to apply the presumption
of compensability to the claim for continuing care, which would have
shifted to the employer the burden of producing substantial evidence that
the requested treatment was not medically indicated. 1 7
In Alaska v. Cacioppo," the supreme court refused to extend the

presumption of compensability to a claim for occupational disability
4 9
benefits under the Public Employees' Retirement System ("PERS").
The court reasoned that workers' compensation and PERS serve different
functions. Whereas PERS is intended to encourage continued public
employment, workers' compensation protects a worker's ability to earn
certain wages.47

indicated, the injured employee has the right of review by the board. The board may
authorize continued treatment or care or both as the process of recovery may require.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(a) (1990).
465. Carter,818 P.2d at 663.
466. Id. at 663-64.
467. Id. at 664-65. The court noted 'that the presumption is not inconsistent with the
Board's discretion because only the burden of going forward is shifted, not the burden of
proof, and the presumption will drop out if the employer adduces substantial evidence for
its position that continued care is not needed. Id.
Justice Compton dissented in part, arguing that applying the presumption in this case
was of no practical significance. The reasons for establishing a presumption did not exist
when all that an employee had to establish was that continued care was indicated.
Id. at 667 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
Justice Moore also dissented, arguing that the presumption was inapplicable to the
statutory scheme governing continuing treatment. When the court referred to applying the
presumption to whether continued treatment was indicated,it meant whether such treatment
was needed. If the court meant indicated, then Justice Moore agreed with Justice
Compton's dissent. Id. at 667 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting). He argued that the presumption
was simply intended to aid an employee who is injured on the job but cannot demonstrate
conclusively the cause of the injury, and that the presumption was irrelevant to the court's
holding in this case. Id. at 668 (Moore, J., dissenting). Even if the presumption were
applicable, Justice Moore argued, the presumption should drop out because the record
contained substantial evidence to support the Board's position. Justice Moore concluded
that the holding was a "direct assault on the compromise between workers' and employers'
interests" because "[t]he court turns [the compensation] scheme on its head, requiring [the
Board] to presume that any continuing care requested by an employee is indicated medically
and to order the employer to pay for it unless the employer can prove that the requested
treatment is not indicated." Id. at 668-69 (Moore, J., dissenting).
468. 813 P.2d 679 (Alaska 1991).
469. Id. at 682-83. The presumption is known as the "last injurious exposure" rule: the
"employer at the time of the worker's most recent injury which is causally connected to the
disability has full liability ....
Id. at 682. See infra note 475.
470. Id. at 682-83 n.3.

1992]

YEAR IN REVIEW

The court did, however, extend the definition of legal cause used in
workers' compensation cases to PERS. If there is more than one possible
cause of a disability, benefits will be awarded when it is established that
"employment is a 'substantial factor in bringing about the harm or
disability at issue,"' regardless of whether a non-occupational injury also
could have independently caused the injury.47
In Hester v. State Public Employees' Retirement Board,472 the
supreme court affirmed the superior court's determination that a former
police officer was not entitled to occupational disability benefits under
473
PERS. Although the court affirmed the denial of benefits in this case,
it held that causation standards in workers' compensation cases are
applicable under PERS47 4 and rejected the state's argument that
PERS 75 does not entitle an employee to disability benefits when the
employee's preexisting condition is aggravated by his or her work.476
The court also held that the presumption of coverage found in workers'
compensation cases is not applicable under PERS.477 Hester would have
been entitled to PERS compensation if he could have established by a
preponderance of the evidence that "work-related stress was a substantial
factor in aggravating his ...disease to the extent that he was no longer
capable of working. 478
In Houston Contracting,Inc. v. Phillips,479 the supreme court focused
on benefit computation statutes and the extent of the Board's authority to
condition benefits upon compliance with rehabilitation orders. After
several appeals and a Board recalculation of benefits, the superior court
determined that the Board had improperly applied Alaska Statutes section

471. Id. at 683 (quoting Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Constr., 773 P.2d 955, 958
(Alaska 1989)).
472. 817 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1991).
473. Id. at 477. The court concluded that the Board's decision denying benefits was
supported by substantial evidence. But see id at 477-78 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting)
(concluding Board's denial of benefits was not supported by substantial evidence).
474. Id. at 475.
475. Occupational disability is defined under PERS as:
[A] physical or mental condition that, in the judgment of the administrator,
presumably permanently prevents an employee from satisfactorily performing the
employee's usual duties for an employer or the duties of another comparable position
or job that an employer makes available and for which the employee is qualified by
training or education; however, the proximate cause of the condition must be a
bodily injury sustained, or a hazard undergone, while in the performance and within
the scope of the employee's duties and not the proximate result of the wilful
negligence of the employee.
ALASKA STAT. § 39.35.680(26) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
476. Hester, 817 P.2d at 475.
477. Id. at 476.
478. Id.
479. 812 P.2d 598 (Alaska 1991).
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23.30.220(3).4
The court also penalized the employer for failing to
adjust Phillips' benefits when it was first on notice that it should do so. 48'
Finally, the superior court determined that the Board improperly withheld
benefits when Phillips refused to see a counselor to complete his
rehabilitation. 482
The supreme court reversed, finding that the Board's construction of
section 23.30.220(3) was correct." Specifically, the court found that the
Board properly considered Phillips' extended work history, since his job
on the trans-Alaska pipeline at the time of the injury paid more than any
work he had done in previous years, and the nature of construction work
in Alaska is episodic.'
The court also found that the superior court's award of penalties
against Houston Contracting was erroneous. 48 The court held that such
penalties are appropriate only when the compensation sought from the
employer is "'payable without an award.' 48 6 The court found that the
adjustment of compensation Phillips requested clearly did not meet this
requirement, since a Board determination was necessary before benefits
were payable under the relevant statute.48 7
The court further held that Phillips' refusal to participate in a courtarranged evaluation by a rehabilitation expert, combined with his failure to
arrange an independent evaluation, justified the Board's termination of his
T=D benefits.488 However, the court held that the Board
could not
489
properly direct Phillips to forfeit the benefits retroactively.

480. Id. at 599-600. The Board initially determined Phillips' benefits according to
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.220(2), but Phillips argued that the wrong subsection of the
statute had been used and applied for an upward adjustment of his compensation rate
pursuant to Alaska Statutes sections 23.30.220(1) or 23.30.220(3). Subsection (1) and (2)
provided the method by which "Average Weekly Wage" was calculated, depending upon
the amount of time employed; subsection (3) permitted the Board discretion to adjust such
calculation when (2) yielded an unfairly low result. See Act of 1965, ch. 75, § 1, 1965
Alaska Sess. Laws 46 (repealed 1983).
481. Houston Contracting,812 P.2d at 599-600.
482. Id. at 600.
483. Id. at 601.
484. Id. (citing Brunke v. Rogers & Babler, 714 P.2d 795, 799 (Alaska 1986)).
485. Id. at 602.
486. Id. (quoting Phillips v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 740 P.2d 457, 460 (Alaska
1987)).
487. Id.
488. Id. (citing Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Alaska
1982) (implying that the payment of TTD benefits to an employee is contingent upon
cooperation with rehabilitation)). The Board had directed the rehabilitation pursuant to
former Alaska Statute section 23.30.040(e). See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.040(e) (repealed
1982).
489. Houston Contracting, 812 P.2d at 604.
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In Green v. Kake Tribal Corp.4"° the supreme court held that an
insurer can recoup its overpayment of benefits to an injured worker by
withholding up to 100 percent of future payments until the full amount
overpaid is recouped. 4 9' According to both a federal statute4 92 and a
state statute,493 an injured worker in Alaska can never receive as workers'
compensation more than eighty percent of his pre-injury earnings. 4 The
Social Security Administration ("SSA") automatically offsets its payments
to achieve this balance until the insurer seeks an offset.495 In Green, an
insurance company, the Alaska Timber Insurance Exchange ("ATIE"),
overpaid an insured's employee for four years before it sought an offset
from the Board.49
The Board initially determined that ATIE could recoup its overpayment
by withholding twenty percent of each future payment over a period of
thirty-three years. Subsequent to this decision, however, the SSA paid the
employee a lump sum reflecting the amount it had automatically deducted
for four years to keep him within the eighty percent limitation.497
Thereafter, pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(j), 491 which
expressly provides that under certain circumstances more than twenty
percent of compensation may be withheld in order to recoup overpayment,
the Board modified its prior order and determined that ATIE could
withhold 100 percent of its payments for the next six years to recoup the
prior overpayments.4 9
The supreme court affirmed the modified order, concluding that the
employee was merely "the middleman in what essentially [was] a settling
of accounts between SSA and ATIE." 5°° The court also noted that
"Green is still in an enviable position: he receives a lump sum from SSA
immediately, but need only 'return' the money to ATIE over the next six

490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

816 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 1365.
42 U.S.C. § 424a(a) (1988).
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.225(b) (1990).
Green, 816 P.2d at 1364.

495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id. The SSA paid Morris $36,561. Id.
498. The statute provides in relevant part:
If any employer has made advance payments or overpayments of compensation, the
employer is entitled to be reimbursed by withholding up to 20 percent out of each
unpaid installment or installments of compensation due. More than 20 percent of
unpaid installments of compensation due may be withheld from an employee only
on approval of the board.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155G) (1990).
499. Green, 816 P.2d at 1365.
500. Id.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

years." '' Finally, the court ruled that ATIE could not recover interest
on the overpayment amount; the right to interest applies only when a
payment is made late, not in advance.
The court reasoned that public
policy dictates that ATIE should bear the burden of the discrepancies
between federal and state compensation statutes; placing this burden on the
worker "goes against the grain of the beneficent purposes of the workers'
compensation scheme as 5well
as this court's extensive workers'
3
compensation jurisprudence.
In Hulsey v. Johnson & Holen, °4 the supreme court concluded that

a law firm's attempt to reopen a workers' compensation claim constituted
the rendering of services before the Board, entitling the firm to attorneys'
fees. 5 The court reasoned that a petition to reopen a claim is essentially

a petition for modification of a workers' compensation award under Alaska

Statutes section 2 3 .3 0.130, 506 and concluded that "a modification
' 57
proceeding . . . 'originates in the initial claim for compensation. '
Thus, the court held that the firm's actions constituted "legal services in
respect to a claim... within the meaning of' the statute.508
Croft v. Pan Alaskan Trucking5" dealt with the issue of whether an
employer may be reimbursed for attorneys' fees paid to the employee's
attorney during the pendency of a workers' compensation appeal that was
later resolved in favor of the employer. The supreme court held that
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.1550)51 provides the exclusive remedy for
501. Id. at 1366. The court noted that the bonus in terms of the time value of money
that Green receives from the disharmony between state and federal law is "substantial." Id.
at 7 n.11.
502. Id. at 1368.
503. Id. The SSA paid less than was necessary, while ATIE paid more than was
necessary. Id. at 1364. The "imperfect" fit between the statutes was that they required
Green to refund to ATIE the amount of its overpayment, rather than merely requiring the
SSA to refund it. Id. at 1363-66.
504. 814 P.2d 327 (Alaska 1991).
505. Id. at 328. Alaska Statutes section 23.30.145(a) provides: "Fees for legal services
rendered in respect to a [workers' compensation] claim are not valid unless approved by the
board.". ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145(a) (1990). The Board itself has created an exception
to this rule, but it applies only in certain circumstances, one being that the fee is $300 or
less. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 45.180(c) (April 1991). In this case, the law firm
was suing to recover $3,159.67. Hulsey, 814 P.2d at 328 n.1.
506. The statute provides in part:
Modification of Awards. (a) Upon its own initiative, or upon the application of any
party in interest on the ground of a change in conditions ... or because of a mistake
in its determination of a fact, the board may... before one year after the rejection
of a claim, review a compensation case ....
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.130 (1990).
507. Hulsey, 814 P.2d at 328 (quoting Interior Paint Co. v. Rodgers, 522 P.2d 164, 167
(Alaska 1974)).
508. Id.
509. 820 P.2d 1064 (Alaska 1991).
510. The statute provides:

1992]

YEAR IN REVIEW

an employer to recover overcompensation, inferring that "the inclusion of
this specific remedy was intended to exclude other remedies for
overcompensation. ' .. Finally, the court held that attorneys'
fees can be
512
considered compensation for the purposes of the statute.
In dissent, Justice Moore agreed that the statute provided the exclusive
remedy for the recovery of advance payments or overpayments, but argued
that attorneys' fees should not be considered compensation within the
meaning of the statute.5 13 Justice Moore found support for this position
in the statute's definition of "compensation"51 4 and in the express
statutory provision of attorneys' fees in addition to the compensation
awarded.515 The purpose of Alaska Statutes section 23.30.1550), he
argued, is to prevent a claimant from experiencing a large financial burden
while repaying funds to which he is not entitled;
such protection was not
51 6
meant to be extended to a claimant's attorney.
In Summerville v. Denali Center,517 Summerville appealed the
Board's decision denying her temporary and permanent total disability
benefits. After Summerville was injured on the job and underwent three
years of rehabilitation treatment, the Rehabilitation Administrator ("RA")
terminated the treatment on the ground that it would not enable
Summerville to return to employment. However, the Board denied
Summerville's application for disability benefits on the grounds that she
was currently employable. 518
The supreme court reviewed the relationship between the RA and the
Board, as well as their respective roles.5 19 It held that while the Board

If an employer has made advance payments or overpayments of compensation, the
employer is entitled to be reimbursed by withholding up to 20 percent out of each
unpaid installment or installments of compensation due. More than 20 percent of
unpaid installments of compensation due may be withheld from an employee only
on approval of the board.
ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.155(j) (1990).
511. Croft, 820 P.2d at 1066 (citing Green v. Kake Tribal Corp., 816 P.2d 1363 (Alaska
1991)).
512. Id. at 1067.
513. Id. (Moore, L, dissenting).
514. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(8) (1990) (defining "compensation" as "the money
allowance payable to an employee or the dependents of the employee as provided for in this
chapter, and includes the funeral benefits provided for in this chapter").
515. Croft, 820 P.2d at 1067 (Moore, J., dissenting).
516. Id. at 1068 (Moore, J. dissenting).
517. 811 P.2d 1047 (Alaska 1991).
518. Id. at 1050.
519. The RA's role is narrow. The Administrator must "review a rehabilitative plan and
decide whether to approve, modify or deny the plan." Id. at 1050 (citing ALASKA STAT. §
23.30.041(0 (1983)). Although the 1988 amendments to the Act only apply to injuries
sustained on or after July 1, 1988, the court specifically noted that the "decision concerning
the relationship between the RA and the board would be the same under the current statute."
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is bound by all the RA's rehabilitation plan decisions which are not
appealed, the Board is not bound by the RA's underlying factual
findings.5' 2 The court then noted that the injured worker might have
avoided1 her dilemma if she had appealed the RA's decision in the first
52
place.
In McKeown v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,52 2 the supreme court held that
"an employer's private settlement of a claim for unpaid overtime and
liquidated damages under the [Alaska Wage and Hour Act] is injurious to
interests of the public and, therefore, void on the grounds of public
policy. '5 2 The court found that the purpose of the liquidated damages
provision was to assess punitive damages against the violating employer;
5 24
compensating the employee was merely an incidental result.
According to the court, allowing the employer to settle privately would
permit the employer to "escape... without punitive sanction. ' ' 525 The
court supported its holding by stating that private settlement would also
appear to violate the Fair Labor Standards Act 526 because such
settlements contradict the deterrent effect intended in the statute.527 The
court further held that the "tender-back" requirement of Thorstenson v.
Arco Alaska, Inc.,5'2 which required the return of settlement monies, did
not apply in this case. Instead, the court permitted the employees who
settled privately with Kinney to retain their settlement money and join the
class action, subject to offset of the damage award.529
In Braun v. Alaska Commercial Fishing and Agriculture Bank,53 the
supreme court held that, on the facts of the case, economic necessity
constituted good cause for termination of a bank employee.53' According

Id. at 1050 n.2.
520. IM
521. Id. at 1051.
522. 820 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1991).
523. Id. at 1070. Alaska Statutes section 23.10.110(a) provides: "[ain employer who
violates a provision of [Alaska Statutes sections] 23.10.060 or 23.10.065 is liable to an
employee affected in the amount of unpaid minimum wages, or unpaid overtime
compensation... and in an equal additional amount as liquidated damages." ALASKA
STAT. § 23.10.110(a) (1990).
524. McKeown, 820 P.2d at 1070.
525. Id.
526. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
527. McKeown, 816 P.2d at 1070-71. While not identical, the AWHA was based on the
Federal Labor Standard Act of 1938. Id. at 1070 n.2.
528. 780 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1989).
529. McKeown, 816 P.2d at 1071.
530. 816 P.2d 140 (Alaska 1991).
531. Id. at 142 (granting summary judgment in favor of the bank on its defense of
excuse because no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the necessity of the
termination).
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to the court, the employee's termination was only one of many good-faith
actions the Bank was taking at the time out of concern for the bank's
financial stability.532
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1547 v.
Ketchikan,533 the supreme court determined that when asked to clarify an
arbitrator's award, the superior court should not interpret the award, but
simply determine if the award is ambiguous and remand any ambiguous
sections to the arbitrator for clarification. The arbitrator of a dispute
between Ketchikan and its employees' union ordered the city to reinstate
five terminated employees and restore the rights they would have had if
they had not been laid off. The city asked the arbitrator to clarify the
award as it did not specify the extent and duration of the employees' rights.
After the arbitrator denied the request, the city sought a declaratory
judgment from the superior court. The court determined that the award did
not require reinstatement of the employees under the newly
negotiated
534
collective bargaining agreement, and the union appealed.
The supreme court held that the superior court erred by interpreting the
arbitrator's decision and instructed the superior court to remand the award
to the arbitrator for clarification.535 However, the supreme court rejected
the union's argument that the superior court did not have jurisdiction over
the declaratory judgment action.53
In Alaska State Employees Ass'n v. Alaska Public Employees
Ass'n,537 the supreme court approved the transfer of funds from the
Alaska Public Employees Association ("APEA") to the Alaska State
Employees Association ("ASEA"), the General Government Unit of the
state employees' new union.5 38 The supreme court found the Second
Circuit's rationale in a similar case 39 persuasive. There the Second
Circuit held that both unjust enrichment and the discouragement of
employees' liberty to choose their own representatives by disallowing

532. Id. at 142-43. Other measures included increasing the loan volume handled by each
loan officer, articulating a new policy on contracts and capital acquisitions to lower
expenses, and eliminating positions and not filling vacancies. Id. at 143.
533. 805 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1991).

534. Id. at 341.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 342-43 (noting that the statutes and common law of Alaska demonstrate a
strong policy of minimal court interference with arbitration). The union argued that the
court's declaratory judgment jurisdiction normally is used only to determine matters of
suitability of arbitration. The court noted that "[w]hile many declaratory actions do involve
arbitrability, other issues can be resolved as well." Id. at 342 n.6.
537. 825 P.2d 451 (Alaska 1991).

538. Id. at 457.
539. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Local 3, Bakery
and Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 733 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1984).
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transfer of union funds are fundamental problems in this type of case.50
The Alaska Supreme Court held that because the APEA funds were held
in trust for the use and benefit of the government employees, 5 4 the
"equitable principle against unjust enrichment" mandates the transfer of a
pro rata amount of funds in all the accounts from the APEA to the
ASEA. 542 The court noted that a pro rata transfer was appropriate
because many employees voted to retain the APEA as their bargaining
representative, hence, they did not voluntarily leave the APEA.5"
The court also held that characterizing the funds contributed to the
APEA's Strike Fund as dues was not determinative of whether the Strike
Fund was a trust to benefit the employees; the APEA gave up its
ownership rights to the funds, from whatever source derived, when it
deposited the funds into the Strike Fund.5 " The court also concluded
that the APEA's Business Leave Bank was subject to fiduciary duty
analysis as a trust because the state was not personally liable for any part
of the funds, and either the APEA or its members had a beneficial interest
in the funds." 5
VI. FAMILY LAW
In 1991, the Alaska Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decided ten
cases in the area of family law. These cases have been subdivided into two
categories: child and spousal support, and property division. Most notably,
the supreme court determined in Ogard v. Ogard546 that marital property
should be valued at the date of trial, and applied this standard to several
cases throughout the year.

540. Id. at 233.
541. Alaska State Employees Ass'n, 825 P.2d at 457. The APEA accumulated funds into
three trusts, the Strike Fund, the Legal Trust Fund, and the Business Leave Bank. Id. at
453.
542. Id. at 456-58.
543. Id. at 457.
544. Id. at 458 (the court remanded, not ruling on the status of the Strike Fund because
the purpose of the fund, the beneficiaries of the fund, and the interpretation of certain
clauses pertaining to the fund were questions for the trier of fact to determine).
545. Id. at 458-61.
546. 808 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1991). See infra page 174.
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A. Child and Spousal Support
In Pugil v. Cogar,4 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in basing the father's child support
obligation on his potential income."8 Basing its decision on two
previous decisions, Pattee v. Pattee 9 and Patch v. Patch,"'0 the court
declared that a "trial court must consider all the circumstances of the
change in employment to determine [child support]. ' 5 '
In Pugil, the court acknowledged the superior court's finding that,
considering the father's child support obligation, his plans for further
education and new employment as a welder were unrealistic. In addition,
the court held that since the father's "reduction- in income was voluntary
and temporary in nature," and the mother was physically impaired, the
superior court did not err in refusing to place a greater burden of support
on the mother, notwithstanding that she was the custodial parent.552
In the divorce proceeding of KowaIski v. Kowalski,553 the court again
addressed a situation involving a change in employment. The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's determination of child support, holding that
"a showing of bad faith is not a prerequisite to a finding that
unemployment is voluntary."5 ' In so ruling, the court reaffirmed the
principle set out in Houger v. Houger5s5 that the obligor parent bears the
burden of establishing a "justifiable reason for being relieved of his duty
to support his children."'' 556 In Kowalski, the obligor-husband produced
no evidence supporting his claim that he could not currently earn the
amount set by the trial judge. The court noted that if he could not meet his
obligation, he could seek modification of the award, which would give him
and his former wife a chance to present evidence on his ability to earn
income at his pre-marriage level.557

547. 811 P.2d 1062 (Alaska 1991).

548. Id. at 1067.
549.
550.
551.
at 662.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.

744 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1987).
760 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1988).
Pugil, 811 P.2d at 1066 (citing Patch, 760 P.2d at 529); see also, Pattee, 744 P.2d
Pugil, 811 P.2d at 1067.
806 P.2d 1368 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 1371.
449 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1969).
Kowalski, 806 P.2d at 1371 (quoting Houger, 449 P.2d at 770).
Id. at 1372.
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In Musgrove v. Musgrove,551 the obligor-husband refused to continue
rehabilitative spousal support because his wife was cohabitating with a
man. The superior court found that there was no reason to discontinue the

spousal support, characterizing the living arrangement as having the same
economic effect as if the wife had chosen to live with a female

roommate.559

The supreme court affirmed, defining rehabilitative

alimony as an award for a short duration that has a specific purpose
"'limited to job training or other means directly related to entry or
advancement within the work force."' 560 Such support is modifiable only
where there is a "material and substantive change in circumstances related
to its purpose. ' 61 The court held that the former wife's cohabitation

with a man did not qualify as a substantial change of circumstances, and
the wife had not completed or ceased her rehabilitative efforts.562
B. Property Division
In Ogard v. Ogard63 the Alaska Supreme Court clarified that with
respect to the division of marital property, the date of valuation should be
"as close as practicable to the date of trial."5" The court explained that
confusion arose when "value" had been misused in a previous decision,
Nelson v. Nelson,565 which involved the determination, not valuation, of
marital and non-marital assets. The court noted, however, that there may
be some situations in which the separation date is more appropriately used

for valuation than the date of trial. 5'

558. 821 P.2l 1366 (Alaska 1991).
559. Id. at 1369.
560. Id. (quoting Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Alaska 1989)).
561. Id. at 1370.
562. Id.
563. 808 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1991).
564. Id. at 819.
565. 736 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1987). In Ogard, the court stated:
In [Nelson], we held that when "the parties had not co-mingled their financial affairs
since their separation[, t]he separation was ...a convenient and appropriate time at
which to value the marital property for division." In so stating we misused the word
"value," for there was no issue of valuation in Nelson. A more appropriate word
would have been "determine."
Ogard, 808 P.2d at 819 (quoting Nelson, 736 P.2d at 1147) (citation omitted).
566. Ogard,808 P.2d at 820. The court gives two examples of this: when one spouse
deliberately causes the value of the marital property to decline and when the value increases
due to the efforts of one of the spouses. Id. The court also rejected the lower court's
calculation of the husband's income because it had included a $6,000 savings of rental costs
which the court regarded as the imputed benefit of living in a four-plex he owned. The
supreme court held that this, in effect, required the husband to pay rent to live in a place
he owned. Id. at 818.
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Ogard also involved the calculation of interim child support,
retroactive to the date of separation, that was to be paid by the husband
until the final amount was determined. The supreme court ruled that the
superior court should have adjusted the amount of support to reflect the
money that the husband spent on the children after the separation. 67 The
court noted that such a reduction was not precluded because no clear
agreement had been made as to custody and support obligations."
Doyle v. Doyle" involved a husband's appeal of a lower court's
division of property and award of child support. In analyzing the division
57 ° and held that
of property, the supreme court relied on Ogard v. Ogard
the marital property should be valued as of the date of trial unless the trial
court specifically finds a special situation which requires a different
572
Consistent with its approach in Nelson v. Jones,
valuation date."
the court rejected a method of valuation based on purchase price or
replacement cost, and held that fair market value is the appropriate
valuation of a marital asset. 73 The court also upheld the trial court's
decision to
include the husband's military pension as divisible marital
7
property
The court further held that it was not an abuse of the trial court's civil
contempt power to order the husband and son to return personal property
taken from the wife's home."
However, the court concluded that the
fine of $1,000 per item not returned was not a proper exercise of the
court's powerY6
In reviewing the trial court's award of child support, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court impermissibly departed from the child support
award required by Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3, by taking into

567. Id. at 817.
568. Id. Compare Young v. Williams, 583 P.2d 201, 203 (Alaska 1978) (holding that
when a defendant husband must pay child support and the unpaid support becomes a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the husband "cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on
account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children").
569. 815 P.2d 366 (Alaska 1991).
570. 808 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1991).
571. Doyle, 815 P.2d at 369.
572. 781 P.2d 964, 970 (Alaska 1989).
573. Doyle, 815 P.2d at 369-70.
574. Id. at 370 (citing Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Alaska 1987)).
575. Id. at 371.
576. Id. at 371-72. Alaska Statutes section 09.50.040 states that the court may punish
for contempt and "give judgment in favor of the party aggrieved" in an amount "sufficient
to indemnify that party and to satisfy the costs and disbursements of that party." ALASKA
STAT. § 09.50.040 (1983). In Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1989), the court
interpreted section 09.50.040 to mean that there must be a correlation between the aggrieved
party's actual damages and the fine imposed. Id. at 648.
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consideration the spouses' earning power disparity, the child's age of nearmajority, and the role the child played in the divorce. 5," The supreme
court held that none of the factors considered by the trial court met the
requirements of Civil Rule 90.3(c), which permits variance only for "good
cause." '
The court noted that any determination of "good cause" in
awarding child support must focus on the child's needs, a focus lacking in
the trial court's findings.579
In Moffitt v. Moffitt, 580 the supreme court held that when calculating
the value of a business' goodwill in divorce proceedings, a reasonable
deduction must be taken for depreciation.5 8' The supreme court held that
a determination of goodwill is a question of fact, and can therefore 58be2
overturned only upon a finding of clear error on the trial court's part.
The court then determined that the trial court had committed clear error in
its determination of goodwill because it failed to make a depreciation
adjustment to any of the firm's assets in accordance with the reasoning of
its recent decision in Ogard v. Ogard,5s3 failed to attribute any income
to Mrs. Moffitt because the couple had agreed she would not be
paid any
5 85
salary,5 and attributed an arbitrarily low salary to Mr. Moffitt.
The court further relied on Ogardin holding that the trial court should
consider the value of the company as of the date of the trial on remand,
rather than on the original divorce trial date. 8 6 In Ogard, the court
opined that the later date was a better date for valuation because it reflects
"'the most current and accurate information possible and . . . avoids
inequitable results."' 5
Finally, the court recognized that judicial efficiency might require the
valuation date to be the date of the original trial on remand, when

577. Doyle, 815 P.2d at 372-73; see ALASKA R. Cv. P. 90.3 (providing that "ftjhe court
may vary the child support award as calculated... for good cause ...
578. Doyle, 815 P.2d at 373.
579. Id.; see A.ASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. I(B).
580. 813 P.2d 674 (Alaska 1991).
581. Id. at 676.
582. Id.
583. 808 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1991). See supra page 170. In Ogard,the court stated that
"[djepreciation is a means of reflecting on an annual basis the cost of capital equipment.
Such costs are real and should not be disregarded unless it appears that equipment was
acquired in order to avoid or reduce an obligor's child support obligation." Id. at 819.
584. Moffitt, 813 P.2d at 676-77. The supreme court held that whether or not the parties
were paying themselves a salary was irrelevant, as an objective purchaser of the business
would value Mrs. Moffitt's contributions to the firm. Id. at 677 n.5.
585. Id. at 677.
586. Id. at 676-78.
587. Id. at 678 (quoting Ogard, 808 P.2d at 819).
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circumstances force a court to value many distributed assets at their old
values.588
In Miles v. Miles,589 the supreme court affirmed the superior court's
equal division of marital property in a divorce case and found no error in
the trial court's finding that the husband's lobbying practice had no
goodwill value.59 The supreme court noted that the allocation of marital
property is within the broad discretion of the trial court and that equal
division is presumptively the most equitable, absent a showing of
circumstances that would warrant otherwise.5 91 In the instant case, where
both parties were professionals with substantial earning capacity, it was not
an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to divide the marital property
52
equally.
The wife also challenged the court's classification of certain properties
as the husband's separate property. The court concluded, however, that the
relevant properties in Alaska belonged to the husband prior to marriage and
there was no intent on the part of the parties to hold the properties jointly;
the wife "did not contribute to mortgage payments or reside on the
properties, nor did she assume any financial risk or work extensively to
maintain or manage them."593 The supreme court further concluded that
the down payment for a jointly held Florida condominium remained the
husband's separate property 5 4 The court noted that although "[i]t is
within the trial court's discretion to find that premarital assets have become
part of the marital estate... commingling assets 'does not automatically
establish intent to jointly hold property, and a court always should consider
the property's source when determining what assets are available for
distribution." 5 95

588. Id.
589. 816 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1991).
590. Id. at 131. The supreme court held that the use of an expert witness and of the
method of capitalization of excess earnings to determine whether goodwill exists was
acceptable. Id. As goodwill value was found not to exist, the issue of marketability of
goodwill was not reached. Id. (citations omitted).
591. Id. Factors to be considered in dividing marital property are the following: "earning
ability of the parties, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their
physical conditions and health, their financial circumstances including the time and manner
of acquisition of the property at issue, its value at the time and any income producing
capacity." Id. (citing Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962)).
592. Id.
593. ld.
at 131-32.
594. Id. at 132.
595. Id. (quoting Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 224 (Alaska 1986)). Chief Justice
Rabinowitz dissented on this point, arguing that the down payment should not have been
considered separate property. Id. at 133 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting). He noted that even
though property may have been acquired by one spouse prior to marriage, the court should
consider the property as jointly held if the parties display an intent to treat the property as
joint, "'usually through joint management and control of the property."' Id. (quoting
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Wood v. Collins" involved the division of the property of Vernon
Collins and Helene Wood after the termination of their twelve-year, nonmatrimonial relationship. When the relationship ended, Helene left
Vernon's apartment and moved to Hawaii to live in a condominium they
co-owned. Vernon brought suit to dissolve the partnership in the
condominium, and Helene counterclaimed alleging that Vernon had
promised to take care of her housing needs for the rest of her life, even if
they separated.5' 9
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the superior court's holding that
no express or implied contract to provide Helene with housing had been
formed. 98 The court also held, however, that the superior court erred in
awarding Vernon half of the payments made in connection with the
property prior to the separation. 599 Relying on Beal v. Beal,60 the
court held that property accumulated during cohabitation before separation
should be divided according to the express or implied intent of the
parties. 6° Applying this rule, the court determined that the record
supported the conclusion that it was the intent of the parties that Vernon
was to pay the majority of the expenses.6w The court additionally held
that the regular rules of cotenancy should apply after the separation. 6°3
Although the rules of cotenancy provide that an occupying cotenant need
not pay rent to the other non-occupying cotenant, the court noted that an
exception exists when one cotenant's use of the property effectively
excludes the other's use and enjoyment of the property.6 4 The court
concluded that Vernon was properly awarded half the payments made in
connection with the property after separation6 5

Carlson, 722 P.2d at 224) (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting). The dissent believed that the
intent was shown in the instant case --both parties held title, were obligors on the note and
worked together to repair and improve the property, id. (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting), -- and
argued that Matson v. Lewis, 755 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1988), which held that a down
payment from separate property had become a marital asset, was indistinguishable. Miles,
816 P.2d at 133-34 (Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting).
596. 812 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1991).
597. Id. at 953.
598. Id. at 955. The court also held that equitable principles did not favor Helene, and
equitable relief requiring Vernon to take care of Helene's housing needs would not be
appropriate. The court noted that it would not even reach the preliminary issue of whether
equitable relief involving property would be available when cohabitating couples end a
relationship. id.
599. Id. at 956-57.
600. 577 P.2d 507 (Or. 1978).
601. Wood, 812 P.2d at 956.
602. Id. at 957.
603. Id. at 958.
604. Id.
605. Id.

a
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In Thomas v. Thonas,6 the supreme court determined the proper
approach in valuing a non-vested pension. Relying on its decision in Laing
v. Laing,67 the court held that the lower courts need to state a specific
factual finding on whether the non-vested pensions will vest in the
future.6°z When it is apparent at the time of trial that the pension will not
vest and that the employee's contributions will be refunded, those
contributions made during the marriage will be considered marital property
to be divided equally.'
The supreme court remanded to the trial court
to decide whether the pension will vest in the future. If the pension is
expected to vest in the future, instead of valuing the pension at the time of
trial, the court will reserve jurisdiction on the issue. 1 ° If the pension
later vests, the court may then divide the proceeds.6 '
The court also addressed the proper valuation of a limited-entry seine
permit." 2 The supreme court held that the trial court properly treated the
permit as marital property but erred in failing to account for its
appreciation over the course of the marriage.1 3
In Bays v. Bays, 614 the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
award of temporary rehabilitative support, an interest in the husband's
pension plan, and child support. The court first held that, since the
husband was a well-paid city employee and the wife had few job skills, the
award of reasonable rehabilitative support of limited duration was not an
abuse of discretion by the superior court. 615 The court noted that the rule
established in Schanck v. Schanck61 6 for meeting the needs of the parties
through a division of property rather than through
alimony does not apply
617
to rehabilitative or limited duration support.
The court sustained the superior court's calculations and division of the
husband's pension benefits on the ground that the husband waived his
objection by never differentiating between the pension contributions made
before or after marriage and those made during the marriage.6 18 The

606. 815 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1991).

607. 741 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1987).
608. Thomas, 815 P.2d at 376.

609. Id.
610. Id. at 375.
611. Id. at 375-76.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.

Id.
Id. at 377.
807 P.2d 482 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 485.
717 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1986).
Bays, 807 P.2d at 485.
i at 486.
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court also stated that the decision concerning the pension could be upheld
on alternative grounds. A determination of when a couple ceases
functioning as a unit will establish at what point post-marital property is
considered separable from marital property."" Inthis case, the evidence,
including the husband's monetary contributions to his wife and children
after the separation and before trial, established that the couple continued
to operate as a marital unit until the date of trial.62 °
Finally, the court held that the lower court properly calculated the
husband's child support obligation by not deducting his pension payments
from the total wage figure reported in his W-2 form. The pension
deductions were non-taxable and thus would not be included in his W-2
form gross figure.621

VII. FISH AND GAME LAW
Seven cases were decided by the Alaska courts in the area of fish and
game law during 1991. The cases addressed the requisite mens rea for
certain offenses, fine limitations, proper preservation and restitution for
Alaska wildlife, and the availability of the "first in time" defense.
In PeninsulaMarketing Ass'n v. State,622 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that Alaska Statutes section 16.05.251(e) applies to the allocation of
fish resources between two commercial fisheries. Peninsula Marketing
Association sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of a cap of
500,000 chum on the June fishery, which was adopted by the Alaska Board
of Fisheries to ensure that enough chum would reach the fisheries in the
western part of Alaska. 6'
Although the Board of Fisheries rendered its case technically moot by
raising the cap to 600,000 chum, 624 the supreme court heard the case
because of the public interest in interpreting Alaska Statutes section
i6.05.251(e). 6' This provision establishes relevant criteria for the Board
of Fisheries' determination of "the allocation of fishery resources among
personal use, sport and commercial fishing., 62 6 The court held that

619. Id. (citing Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1986)).
620. i
621. Id.
622. 817 P.2d 917 (Alaska 1991).
623. Id. at 918; see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 09.365(0 (Oct. 1991).
624. ALAsKA ADmsN. CODE tit. 5, § 09.365(0 (Oct. 1991).
625. PeninsulaMarketing, 817 P.2d at 920.
626. The statute provides in part: "[tlhe Board of Fisheries shall establish criteria for the
allocation of fishery resources among personal use, sport, and commercial fishing." ALAsKA
STAT. § 16.05.251(e) (Supp. 1991).
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although this phrase specifically meant to preclude allocation among
subsistence uses, it was "equally applicable to intra-group resource
allocation as [it was] to inter-group allocation," and thus included the
allocation of fish between two commercial fisheries.627 The court further
reasoned that since Alaska Statutes section 16.05.251(d)6 28 applied 629
to
intra-commercial allocations under Meier v. State Board of Fisheries,
it would be disharmonious for the court not to apply subsection (e) intracommercially. 60
The court rejected the argument that the statute's plain meaning could
be overcome by the legislative history of the section: "[w]e can find no
support for interpreting [Senator Fischer's] comments as meaning that no
criteria need be established by the [B]oard for decisions allocating
resources between two commercial fisheries."63 1 Furthermore, according
to the court, "the [B]oard's belief that it was supposed to apply the section
251(e) criteria supports the conclusion that section 251(e) was meant to
apply to intra-group allocations." 632
In State v. Stein,633 the court of appeals rejected the rule followed by
some courts that restitution is not due when a payment of a fine is made
voluntarily pursuant to a mistake of law.634 Defendant Stein was fined
$1000 when he was convicted of a strict liability violation for unlawful
commercial fishing in closed waters. Two years later, relying on
Constantine v. State,635 in which the court of appeals held that the
legislature limited the fine for strict liability fishing violations to $300,
Stein moved to have his judgment corrected and his fine reduced.636 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of the defendant's
motion for return of $700, holding that, in doing so, the district court did
not abuse its discretion.637

627. PeninsulaMarketing, 817 P.2d at 921.
628. Alaska Statutes section 16.05.251(d) provides:
Regulations adopted under (a) of this section must, consistent with sustained
yield and the provisions of [Alaska Statutes section] 16.05.258, provide a fair and
reasonable opportunity for the taking of fishery resources by personal use, sport and
commercial fishermen.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.251(d) (Supp. 1991).
629. 739 P.2d 172 (Alaska 1987).
630. PeninsulaMarketing, 817 P.2d at 921.
631. Id. at 922.
632. Id.
633. 806 P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
634. Id. at 347.
635. 739 P.2d 188 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
636. Stein, 806 P.2d at 346.
637. Id. at 347.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

63 8 the defendants were also convicted of
In State v. Danielson,
commercial fishing in closed waters under a strict liability theory. They
were each fined $2500 and ordered to pay the state $2000 in lieu of
The defendants sought and received a
forfeiting their fishing nets.
refund under the cap established in Constantine,' thereby reducing their
fine to $300.611
Defendants applied for modification of their sentence under Alaska
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, and for post-conviction relief under Rule
35.1.62 The state argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction
to order the state to reimburse the defendants for the illegally assessed
fines. 3 The state maintained that the order to reimburse violated Alaska
Statutes section 22.15.0506s4 because it was equitable in nature and
turned the state into a defendant.65 The court of appeals rejected both
arguments, holding that motions for post-conviction relief are part of the
original criminal proceedings and thus are not governed by the civil
jurisdiction of the district court, and that the state was not turned into a
defendant by the order of reimbursement because the Rule 35(a) motion
was part of a criminal proceeding in which Danielson was a defendant." 6
The court further rejected the argument that the refund was barred by
sovereign immunity. 6 7 The court reasoned that the application for
refund was not a cause of action against the state barred by Alaska Statutes
section 09.50.250" because the application was part of the original
criminal case, not an action against the state. 649

638. 809 P.2d 937 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
639. Id. at 938.
640. See supra note 635 and accompanying text.
641. Danielson, 809 P.2d at 938.
642. Id. Rule 35 details the procedure required for a reduction, correction, modification
or suspension of a sentence. Rule 35.1 details procedures for post-conviction relief.
ALASKA R. CmiM. P. 35, 35.1.
643. Danielson, 809 P.2d at 939.
644. The statute provides:
The jurisdiction of the district courts does not extend to
(1) an action in which the title to real property is in question;
(2) an action for false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious prosecution,
actions of an equitable nature (except as otherwise provided by law), or actions in
which the state is a defendant.
ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.050 (1988).
645. Danielson, 809 P.2d at 939.
646. Id.
647. Id. at 940.
648. The statute outlines what types of claims are actionable against the state. ALASKA
STAT. § 09.50.250 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
649. Danielson, 809 P.2d at 941.
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In McCann v. State,6' the court of appeals rejected the state's theory
of "making the state whole," and found that ordering forfeiture when
seizure had already occurred contravened the plain meaning of Alaska
Statutes section 16.05.722.6" Officers of the State Fish and Wildlife
Protection Agency seized undersized crab from defendant McCann's vessel
and returned them to the sea. The trial court imposed the maximum fine
under the statute and also entered a forfeiture order requiring McCann to
pay the fair market value of the crabs that were either dead or unlikely to
survive their return to the sea. 652 McCann appealed the forfeiture order,
arguing that the state could not seize the crab and then impose a forfeiture
order. The state contended that the forfeiture order was proper because
McCann had to pay the fair market value of only those crabs that were
either dead or unlikely to survive, thus making the state whole by
compensating it for a lost resource. 653 In rejecting this argument, the
court of appeals held that the controlling statute seeks to prevent any profit
from illegal catches and in so doing provides for one of two penalties for
fishers: fine or forfeiture. Forfeiture may be either the crab itself or its fair
market value. Since McCann did not profit from sale of the crab, he was
not subject to forfeiture.
In Jurco v. State,654 the court of appeals interpreted the meaning of
the term "salvage" in section 92.410(b) of title 5 of the Alaska
Administrative Code 655 to impose a duty to save property from
destruction or waste. 6 In the case of defensive game killing, the killer
has a "duty to deliver the meat to the authorities and to exercise reasonable

650. 817 P.2d 484 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
651. The section provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person who without any culpable mental state violates [Alaska Statutes
section] 16.05.440 - 16.05.690, or a regulation of the Board of Fisheries or the
department governing commercial fishing, is guilty of a violation and upon
conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than
(1) $3,000 for a first conviction; and
(2) $6,000 for a second or subsequent conviction.
(b) In addition, the court shall order forfeiture of any fish, or its fair
market value, taken or retained as a result of the commission of the violation.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.722 (Supp. 1991).
652. McCann, 817 P.2d at 485-86.
653. Id. at 486.
654. 816 P.2d 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
655. This section provides:
Game taken in defense of life or property is the property of the state. A person
taking such game shall immediately salvage the meat .... A person taking game
under this section shall notify the department of the taking immediately, and shall
submit a written report of the circumstances of the taking to the department within
15 days after the taking.
ALASKA ADMN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.410(b) (Oct. 1991).
656. Jurco, 816 P.2d at 914.
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care in assuring that the meat is delivered in an edible condition."657 The
court noted that in some cases this regulation may require gutting the
animal or delivering the animal to the authorities in order to preserve the
meat, but
it did not impose an absolute duty to gut the animal in all
65 8
cases.

In Waiste v. State,69 the court of appeals concluded that the general
negligence standard prescribed in Alaska Statutes section 16.05.72366
does not supersede Board of Fisheries' regulations that specify a mens rea
other than negligence. Specifically, the court determined that regulation1
section 39.105(d)(3) of title 5 of the Alaska Administrative Code,6
which provides that a drift gill net is legal when it "'has not been
intentionally staked, anchored, or otherwise fixed .
,"'662 still requires
a mens rea of intent rather than the lower negligence standard. The court
reasoned that to hold that the later-enacted statute superseded prior
regulations would "contravene[] the widely accepted presumption against
repeal of prior laws by implication." 663 As additional support for its
decision, the court noted the general rules that (1) a more specific statute
should prevail when different statutes, albeit in broader terms, deal with the
same subject; and (2) ambiguous criminal statutes should be strictly
construed in favor of the accused.664
In Clucas v. State,65 the court of appeals reversed the defendant's
conviction for operating a set gill net within 600 feet of another gill net for
the first time, holding that the "first in time, first in right" defense
applies in criminal cases, even those involving violations of strict liability
statutes. 667 The court noted that the principle has been applied
consistently in civil cases and that Alaska courts have assumed that the

657. Id. at 915.
658. Id.
659. 808 P.2d 286 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
660. Id. at 289-90. Alaska Statutes section 16.05.723(a) provides in pertinent part: "[a]
person who negligently violates [Alaska Statutes section] 16.05.440 - 16.05.690, or a
regulation of the board of fisheries or the department governing commercial fishing, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.... ." ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.723(a) (Supp. 1991).
661. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 39.105(d)(3) (Oct. 1991).
662. Waiste, 808 P.2d at 287 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 39.105(d)(3) (Oct.
1991)) (emphasis added).
663. Id. at 289 (citing IA C. DALLAS SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 23.10, at 346 (Norman J. Singer ed., rev. 4th ed. 1985)).
664. Id. (citations omitted).
665. 815 P.2d 384 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
666. Id. at 385. Clucas argued that he had placed his nets first and a subsequent person
had placed his nets within 600 feet of Clucas' net. Id.
667. Id. at 388.
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defense also applies to violations of minimum distance fishing
regulations. 6
In addressing whether the defense should apply to the violation in
question, which triggered strict liability violations, the court concluded that
the wording of the relevant statute, Alaska Statutes section 16.05.722,
which establishes liability for those who violate fisheries regulations
"'without any culpable mental state,"' 9 affects only defenses based on
the lack of a culpable mental state, not defenses unrelated to mental
state.67 In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished strict from
absolute liability. Strict liability prohibits any defenses based on the
accused's mental state, whereas absolute liability precludes any defense at
all.67 This distinction recognizes that proof of all elements of a crime
may not link the defendant to the harm sought to be prevented by the
statute. 672 The "first in time, first in right" defense is valid for minimum
distance fishing violations because the harm of depleting Alaska's fishery
resources is caused not by the first person who begins fishing, but by
subsequent arrivals who fish within 600 feet. In deference to the state's
interest in assuring that its regulations are effectively enforced, the court
imposed a significant limitation on raising a "first in time" assertion: the
defendant must affirmatively raise the673defense and bear the burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.
VIII. PROCEDURE

The Alaska Supreme Court faced a variety of procedural challenges
during 1991. Although many of these cases involve substantive questions
of import, procedural issues predominate and thus justify treatment in a
separate section. The case summaries fall into four categories: failure of
prosecution, modification of final judgment, statute of limitations, and
attorneys' fees and sanctions. Other case summaries appear in the
"miscellaneous" heading at the end of this section.
Three cases of particular interest in this area are State v. Municipality
of Anchorage,674 which determined when it is appropriate to order a new
trial for less than all the parties involved, Lee Houston & Associates, Ltd.

668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.

Id. at 387-88.
I at 389 (quoting ALAsKA STAT. § 16.05.722 (1991)).
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id at 389-90.
Id. at 390.
805 P.2d 971 (Alaska 1991). See infra page 198.
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v. Racine,6 5 which expanded the statute of limitations applicable to
claims for professional malpractice, and Pedersen v. Zielski,676 which
modified the "discovery rule" applied to the statute of limitations.
A. Failure of Prosecution
In Power Constructors, Inc. v. Acres American,6 77 the Alaska
Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of an action with
prejudice because the claimant failed to prosecute the case for three
years.678 Power Constructors, Inc. filed suit in 1986, but failed to
advance the proceeding beyond preliminary discovery. More than a year
passed with neither party taking further action; the superior court served
notice of dismissal in 1988. After having been granted an opposition to the
notice and a motion for additional time for withdrawal and substitution of
attorney, Power Constructors again took no action on the case for more
than a year. In 1989, the superior court dismissed the action with
prejudice. 679
The supreme court held that, by themselves, the substitution of counsel
and the need for additional time to review the lawsuit were not good cause
for the sixteen-month delay caused by Power Constructors. 610 The court
also ruled that the trial memorandum filed by Power Construct6rs after the
court-issued notice of dismissal did not constitute a "proceeding" within the
meaning of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 41(e), and therefore could not
prevent dismissal."' The court also held that dismissal, with prejudice
was proper where Power Constructors made no diligent effort to move the
case forward, filed no motion for additional time, and let the case drag on
for three years. a 2
Moreover, the supreme court concluded that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in dismissing the case because it conducted a
"reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful alternatives to
dismissal." 3 The supreme court determined that Acres American was

675. 806 P.2d 848 (Alaska 1991). See infra page 190.
676. 822 P.2d 903 (Alaska 1991). See infra page 194.
677. 811 P.2d 1052 (Alaska 1991).
678. Id. at 1053.
679. Id.
680. Id. at 1054.
681. Id. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 41(e) states that dismissal is proper when no
proceeding has been undertaken in more than a year. The rule was designed to stop stall
tactics and prevent coercion of settlement of non-meritorious lawsuits. Id. at 1053-54.
682. Id. at 1055.
683. Id. The trial court had rejected alternative routes such as fining Power Constructors
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prejudiced by the delay because the lapse of time increased the costs
associated with locating and deposing witnesses.6
The court noted in
dicta, however, that a showing of prejudice
is
not
necessary
to find proper
5
a court's dismissal with prejudice.6
In Ford v. Municipality of Anchorage, 6 the supreme court held that
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 16.1 provides the exclusive procedure for
dismissing "fast-track" cases for failure to prosecute. Rule 16.1(g)
provides that a court will transfer a case designated as "fast-track" to the
inactive calendar if no motion to set trial is filed within 270 days after
service of the summons and complaint.'
The supreme court held that dismissal under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(e) was improper in light of Rule 16.1(m), which states that
Rule 16.1 supersedes all other civil rules in cases of conflict.6 8 In this
case, the court noted that the superior court failed to transfer the case to the
inactive calendar, and thereby failed to provide the plaintiff with adequate
notice.689 The court concluded that since the plaintiff's case was
specifically assigned to the fast-track, she should have been afforded all the
protections of Rule 16.1, including proper notice.69
In dissent, Justice Burke argued that the majority's strict compliance
with the rules of civil procedure led to an "absurd and manifestly unjust"
result. 69' Justice Burke contended that Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure
94692 should have been invoked to permit the court to forego strict
adherence to the rules when injustice would result.693

or awarding Acres American the costs of finding and deposing witnesses. Id. Justice
Rabinowitz dissented, arguing that the dismissal was improper since the statute of
limitations had not yet run on the action. Id. at 1057 (Rabinowitz & Matthews, J.J.,
dissenting).
684. Id. at 1056.
685. Id. at 1056 n.7.
686. 813 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1991).
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Id. at 656.
690. Id.
691. Ld.(Burke, J., dissenting)
692. Rule 94 states that "[t]hese rules are designed to facilitate business and advance
justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any case where it shall be
manifest to the court that a strict adherence to them will work injustice." ALASKA R. CIv.
P. 94.
693. Ford, 813 P.2d at 656 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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B. Modification of Final Judgment
In Barnes v. Barnes,694 the Alaska Supreme Court held that, contrary
to the general rule announced in Duriron Co. v. Bakke,695 the superior
court did not need to petition the supreme court for remand in order to
modify a final judgment under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)6
when the case was on appeal.6' Instead, the court affirmed the superior

court's grant of Ramona Barnes' Rule 60(b) motion,698 stating that an
application to the supreme court would have been unnecessary because its
earlier remand order directing the superior court to resolve the question at
issue in the 60(b) motion -- the "distribution of certain deferred
compensation funds" -- gave the superior court authority to rule on the
Rule 60(b) motion.'
The supreme court also found that the superior court's order to pay
$82,000 and accrued earnings on a deferred income account from the date
of the original divorce decree to the date of the order was not beyond Mr.
Barnes' financial ability because he had the option of either liquidating his
assets to satisfy the order or obtaining the money from the deferred income
account.70 Similarly, the court found that tax implications should not be
taken into account in this award01 because, although Mr. Barnes would
694. 820 P.2d 294 (Alaska 1991).
695. 431 P.2d 499 (Alaska 1967). Duriron held that if the superior court wishes to grant
a Rule 60(b) motion while an appeal is pending "it must first apply for and obtain a remand
of the case from this court for the stated purpose of granting a Civil Rule 60(b) motion."
Id. at 500.
696. The rule provides in part:
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or It is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
AIASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b).
697. Barnes, 820 P.2d at 296.
698. Ramona Barnes sought amendment to the original divorce decree that awarded her
Larry Barnes' deferred income account because the account was found to be nontransferrable and could be made available only upon a showing of current financial hardship.
Id. at 295.
699. Id. at 297.
700. Id.
701. Id. The court noted that in order to take tax liability into consideration, there must

1992]

YEAR IN REVIEW

have to pay taxes on the deferred income account, "it is uncertain as to
whether [he] intends ... to use the deferred income account to discharge
his liability to [his former spouse]. '
The court did find, however, that the superior court should have
considered Mr. Barnes' Rule 60(b) motion based on its independent
jurisdiction. 3 The court remanded this portion of the appeal and noted
that no further remand would be necessary if the superior court decided to
grant his Rule 60(b) motion because the case would no longer be pending
before the supreme court.'7°
In Lowe v. Lowe,70 5 the supreme court held that a final judgment, in
this case a divorce decree, may be modified under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6)7° in a case where a dissolution petition provided that
one spouse would have primary custody of the children, but the other
spouse maintained primary custody despite the petition. The supreme court
held that the husband's non-disclosure of his military retirement benefits,
interest in oil leases and marital home did not justify relief from the decree
by operation of Rule 60(b)(6), 7° and that his threat to "use every
available legal means to protect his interests" did not amount to the
"extraordinary circumstances" contemplated by subsection (6).70 8 The
court found, however, that the couple's agreement to let the husband have
the retirement benefits because he was to have primary custody of the
children was a "valid basis for modifying the dissolution decree under
subsection (6) of Rule 60(b)" where he did not take the children. 709 The
court found the factors set out in Schofield v. Schofield10 used to
determine "extraordinary circumstances" that justify relief under Rule
60(b)(6) had been met because the breach of the agreement destroyed the
underlying assumption of the decree. 1

be "'immediate and specific tax liability."' Id. (quoting Oberhansly v. Oberhansly, 798 P.2d
883, 887 (Alaska 1990)).
702. Id.
703. Id. at 298.
704. Id.
705. 817 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1991).
706. See supra note 696.
707. Lowe, 817 P.2d at 457-58.
708. Id. at 458.
709. Id. at 459.
710. 777 P.2d 197 (Alaska 1989). The four factors consider whether: "(1) the
fundamental, underlying assumption of the dissolution agreement had been destroyed; (2)
the parties' property division was poorly thought out; (3) the property division was reached
without the benefit of counsel; and (4) the marital residence was the parties' principal
asset." Id. at 202.
711. Lowe, 817 P.2d at 459.
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The court also found that although a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not
subject to the one-year time limitation of motions based on subsections (1)
through (3), it must nonetheless be filed within a reasonable time. 12 The
supreme court remanded the case for a determination of whether four and
one-half years constituted a reasonable amount of time for purposes of
Rule 60(b)(6).7' 3
C. Statute of Limitations
In Lee Houston & Associates, Ltd. v. Racine,1 the supreme court
resolved the conflict over the statute of limitations to be applied in cases
involving alleged professional malpractice.715 The plaintiff entered into
an agreement with a real estate agent of the defendant's company to sell
property received in an estate settlement. The property was sold for cash
and a promissory note supposedly secured by a "third" deed of trust on
property in Anchorage, terms that the plaintiff claimed the agent
represented as "exceptional. 7 16 The buyer ceased making payments on
the note after approximately a year, and did not respond to a demand letter
sent by the plaintiff's lawyer. In 1986, the plaintiff received notice of
foreclosure on the Anchorage property from the holder of a senior deed on
the property. It was at this time that the plaintiff learned that she had a
sixth deed of trust and that there was over $410,000 of indebtedness
superior to hers on the property. She filed suit against the agent and the
real estate company, claiming negligence, misrepresentation, fraud and
breach of professional contract of employment. 1 7
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the tort claims
were barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Alaska Statutes section
09.10.070 because the plaintiff should have known of the conduct of the
agent when she received no answer from her demand letter.718 The court

712. Id. at 457.
713. Id.
714. 806 P.2d 848 (Alaska 1991).
715. For further discussion of this case and the statute of limitations applicable to
malpractice claims, see Scott Lawrence Altes, Note, The Statute of Limitations For
Professional Malpractice in Alaska After Lee Houston & Associates, Ltd. v. Racine, 9
ALASKA L. REv. 41 (1992).
716. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 850. The plaintiff received $100,000 cash and a $255,000
promissory note supposedly secured by a third deed of trust on property in Anchorage. She
claimed that the agent represented that the deed she was receiving was a third deed of trust
with only $70,000 to $80,000 in debt ahead of her. In truth, the closing documents clearly
indicated that the deed to the Anchorage property was a sixth deed of trust with more than
$410,000 in superior indebtedness. Ia
717. Id
718. Id
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next considered the plaintiff's breach of contract claim. The defendants
argued that plaintiff's breach of contract claim actually sounded in tort as
a claim of professional malpractice, and therefore that the two-year torts
statute of limitations719 applied rather than the six-year contracts statute
of limitations.O The defendant relied on Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v.
White,721 in which the supreme court treated an attorney malpractice
claim as a tort claim because there was no breach of a particular promise,
only of a duty of due care imposed by law.7 The plaintiff, on the other
hand, relied on Bibo v. Jeffrey's Restaurant,7 where the supreme court
held that a breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate director was a claim
upon an implied contract,72 and claimed that the listing agreement gave
rise to fiduciary duties owed by the defendant.
The court recognized that although both cases dealt "with a
professional's alleged breach of a duty of due care which was implied by
law as a result of a contractual undertaking,"5 one claim was deemed
to be a tort claim and the other a contract claim. The court attributed this
inconsistency to "the limited utility of the 'gravamen' test in the context of
claims of professional incompetence which may be reasonably said to arise
either in tort or in contract." 72 The court looked at the language of the
statutes, as well as the policies behind them, to resolve the inconsistency
of prior case law and to determine the applicable statute of limitations.
The court noted that the language of the two-year statute of
limitations72 7 indicates its inapplicability to "actions arising out of
professional service relationships which primarily involve economic
injury.' 72 The statute, which specifically limits the claims for injuries
729 cannot apply to a
to the "rights of another not arising on contract,"
breach of a professional service arising in part from a contract. In contrast,
the court noted that language in the six-year statute of limitations, which
limits claims 'upon a contract or liability,"' does seem to include claims
719. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983). See supra note 157.
720. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983).
721. 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981).
722. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 852-53 (citing Van Horn Lodge, 627 P.2d at 643).
723. 770 P.2d 290 (Alaska 1989).
724. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 853 (citing Bibo, 770 P.2d at 295-96).
725. Id.
726. Id. at 853-54 (citing Jones v. Wadsworth, 791 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Alaska 1973)).
The court has held that the "gravamen" of the plaintiffs claim determines if the claim
sounds in contract or in tort, thereby determining the applicable statute of limitations. Id.
at 852 (citing Van Horn Lodge, 627 P.2d at 643; Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 444 P.2d 536,

538-39 (Alaska 1968)).
727. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
728. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 854.
729. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983) (emphasis added).
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arising from professional service relationships, even if the claim is not
based exclusively on contract principles.73
The court further supported its decision on the basis of policy, noting
that courts generally favor longer limitations periods.'
Further, the
court felt application of the longer period of limitations would be consistent
with the primary purpose of statutes of limitations -- to encourage the
prompt bringing of claims "and avoid injustice which may result from lost
evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses."732 In cases based
on economic loss, such as the plaintiff's claim in Lee Houston, the court
concluded that the evidence would be largely documentary, and that
the
7 33
low.
be
would
lost
being
witnesses
or
fading
memories
of
likelihood
The court thus held that the action was based on a "contract or
liability" for the purposes of determining the applicable statute of
limitations, and overruled Van Horn Lodge to the extent that it was
inconsistent with this holding."
Justices Burke and Moore dissented,
arguing that Bibo instead of Van Horn Lodge should
be overruled because
735
the claim sued on arose in tort, not in contract.
In Cameron v. State,736 the supreme court added a third part to the
discovery rule, which determines when an action accrues for purposes of
the statute of limitations. Alaska Statutes section 09.10.070737 requires
that a claim be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of
action. 738 The traditional rule provided that accrual was established at the
time of injury, 739 but the "discovery rule" was developed to deal with the
situation where the injury does not provide sufficient notice of the cause
of action." The supreme court reviewed previous cases and expressed
the discovery rule as follows:
(1) a cause of action accrues when a person discovers, or reasonably
should have discovered, the existence of all elements essential to the cause
of action;

730. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 854 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983)
(emphasis added)).
731. kl at 854-55.
732. Id. at 855 (citation omitted).
733. Id
734. Id
735. ld at 856-57 (Burke, J., dissenting).
736. 822 P.2d 1362 (Alaska 1991).
737. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
738. Cameron, 822 P.2d at 1364-65.
739. Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 906 (Alaska 1991), see infra page 194; Russell
v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 375 (Alaska 1987).
740. Cameron, 822 P.2d at 1365.
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193

(2) a person reasonably should know of his cause of action when he has
sufficient information to prompt an inquiry into the cause of action, if all of the
essential elements of the cause of action may reasonably be discovered within
the statutory period at a point when a reasonable time remains within which to
file suit."4
The court74also
added a third part to the discovery rule based on Pedersen
2
v. Zielski:

where a person makes a reasonable inquiry which does not reveal the
elements of the cause of action within the statutory period at a point where
there remains a reasonable time within which to file suit, the limitations
period is tolled until a reasonable person discovers actual knowledge of,
or would again be prompted to inquire into, the cause of action. 743
The court concluded that Cameron, a miner, was on inquiry notice at least
by March 7, 1984, when he was informed by his doctor that he had
asthma,7' and that he could reasonably have filed his suit within ten
months.74
In a concurring opinion, Justice Compton stated that he believed the
case should have been affirmed based on a "straightforward application of
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles. 746 He argued that Mine Safety
does not suggest two different accrual dates, nor does Pedersen add a third
part to the discovery rule.7 47 He concluded that the cause of action in
Cameron accrued on February 27, 1984, when Cameron first approached
his doctor. Justice Compton further suggested that the court's
responsibility is to determine when the time limits commence, not to
determine whether the time limits set by the legislature are reasonable.748
In State Department of Corrections v. Welch,749 the court again
applied the discovery rule in barring an action brought against the
Department of Corrections by the parents of a teenager shot and killed by

741. Id. at 1366 (citing Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles, 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska
1988); Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp., 800 P.2d 920 (Alaska 1990), superseded by 818 P.2d
632 (Alaska 1991)).
742. 822 P.2d 903 (Alaska 1991), see infra page 194.
743. Cameron, 822 P.2d at 1367.
744. Cameron consulted a doctor about his breathing difficulties on February 27, 1984.
On May 7, 1984, the doctor provided Cameron with a letter stating that there was evidence
to suggest that his breathing difficulties stemmed from occupational exposure. Cameron dug
tunnels and was exposed to heavy concentrations of rock dust, diesel exhaust and dynamiteblasting by-products. Id. at 1363-64.
745. Id. at 1367. On March 14, 1986, more than two years after his initial visit to the
doctor, Cameron filed a complaint against the state for negligence in failing to provide a
safe workplace. Id. at 1364.
746. Id.at 1368 (Compton, J., concurring) (citing Mine Safety, 756 P.2d at 288).
747. ld.
at 1369-70.
748. Id. at 1370.
749. 805 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1991).
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a parolee. Although the murder occurred on August 18, 1986, and the
parolee was arrested on September 9, 1986, the parents did not file suit
until January 12, 1989.50 The state moved for summary judgment,
claiming that the suit was time-barred by Alaska Statutes section
09.55.580(a)."' The parents also moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the earliest date the statute of limitations could begin to run was
February 5, 1987, the date the parolee pleaded guilty to the murder. 52
The superior court denied both motions, noting that genuine issues of
material fact existed concerning when the plaintiffs had adequate
knowledge of an available cause of action. 5 3
The supreme court reversed, directing the superior court to enter
judgment in favor of the state. The court applied the discovery rule, which
holds that a statute of limitations "begins to run 'when a reasonable person
has enough information to alert that person that he or she has a potential
cause of action or should begin inquiry to protect his or her rights.""'7
The court noted that among other things, the parents had knowledge
through the newspapers and television of the murderer's status as a parolee,
and that the Judgment and Order of Probation on Indictment concerning the
murderer was a public document that stated as a condition of probation that
the individual seek psychiatric treatment.755 The court deemed the
information available to the parents sufficient to provide the critical inquiry
notice to them prior to January 12, 1987.756
In Pedersen v. Zielski7 57 the supreme court held that the discovery
rule applies not only when an injury "is undiscovered and reasonably
undiscoverable" but also where "the injury is known but its cause is
75
unknown and reasonable diligence would not lead to its discovery., 1
This medical malpractice case was governed by a two-year statute of
limitations pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 09.10.070 and Alaska's

750. Id. at 980.
751. The statute provides in part:
[w]hen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another,
the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action therefore against
the latter, if the former might have maintained an action, had the person lived,
against the latter for an injury done by the same act or omission. The action shall
be commenced within two years after the death ....

ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(a) (Supp. 1991).
752.
753.
754.
1988)).
755.
756.
757.
758.

Welch, 805 P.2d at 981.
Id
Id. at 982 (quoting Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles, 756 P.2d 288, 291 (Alaska
Id at 981.
Id at 982.
822 P.2d 903 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 907.
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broad formulation of the discovery rule. 759 The court opined that in this
case the cause of the plaintiff's injury might not be reasonably deduced
from the information available to him.7 ' Moreover, the court found that
the plaintiff had been diligent in questioning his doctors and hiring lawyers
to investigate the situation.76 Subsequently, the court found that a jury
question existed as to whether the plaintiff's inquiry was reasonable, noting
that if the jury so found, the statute of limitations "should not accrue until
[the plaintiff] received actual knowledge of the cause of his paralysis or he
received new information
which would prompt a reasonable person to
762
inquire further."
The court also found that because of the existing physician-patient
relationship between the plaintiff and his doctors (defendants), the
defendants could be estopped from relying on the statute of limitations.763
The court opined that the doctors' non-disclosure of a possible cause of the
plaintiff's injury satisfied the first prong of the equitable estoppel analysis
set forth in Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage.7M' Relying on various
case law from other states, the court found that "the fact that the true state
of affairs appeared in the medical records [did not] necessarily preclude[]
an estoppel. 765
In Fields v. FairbanksNorth Star Borough,766 the supreme court held
that for the purposes of tolling a statute of limitations provision, the
limitation period will exclude the date of the triggering event and include
the last day of the limitations period. 767 Angel McFetridge was injured
at North Pole High School before she had achieved the age of
majority.76 Because she was a minor when injured, Alaska Statutes
section 09.10.140 governed the applicable statute of limitations period,
deemed to be two years after majority is reached.769

759. Id. at 906-07; see State Dep't of Corrections v. Welch, 805 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1991).
760. Pedersen, 822 P.2d at 907.
761. Id.
762. Id. at 908. Justice Compton's dissent noted that the majority's reasoning produced
two distinctive discovery rule accrual dates: first, "when the plaintiff has information
sufficient to alert a reasonable person to the fact that he has a potential cause of action"; and
second, when "within the statutory period, the essential elements may be reasonably
discovered." Compton found this two-part analysis contrary to the discovery rule adopted
in Greater Area Inc. v. Bookman, 657 P.2d 828 (Alaska 1982). Pedersen, 822 P.2d at 911
(Compton, J., dissenting in part).
763. Pedersen, 822 P.2d at 908-09.
764. 743 P.2d 372 (Alaska 1987).

765.
766.
767.
768.

Pedersen, 822 P.2d at 910.
818 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 659.
769. Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (Supp. 1991).
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The supreme court noted that the "common law rule for computation
of time periods," codified in Alaska Statutes section 01.10.080, governed
when the statute of limitations ran.770 The court rejected the superior
court's application of the birthday exception "under which a person is
deemed to have reached a given age on the earliest moment of the day
preceding an anniversary of birth, ' 77 as contrary to the common concept
of a birthday. 2 Instead, the court applied the common law practice of
computing a statute of limitations time period by excluding the day of the
triggering event -- here the attainment of majority age -- and including the
final day of the period.773 Thus the court held that McFetridge's claim
was timely because it was filed on the first business day following the
774
birthday two years after she reached the age of majority.
D. Attorneys' Fees and Sanctions
In Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine,775 the
supreme court affirmed the denial of certification of an initiative to set
limits on the recovery of attorneys' fees in personal injury cases.776
Applying Alaska Statutes section 15.45.010777 and article XI, section 7
of the Alaska Constitution, 8 the court concluded that the initiative was
properly removed from the "sphere of the electorate, 779 because it
attempted to prescribe a rule of court. Additionally, the court held that the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the group was not

770. Fields, 818 P.2d at 660. Alaska Statutes section 01.10.080 provides: "[t]he time
in which an act provided by law is required to be done is computed by excluding the first
day and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is excluded."
ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.080 (1990).
771. Fields, 818 P.2d at 660.
772. Id. at 661.
773. Id.
774. Id.
775. 810 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991). For further discussion of this case, see Laurence
Keyes, Alaska's Apportionment of Damages Statute: Problemsfor Litigants, 9 ALASKA L.
REV. 1, 15 n.75 (1992).
776. Citizens Coalition, 810 P.2d at 163.
777. Alaska Statutes section 15.45.010 provides that the people may exercise, through
the initiative, the law-making powers of the legislature, subject to the same restrictions that
appear in article XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.010
(1988).
778. Article XI, section 7 of the constitution provides that "(t]he initiative shall not be
used to dedicate revenues, make or repeal appropriations, create courts, define the
jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their rules, or enact local or special legislation." ALASKA
CONST. art. XI, § 7.
779. Citizens Coalition, 810 P.2d at 170-71.
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a public interest litigant and thus that the group had to pay attorneys' fees. so
The Coalition failed to prove that there was no relationship between the
lawsuit and the group's economic interests, and thereby failed to satisfy the
last criterion of the four necessary to be considered a public interest
litigant. 7 1
782
Alaska State Employees Ass'n v. Alaska Public Employees Ass 'n
involved a dispute over union dues between two groups competing to
represent state employees. After the Alaska State Employees Association
("ASEA") won the representation election, there was a four-month delay
before it was certified formally as the union representative. During that
delay, the former union bargaining representative, the Alaska Public
Employees Association ("APEA") continued to collect dues and later sent
demands for delinquent dues to members represented by ASEA.7 3
ASEA filed suit to enjoin the union from collecting these dues and to force
APEA to disgorge any other dues wrongfully collected.7 ' Although the
suit was dismissed, APEA filed for and was granted sanctions under Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 11.785
The supreme court concluded that the superior court abused its
discretion in awarding sanctions, stating: "[i]n our view, "ASEA's position

was not so devoid of merit as to justify the imposition of sanctions.

786

780. Id. at 171-72.
781. Id. The four criteria for identifying a public interest litigant are:
(1) Is the case designed to effectuate strong public policies?
(2) If the plaintiff succeeds will numerous people receive benefits from the lawsuit?
(3) Can only a private party have been expected to bring the suit?
(4) Would the purported public interest litigant have sufficient economic incentive
to file suit even if the action involved only narrow issues lacking general
importance?
Id. (quoting Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage School District, 803 P.2d 402, 404
(Alaska 1990)).
782. 813 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1991).
783. Id. at 670.
784. Id. at 670-71.
785. The version of the rule in effect at the time the superior court granted the sanctions
read in part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless expense in the cost of
the litigation.... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ....
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 11. This rule is virtually identical to the federal rule. Recent
amendment to the rule deleted the mandatory sanction provision. Alaska State Employees
Ass'n, 813 P.2d at 671 n.4.
786. Alaska State Employees Ass'n, 813 P.2d at 672.
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The court held that ASENs argument that no employee is obligated to pay
dues after employees vote to replace a union as its bargaining
representative constituted a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.7 The court further held that
the theories of relief advanced by ASEA to enjoin APEA from collecting
delinquent dues were reasonable."!
E. Miscellaneous
State v. Municipality of Anchorage 9 involved an issue of first
impression as to whether it is appropriate for a trial court to order a new
trial for less than all of the co-defendants. 790 The state and the
Municipality of Anchorage were co-defendants in a negligence action
brought by the personal representative of the estate of a man killed while
biking on a paved pathway in Anchorage. The jury found the municipality
not negligent, but found the state's negligence to be a partial cause of Mr.
Hanson's death, 79' and awarded Mrs. Hanson $33,000 and her daughter
$3,000. 7' The jury also found Mr. Hanson comparatively negligent and
apportioned seventy percent of the negligence to him.793 Mrs. Hanson
moved for a new trial, claiming that the damages were inadequate and that
the jury failed to follow the court's instructions. 7' The superior court
denied the motion as to the municipality, but ordered a new trial against the
state, noting that it would be unconscionable to let the verdict stand in light
of the low damages award.795

787. Id. ASEA based its argument on Lyons Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1172, which
held that after a deauthorization vote, the union could not demand that new employees pay
initiation fees and dues pending certification of the election results. The court also held that
based on Ferro Stamping & Manufacturing Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1459 (1951), the contention
that no dues are owed where an employee has signed a dues check-off but the state has
failed to collect the dues, is also a valid good faith argument. Alaska State Employees
Ass'n, 813 P.2d at 673.
788. Alaska State Employees Ass'n, 813 P.2d at 673. The court found no necessary bar
to using estoppel as a basis for relief in the context of an injunction. Id. (citing
Municipality of Anchorage v. Schneider, 685 P.2d 94 (Alaska 1984)). Similarly, the court
held that waiver and laches could also support an action for an injunction. Id.
789. 805 P.2d 971 (Alaska 1991).
790. Id. at 973.
791. Id. at 972.
792. Id.
793. Id.
794. This claim was partially based on a phone call from the jury foreman to the judge
after the trial ended. The foreman indicated to the judge that the jury had considered Mr.
Hanson's negligence in calculating damages. Id.
795. Id.
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The sole issue on review was whether the superior court erred in
denying a new trial against the municipality. 796 Because the issue was
one of first impression, the court analyzed the case law of a number
of other jurisdictions 798 in combination with Alaska case law concerning
separable issues 7' and found that trial courts have discretion to grant a
new trial as to some, but not all, of the co-parties. 800 Because the jury
had clearly indicated that the municipality was not negligent, the supreme
court found there was no need to separate the issue of liability from the
issue of percentage of fault.8° 1 Furthermore, the court found that the state
had a full and fair opportunity to convince the jury that it was the
municipality that had caused the accident, but had failed to do so. As there
was no sign that the jury error as to damages affected their decision that
the municipality was not negligent, the court held that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion and8 affirmed the denial of the motion for
a new trial against the municipality. 02
In Fergusonv. State Departmentof Corrections, 3 the supreme court
held that the principle of res judicata would not bar Ferguson's due process
and equal protection claims because Ferguson had not been provided the
chance to fully litigate the action. While imprisoned, Ferguson was tested
randomly for drugs."°
Following a positive test result, Ferguson's
request for a retest was denied due to his indigency. 805 As a result of the
positive test, and without a disciplinary hearing, Ferguson was removed
from the Alaska Correction Industries Program ("AC") and moved back
into the prison dormitorysre Ferguson filed a civil rights complaint
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.' The superior court dismissed

796. Id. at 973.
797. Id.
798. Id. at 974-75 (citing Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of
Milwaukee, 624 F.2d 798, 811 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980); McIntosh v.
Lawrance, 469 P.2d 628 (Oregon 1970); Halverson v. Anderson, 513 P.2d 827 (Wash.
1973); Williams v. Slade, 431 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1970)).
799. Id. at 973-74 (citing Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska
1980)).
800. Id. at 975.
801. Id.

802. Id.
803. 816 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1991).
804. Id. at 136.
805. Id.
806. Id. Ferguson later appeared before the prison's disciplinary committee. The
committee sanctioned him with thirty days of lost statutory good time, twenty days of
punitive segregation, forty hours of free labor and placement in a drug monitoring program.
Id. at 136-37.
807. Id. at 137. Ferguson alleged that:
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the case, stating that Ferguson's first allegation failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and that the remaining issues raised were
barred by the res judicata effects of Cleary v. Smith."'8
On appeal, the supreme court found that the doctrine of res judicata
should not apply because the Clearyplaintiffs did not adequately represent
Ferguson's interests, and that the traditional res judicata test should be
modified when the absent class member was not fairly and adequately
represented in the initial litigation."0 9 The court noted that the plaintiffs
in Cleary had not litigated the drug testing issue, as evidenced by their
failure to consult any drug testing experts as to the reliability of the drug
test or the admissibility of drug testing evidence.810 Moreover, the court
found that although Ferguson did not have a protected federal constitutional
right to prison employment, under Alaska law he had "an unenforceable
interest in continued participation in rehabilitation programs. ' ' .. The
court found that the ACI program was a rehabilitation program, and as
such, Ferguson could not be terminated from the program without due
process of law." 2 The court further noted that removing Ferguson from
the ACI program based solely on the results of the drug 8test
was not
13
adequate process due to the possible unreliability of the test.
In Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church 14 the plaintiff
appealed a grant of summary judgment in a child abuse case. The main
issue in the case was whether Broderick, the child's mother, had presented
sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether her child was15 abused by a church employee while at the church's
"tiny tots" program.

In opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
Broderick filed affidavits by a doctor, Lee Maxwell, which stated that after
reviewing the Kaufman report 1 6 and interviewing the child, he
1) his liberty interest in participation in the ACI program was abrogated without due

process; 2) he was denied the right to challenge the evidence used against him and
thus was denied due process; 3) the indigence-based denial of a retest resulted in a
denial of equal protection; and 4) the drug test used was not sufficiently reliable
without alternative testing to be used in this manner.
Id.
808. Id.; see Cleary v. Smith, No. 3AN-81-527 (Alaska Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 1990). For
a full discussion of Cleary, see Bradford J.Tribble, Note, Prison Overcrowding in Alaska:
A Legislative Response to the Cleary Settlement, 8 ALASKA L. REy. 155 (1991).
809. Ferguson, 816 P.2d at 138.
810. Id. at 139.
811. Id.
812. Id. at 140.
813. Id.
814. 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1991).
815. Id.at 1215.
816. Kaufman was the child's counselor for a period of about six months, and as of the
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determined that the child had been sexually molested." 7 These affidavits
were disallowed by the superior court because of "a serious credibility
problem." '
The supreme court, however, held that the issue of
credibility should be determined by the trier of fact, not by the court in its
determination of a summary judgment motion. 1 9 Subsequently, the court
permitted Maxwell's testimony because Alaska Rule of Evidence 703
allows an expert to use hearsay evidence in forming an opinion. The court
also stated that the appropriate rule to challenge an expert's opinion as
"novel" is Rule 702,"2 not Rule 703.821 The court then held that
Maxwell's affidavit was admissible under Rule 702, noting that "[e]xpert
testimony that a child has been sexually molested and is suffering from
post-traumatic stress has routinely been admitted in court in other

jurisdictions. ' '
A hearsay issue was also raised because the only identification of the
child's abuser came from the child's mother rather than the child.
Affirming a practice that is widespread in other jurisdictions, the court
ruled that the hearsay exception provided in Rule 803(23)823 governed

time of the appeal he had not been located. ld. at 1214 nn.5-6.
817. Il at 1214.
818. Id. at 1215-16.
819. Id. at 1216.
820. Alaska Rule of Evidence 702(a) provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an

expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
ALASKA R. EviD. 702(a).
821. Broderick, 808 P.2d at 1216. Alaska Rule of Evidence 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing.
Facts or data need not be admissible in evidence, but must be of a type relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences on the subject.
ALASKA R. EviD. 703.
822. Broderick, 808 P.2d at 1216.
823. Alaska Rule of Evidence 803(23) provides:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, [is admissible] if the court
determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (b) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered then any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c) the
general purposes of these rules and the interest of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
ALASKA R. Evm. 803(23). If for some reason the child is unable to testify or to remember
the identification and is therefore "unavailable," Alaska Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), having
the same purpose as Rule 803(23), is applicable. Broderick, 808 P.2d at 1218 n.16.
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this situation.'
The court cited several factors that indicated the
reliability of the mother's statements: the child's spontaneity when
identifying her abuser in the presence of her mother, the young age of the
child, the "childish terminology" used by the child and the child's
consistency.8"
In State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n, 26 the supreme court held
that a temporary restraining order issued by the trial court was improper
because the court "failed to consider the injury to subsistence users which
would result as a consequence of the issuance of the temporary restraining
order."827 The court held that issuing a temporary restraining order only
on a showing of "serious and substantial questions going to the merits of
the case" is appropriate only when the injury that will result from the
restraining order is slight in comparison to the injury that will be suffered
by the individual seeking the injunction, or when the injury can be
indemnified by a bond.'~ The court held that the subsistence user's
injury was as irreparable as that of a commercial fisherman and that
therefore the court should have determined whether the claimants would
have succeeded on the merits of the case before issuing the restraining
order.829
Stadler v.State83 ° involved criminal contempt sanctions for a juror's
failure to return to the courthouse after a recess.83" Stadler gave no
explanation for his failure to return except that he needed a job and did not
think he could continue jury duty for an extended period of time. 832 At
his arraignment, the superior court held Stadler
in contempt of court and
8 33
sentenced him to ninety hours of jury duty.
The supreme court found that the superior court's sentence was
punitive,"
therefore
superior
court
treated cases
Stadler's
contempt asand
criminal,
not found
civil, that
because
in civil
contempt
the

824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.

Broderick, 808 P.2d at 1218 & n.17.
Id. at 1219-20.
815 P.2d 378 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 379
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 379.
813 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 271.

832. Id.
833. Stadler was without counsel at this arraignment. Id.
834. Id. at 272. The court found that the superior court's sentence to Stadler could not
have been remedial because Stadler's obligation to serve as a juror still existed. The state
"could not have been compensating the community for a still existing obligation." Id. at
273.
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punishment given is remedial rather than punitive.835 The court further
noted that no third party was involved in the contempt and that Stadler had
no opportunity to purge the contempt,8 36 factors mitigating in favor of a
criminal contempt finding. Furthermore, the court found Stadler's
contempt to be indirect rather than direct,837 thus entitling Stadler to
procedural protections. 38 The
court thus vacated Stadler's sentence and
39
remanded for resentencing1
IX. PROPERTY LAW
In 1991, the Alaska courts decided five property cases in the areas of
eminent domain, landlord-tenant law, deed reservations and intellectual
property. Two decisions expanded the rights of property owners to
compensation in eminent domain proceedings, while another case
broadened landlords' rights to interfere with tenants' lease assignments. In
the intellectual property area, the court refused to broaden investors' rights
to protect their financial interests in their inventions beyond the
conventional methods of patent, contract or trade secret.
In 8,960 Square Feet, More or Less v. State,m4 the Alaska Supreme
Court determined that, as a matter of law, loss of visibility is compensable
in an eminent domain proceeding where the diminished visibility is the
result of changes to the property taken. Plaintiffs, Dimond D Properties
and Dimond D Developers ("Dimond D"), owned a subdivision bounded
on the north by Dimond Boulevard and on the east by a right of way
owned by the Alaska Railroad."' The state began a project to improve
Dimond Boulevard, which included building a railroad overpass across the
boulevard supported by gradually rising earth berms, lowering the grade of

835. Id. at 272 (citing Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 763 (Alaska 1971)).
836. Stadler,813 P.2d at 272.
837. Id. The court stated that direct contempt required an offender to wilfully disregard
the orders or authority of the court, and since the superior court "could not ascertain the
wilfulness of Stadler's violation from its own observation," the supreme court concluded
that Stadler's contempt must be considered indirect. Id. at 273-74.
838. The court found that Stadler's contempt clearly fell under Alaska Statutes section
09.50.010(11), which dictates a maximum penalty of $100 per violation, and since the
superior court did not give Stadler notice that he might be subject to a penalty greater than
the statutory limit, that court exceeded its authority in sentencing Stadler to ninety hours of
jlr duty. Id. at 275. The court also held, howeverthat Stadler was not entitled to a jury
tra since the potential punishment he could receive for the type of contempt he committed
did not include incarceration. Id. at 274.
839. Id. at 275-76.

840. 806 P.2d 843 (Alaska 1991).
841. 1M at 845.
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Dimond Boulevard itself, and condemning a portion of Dimond D's
subdivision in order to widen the road to six lanes. u 2 At a hearing to
determine just compensation for the taking of land for the, expansion of the
road, Dimond D claimed damages due to the loss of visibility of the
subdivision from the boulevard and also from a shopping mall on the other
side of the newly built berms. The superior court granted the state's
motion for summary judgment, holding that loss of visibility was not
compensable as a matter of law.u 3
The supreme court reversed, finding loss of visibility to be
compensable in some eminent domain proceedings. The court drew a
sharp distinction, however, between the claim regarding the berms and the
claim regarding the lowering of the road."
The court noted that the
berms were built entirely on land belonging to the railroad, and without an
easement of some type, Dimond D had no property interest in the right of
way and therefore had no legal basis for a claim of loss of visibility." 5
In contrast, the lowering of the boulevard was distinct from the building of
the berms, as the lowering and widening of the road was accomplished by
taking land that belonged to Dimond D. The court reasoned that
"ownership of land abutting on a road gives the owner the right to control
the visibility of all adjoining land further off the road," 6 and held that
"loss of visibility to a remaining parcel is compensable where that loss is
due to changes made on the parcel taken by the state.""7 Thus the court
concluded that, in an eminent domain proceeding, loss of visibility is
compensable where the diminished visibility results from changes on the
property taken from the landowner, but not where it occurs due to changes
on the property of another."8
In Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs,49 Gates sued the city when it
moved her fence in order to repair Tenakee Avenue after she refused to
move the fence herself. 50 The trial court granted summary judgment for

842. Id
843. Id.
844. Id at 84.6.
845. Id
846. Id
847. Id. (emphasis in original). The court also noted the possibility of the state taking
land and not immediately creating an obstruction to visibility. In that situation, the court
held that the owner of the remaining land reserves an easement of visibility. Thus, if and
when the state does create a loss of visibility, a separate taking of the easement occurs and
the owner has a right to bring an inverse condemnation proceeding for the loss of visibility.
Id. at 846 n.6.
848. Id. at 848. The court reversed and remanded to the lower court to determine if the
lowering of the road resulted in a loss of visibility. Id. at 848 n.10.
849. 822 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1991).
850. Id. at 457. Gates alleged that the city violated her right to equal protection by
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the city, on the grounds that Gates failed to appeal an administrative
decision within thirty days as required by Alaska Rule of Appellate
Procedure 602(a)(2)"' and the city had municipal immunity against
Gates' claims under Alaska Statutes section 09.65.070."2
The supreme court first held that Gates' claims for damages, her
archaeological site claims, and her statutory claims were inappropriately
characterized as an administrative appeal, and thus that summary judgment
under Rule 602(a)(2) was incorrectly granted. 5 3 All of the claims,
however, that dealt with the decision to move the fence, rather than the
actual act of moving the fence, were properly before the city council acting
as an administrative agency.8 " Nevertheless, the court declined to
resolve the issues, concluding that all of Gates' claims stemming from the
decision to move the fence failed on the merits.8 s5
The court held that the city's decision to revoke Gates' permit for the
fence was immunized under the plain language of Alaska Statutes section
09.65.070(d)(3) and affirmed summary judgment as to any damage claims
arising from the city's decision to move the fence.85 6 While the court
recognized that the actual act of moving the fence could give rise to a
negligence action for damages,857 it concluded that because the fence
always stood and still stands on a right of way owned by the city, Gates
was not entitled to any damages to the real property under the fence. 5 8
However, the court did recognize that there was a material issue of fact as
to how much damage Gates' other property sustained when the city
removed the fence, and it remanded the case for a determination of whether
there had been any damages caused by the negligent removal of the fence
by the city.859

singling out her encroachment for removal, destroyed her real and personal property as well
as an archaeological site, unlawfully widened Tenakee Trail, and violated her right to due

process. Id.

851. The rule provides in part: "An appeal may be taken to the superior court from an
administrative agency within 30 days from the date that the decision appealed from is
mailed or otherwise distributed to the appellant." ALASKA R. App. P. 602(a)(2).
852. Gates, 822 P.2d at 457; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
853. Gates, 822 P.2d at 458.

854. Id.
855. Id. at 458-59.
856. Id. at 459.
857. Id. The court cites Urethane Specialties v. City of Valdez, 620 P.2d 683 (Alaska
1980), for the proposition that planning and operational decisions are to be treated

differently in evaluating a discretionary function exception to sovereign immunity. Gates,

822 P.2d at 459.
858. Id.
859. Id. at 459-60.
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In Ran Corp. v. Hudesman, ' the supreme court held that the
" ' for
"construction of privilege" test presented in Bendix Corp. v. Adams86
purposes of intentional interference tort analysis, should apply to lease
assignment contracts when an owner-landlord interferes with a tenant's
lease assigmnent."' The court noted that "an owner of property has a
financial interest in the assignment of a lease of the property he owns." 863
Accordingly, the court found that the property owner in this case should be
permitted to interfere with his tenant's assignment of the lease when the
owner believed he would receive a greater economic benefit with another
assignee." The court further noted that the owner's threat of litigation
to the current tenant was irrelevant to the existing claim of intentional
interference. '
In Norken Corp. v. McGahan8 66 the current owner of three parcels
of land, Norken, disputed the scope of the original grantor's rights to the
gravel deposits on the parcels. 867 McGahan owned the gravel deposits
by virtue of deed reservations.86 The court held that gravel is not a
mineral, and thus gravel rights are included as a part of the surface estate,
not the mineral estate.8 6'
In Darling v. Standard Alaska Production Co., 870 the supreme court
held that "where an inventor applies for a patent on a product, and relies
solely on that patent application to protect his or her rights, the inventor
cannot obtain restitution for unjust enrichment from a party who copies and
uses that product if the patent application is ultimately rejected. 87 '
Citing Alaska Sales and Service, Inc. v. Miller,72 the court identified
three prerequisites to Darling's unjust enrichment claim. Since the user of
the product, Standard Alaska Production Co. ("Standard") admitted that it
received a benefit and that it appreciated that benefit, the court focused on
"whether considerations of equity will permit Standard to retain the benefit

860. 823 P.2d 646 (Alaska 1991).
861. 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980).
862. Ran Corp., 823 P.2d at 649.
863. Id.
864. Id. at 649-50. The dissent noted, however, that there was "no direct economic
reason to prefer either of the competing tenants" since both agreed to pay the same rent.
Id. at 651 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
865. Id. at 650.
866. 823 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1991).
867. Id. at 623.
868. Id.
869. Id. at 628.
870. 818 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1176 (1992).
871. Id. at 683.
872. 735 P.2d 743, 746 (Alaska 1987).
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without compensating Darling."873 The court explained that Darling's
design was not protected since enforcement of his claim would offend
federal patent policies which encourage disclosure of ideas and innovations:
"enforcement of Darling's unjust enrichment claim would clearly hamper
free exploitation of ideas which are in the public domain.
,,74 The
court noted, however, that those in Darling's position are not without
protection. Inventors who want to secure compensation for their ideas
before disclosure can protect themselves through several methods: patent,
contract, or trade secret" Since Darling voluntarily disclosed his ideas,
and failed to seek either contractual or promissory protection, his only
safeguard was the patent application. When this was denied, he lacked
other forms of protection and his right to compensation was lost. 76
X. TAX LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court heard four cases in the area of tax law
during 1991. One involved a narrow interpretation of the term
"appropriation" under the Alaska Constitution. Two companion cases
interpreted the definition of "developed" land for purposes of determining
eligibility for tax-exempt status under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act. Finally, the court held that discriminatory taxes on the sale of liquor
were unlawful.
877
In City of Fairbanksv. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau,
the Alaska Supreme Court held that a proposed initiative from the Interior
Taxpayers Association was constitutional and should be placed on the
ballot."8 The proposed initiative sought to change Fairbanks General
Code Ordinance 5.402, which delineated how the Fairbanks "bed tax"
should be appropriated among various interests. 9 Whereas Ordinance
5.402 specified certain percentages to be allocated among specific groups
absent a council vote to the contrary, the proposed initiative provided that
the council vote for submitted appropriations annually.880 The superior

873. Darling, 818 P.2d at 680.
874. Mdat 682.
875. Id.
876. Iat at 682-83.
877. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991).
878. Id at 1159.
879. Id. at 1154-55, 1154 n.2. Fairbanks General Code Ordinance 5.402(b) divides such
revenues between the Fairbanks Industrial Development Corp. (10%), the Fairbanks
Convention and Visitors Bureau (70%), beautification (3%) and various other administrative
and discretionary purposes. FAIRBANKS, ALASKA, GENERAL CODE ORDINANCE 5.402(b)
(1988).
880. City of Fairbanks, 818 P.2d at 1154 n.3.
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court issued a permanent injunction holding that "the initiative dedicated
funds unconstitutionally... [and] repealed an existing appropriation."'881
On appeal, the supreme court held that since Ordinance 5.402 was not
an appropriation, the initiative did not repeal an appropriation and was
therefore constitutional under article XI, section 7 of the Alaska
Constitution."82 In keeping with the purpose of the prohibition on repeal
of appropriations, the court construed the term "appropriations" narrowly
to keep budgetary control in the hands of the legislature. 883 The court
compared Ordinance 5.402 to Alaska Statutes section 29.35.100,' 84 the
legislative appropriations authority, and found that Ordinance 5.402 was
not itself an appropriation "because it does not reflect an action taken by
the governing body after annual approval of the budget, nor can it be
construed in any' sense to be a supplemental or emergency act of the
governing body. sas
Moreover, the court found that the initiative was not an appropriation
because it broadened rather than restricted the council's authority to
allocate the bed tax. 8 6 The court noted that the initiative did not allocate
funds in an "executable, mandatory, and reasonably definite" manner.887
While declining to rule on the constitutionality of the ordinance under the
Dedicated Revenues Clause of article IX of the Alaska Constitution,888
the court held that the proposed initiative did not attempt to dedicate
revenues because it did not earmark funds for any specified organization,
nor did it limit the council's discretion. 8 9 Instead, the court held that the
initiative broadened the council's flexibility, and was therefore consistent

881. Id. at 1155.
882. Id. at 1159. Article XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution provides in relevant
part: "[tlhe initiative shall not be used to dedicate revenues, make or repeal appropriations,
...
." ALASKA CoNST. art. XI, § 7.

883. City of Fairbanks,818 P.2d at 1157.
884. Alaska Statutes section 29.35.100 provides:
(a) The governing body shall establish the manner for the preparation and
submission of the budget and capital program. After a public hearing, the governing
body may approve the budget with or without amendments and shall appropriate the
money required for the approved budget.
(b) The governing body may make supplemental and emergency appropriations.
Payment may not be authorized or made and an obligation may not be incurred
except in accordance with appropriations.
ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.100 (a)-(b) (1985).
885. City of Fairbanks,818 P.2d at 1157.
886. Id.
887. Id.
888. Id at 1158 n.7. The dedicated revenues clause of article IX of the Alaska
Constitution places limits on the dedication of proceeds of any state tax to "special
purposes." ALASKA CONST. art. IX.
889. City of Fairbanks,818 P.2d at 1158.
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with the intent of the constitution's prohibition on dedicated revenues as
it maintained "the potential of flexibility in budgeting." 8'
In Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc.,89 1 the
supreme court held that lands are considered "developed" for tax purposes
if they are legally' g and practically893 suitable for sale to the ultimate
user. Because native-owned lands were involved, the court examined the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA"), 894 which conveyed
forty-four million acres of public land and 962.5 million dollars to Alaska
natives in exchange for the extinguishment of all claims based on
aboriginal title."95 The act provides a limited exemption from real
property taxation
for conveyed lands that "'are not developed or leased to
' 8s
third parties.' 9
The Kenai Borough assessor denied property tax exemptions to land
held by the Cook Inlet Region and the Salamat Native Association because
the parcels were within a surveyed and subdivided plat capable of gainful
and productive use. Therefore, the parcels at issue were considered
"developed. ' 89 Disagreeing with this conclusion, the superior court
found the property to be tax-exempt and the borough appealed to the
supreme court.898 To determine the meaning of the term "developed,"
the supreme court examined the legislative history of ANCSA and the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANELCA"), 899 and
cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the term in the context of land.
Rejecting the appellees' assertion that property must actually produce
income to be considered developed, the court concluded that "developed"
means merely that the land has been converted into an area suitable for use
or sale.9 The court noted that since the subdivided lots at issue were
actively being marketed and had access to roads and utilities, they were
developed for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1620. 1 The court held that the

890. Id.
891. 807 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1991).
892. Legal suitability indicates compliance with Alaska Statutes section 40.15.010.
Under that statute, a parcel of land may not be divided for selling purposes without an
approved and recorded plat. Cook Inlet, 807 P.2d at 498.
893. Land that is suitable may not be considered practically suitable for sale if a profit
maximizing land developer would re-plat or make additional improvements. Id.

894. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (1988).
895. Cook Inlet, 807 P.2d at 490.
896. Id. at 490 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1) (1988)). The exemption is also limited
in time to twenty years. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1) (1988).
897. Cook Inlet, 807 P.2d at 490.

898. Id. at 490-91.
899. Id. at 492-96.
900. Id. at 497.
901. Id. at 498-99.
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unsubdivided lots at issue were not developed since they were "not suitable
for sale from the standpoint of a knowledgeable owner wishing to
maximize profits."'
The court remanded several other parcels of land
to the superior court because that court failed to apply appropriate legal
standards in determining whether the parcels were developed. 9 3
In a companion case to Cook Inlet, the supreme court again addressed
the definition of "developed" for purposes of the ANCSA property
exemption. In Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Tyonek Native Corp.,'°4 the
Kenai Peninsula Borough appealed the superior court's decision that a
parcel of land owned by the Tyonek Native Corporation ("Tyonek") was
exempt from taxation for 1985. 05 The parcel, which had been leased by
Tyonek to Kodiak Lumber Mills in the early 1970's, was substantially
improved by Kodiak.906 Tyonek retook possession of the parcel in
1983, 907 and later claimed that the land was exempt from taxation under
the ANCSA exemption. 8 The borough assessor determined that
although the property was no longer leased, it was developed, and therefore
not exempt from taxation.' °9 The superior court reversed the assessor's
finding, however, stating that the land was exempt '9as10 long "as the property
lies unleased or otherwise unproductive and idle."
The supreme court focused on the question of "whether the property
was 'developed' as that term was used in 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1)." 9 1'
The borough defined "developed" as land that was made suitable for
residential or business uses. 912 Tyonek, on the other hand, argued that
the definition was controlled by a state statute that "purports to define the
word 'developed' as used in the federal statute."9 3 The statute defines
the term to mean "a purposeful modification of the property from its
original state that effectuates a condition of gainful and productive present
use without further substantial modification. .. ,,14 Tyonek interpreted

902. Id. at 499. The court also held that an unsubdivided lot not accessible by road was
undeveloped. Id.
903. Id. at 499-500.
904. 807 P.2d 502 (Alaska 1991).
905. Id. at 503.
906. Id Kodiak built, among other things, warehouses, a chip mill, a dock, an air strip,
mobile homes, duplexes, houses, and sewage, water and electrical facilities. Id.

907. Id.
908.
909.
910.
911.

43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1) (1988).
Tyonek, 807 P.2d at 504.
Id
Id at 505.

912. Id.
913. Id. at 503-04.
914. ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.030(m)(1) (1991).
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this definition to require current actual use of the property in order to tax
it, not merely current potential use.
The court rejected Tyonek's argument, finding that Tyonek's definition
was "contrary to the common understanding of the meaning of
[developed]." 9'5 The court found no intent on Congress' part in enacting
the statute for the term "developed" to have a special meaning. 91 6 The
court therefore found that the land had been so improved that it was
"necessarily developed within the meaning of section 1620(d)."'
While
the definition in the state statute is less than clear, the court construed the
meaning of "developed" to be consistent with the meaning as used in the
federal statute. To do otherwise, the court opined, would raise "serious and
substantial questions concerning the constitutionality
of this statute under
91s
the equal rights clause of the Alaska Constitution."
In Lagos v. City of Sitka,919 the supreme court held that section
4.08.040 of the Sitka General Code was unlawful because Alaska Statutes
section 04.21.010(c)(2) prohibits the use of discriminatory sales tax rates
on alcohol, i.e., mandates that alcohol be taxed at the same rate as other
goods.Y The court found that while the text of Alaska Statutes section
04.21.010(c)(2) alone is ambiguous, when it is interpreted in conjunction
with subsection (c)(3) and the legislative history of the amendment to
section 04.21.010(c), it "indicate[s] that the legislature intended ... to
prohibit the imposition of discriminatory sales taxes ....
XI. TORT LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court decided eighteen tort cases during 1991.
These cases are grouped into the following broad categories: judicial
misconduct, malpractice, negligence and product liability. Cases falling
outside the scope of these categories are discussed under the
"miscellaneous" heading at the end of this section.

915. Tyonek, 807 P.2d at 503-04.
916. Id

917.
918.
919.
920.
921.

Id
Id
823 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 645.
Id.
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A. Judicial Misconduct

Inquiry Concerning a Judge' involved an appeal of a decision by
the Judicial Conduct Commission finding that petitioner had violated
judicial canons and recommending that petitioner be publicly admonished
by the supreme court. The petitioner was an officer, director, and
shareholder of City Mortgage Corporation ("CMC"), as well as a Justice
of the Alaska Supreme Court.
The controversy centered on several
actions taken by the petitioner in the context of a settlement conference

between CMC and the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation ("AHFC") in
which the petitioner participated. 924
The supreme court, sitting by assignment, disagreed with both the
petitioner's and the commissioner's arguments about how the petitioner's
conduct should be evaluated under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct,' and concluded that the appropriate test was "whether [the
judge] failed to use reasonable care to prevent a reasonably objective
individual from believing that an impropriety was afoot."§26 In the
instant case, the court found that an appearance of impropriety was created
when petitioner used chambers stationery for three private letters to
opposing counsel,' and met with the governor in order to persuade him
to intervene in a manner favorable to petitioner's interests.'
In analyzing the petitioner's meeting with the governor, the court
reviewed the text and context of Canons 1, 2, 4 and 5.929 The court
922. 822 P.2d 1333 (Alaska 1991) ("Judge HIP').
923. Id. at 1336.
924. Id.
925. Canon 2 states:
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in all His
Activities
A. Ajudge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence
his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to
advance the private interests of others; nor should he convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. He
should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 2 (1984).
926. Judge II, 822 P.2d at 1340. The test employed by the court is the so-called "Judge
11" test that was announced in In Re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 788 P.2d 716, 723
(Alaska 1990).
927. Judge III, 822 P.2d at 1340-41.
928. Id. at 1341-42.
929. Id. at 1342-43. Canon 1 "requires judges to participate in establishing and
maintaining high standards of conduct to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judiciary." Id. at 1342. Canon 2 requires "judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety at all times." Id. Canon 4 permits judges involved in quasi-judicial
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concluded that petitioner violated these canons because a "reasonably
objective person would be justified in believing that an impropriety was
afoot upon learning of a personal meeting between a justice of the state
supreme court and the Governor involving the justice's
private business
930
matters that were then in litigation with the state."
In determining the appropriate sanction, the court looked to American
Bar Association Standards. 93' The court found that while the petitioner

acted negligently, there was no actual harm because the governor did not

do any favors for the petitioner after the meeting. 932 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the violation was "moderately serious" because it
created the potential harm of undermining the public's confidence in the
judiciary.933 After taking into account mitigating and aggravating
934 factors,
the court concluded that a private reprimand was appropriate.
There were three other opinions in the case -- all three both concurred
and dissented with the majority. Judge Hodges argued that the call alone
to the governor's office created an appearance of impropriety, and the

meeting with the governor was actually improper, not just apparently

improper.935 Judge Schulz disagreed with the majority's application of

the objectively reasonable person test, arguing that a reasonable person
apprised of all the details of the petitioner's conduct would not have found
activities to consult with members of the executive or legislative branches "but only on
matters concerning the administration ofjustice." Id. (quoting CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canons 1, 2 & 4 (1984)). Finally, Canon 5
requires a judge to regulate his or her extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk
of conflict with his or her judicial duties.... Subsection C(1) clearly requires a
judge to refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely
on his impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties or
exploit his judicial position. Subsection C(2) limits a judge to holding and managing
investments only if they do not conflict with the requirements of subsection (1).
Id.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (1984).
930. Judge III, 822 P.2d at 1342.
931. Id. at 1343. The four-pronged test is as follows:
1. What ethical duty did the lawyer (judge) violate?
2. What was the lawyer's (judge's) mental state?
3. What was the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's
(judge's) misconduct?
4. Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances?
Id. (citing Judge II, 788 P.2d at 724; DisciplinaryMatterInvolving Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48,
52 (Alaska 1986) (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCIONS (1986), reprintedin ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, §§ 01:805-01:856 (1986) [hereinafter ABA/BNA]).
932. Id. at 1344.
933. Id.
934. Id. at 1345-46. The mitigating factors included the absence of prior disciplinary
proceedings, the petitioner's cooperation with the disciplinary process and his excellent
reputation. The aggravating factors were the petitioner's selfish motive and his substantial
experience in the practice of law. ILaat 1345.
935. Id. at 1346 (Hodges, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

an appearance of impropriety.93 Judge Tunley agreed with Judge Schulz
and reiterated the fact that the Judge II test must include the requirement
that objectively reasonable persons be reasonably informed of surrounding
circumstances. 937

DeNardo v. Michalski 3 addressed the question of whether judicial
immunity protected Judge Michalski from liability for damages due to the
incarceration of the claimant, DeNardo. In a prior proceeding, a court
ordered Denardo to pay attorneys' fees to the state. When DeNardo failed
to comply with the judge's order, the state called for a judgment debtor's
examination against DeNardo, over which Michalski presided. During
these proceedings, DeNardo was questioned about his financial status, and
upon pleading the Fifth Amendment several times, he was held in contempt
of court and incarcerated. DeNardo filed suit against Michalski and June,
the state's counsel who instituted the judgment debtor's examination
hearing, claiming his incarceration was a violation of his constitutional
rights and an abuse of process. DeNardo claimed that Michalski should
have recused himself from the hearing in accordance with Alaska Statutes
section 22.20.020(a)(5), which states that a judicial officer may not preside
over any matter in which he or she has been retained by either party to the
action, or has counseled either party to the action within the past two
years.939 Michalski had litigated appeals against DeNardo within two
years prior to the hearing in question.'
The supreme court held that judicial immunity precluded Michalski's
liability.941 Adhering to United States Supreme Court precedent, the
court noted that judges will not be liable for their judicial actions "'even
when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have
been done maliciously or corruptly.' 942 The court held that Judge
Michalski should be liable only if his acts were not judicial or were outside
his subject matter jurisdiction. 3 Because Michalski's actions were
clearly judicial, and because he had subject matter jurisdiction over
judgment debtors, he retained his judicial immunity.9 " In so holding, the
court noted that even if Michalski should have recused himself from the
hearing, his jurisdictional status over the case was not affected; rather, the

936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.

Id. at 1351 (Schulz, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 1352 (Tunley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
811 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1991) (per curiam).
Id. at 316 & n.2.
Id. at 316.
Id.

942. Id. (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871)).
943. Id. (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)).
944. Id.
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court found that because Michalski had jurisdiction in deciding whether or
not to recuse himself in light of Alaska Statutes section 22.20.020(a)(5),
choosing not to do so did not strip him of his original subject matter
jurisdiction. 4
The court likewise found that Michalski's failure
to
946
award DeNardo a jury trial would not affect his jurisdictional status.
B. Malpractice
In Shaw v. State 7 the defendant was convicted of burglary in 1973
along with a co-defendant. In 1986, the defendant's conviction was set
aside because Shaw was denied effective assistance of counsel due to a
conflict of interest.94 In 1988, the defendant brought a legal malpractice
action against his attorney and the Public Defender Agency for the
conviction. The superior court granted summary judgment for the state,
holding that the suit was barred under the two-year statute of limitations for
legal malpractice claims. 949
The supreme court reversed and held that a convicted criminal must
obtain post-conviction relief before pursuing a legal malpractice claim
against his attorney, and that the statute of limitations is tolled until such
relief is granted. 950 The court noted that other jurisdictions were divided
on the issue, but agreed with those jurisdictions which held that public
policy requires post-conviction relief as a prerequisite to a legal malpractice
claim. 91 The court noted several reasons underlying its ruling: the
requirement promotes judicial economy, establishes an easy to implement
bright-line test, and is consistent with the law on malicious prosecution
which requires that a plaintiff show that an unsuccessful prosecution
occurred in order to establish the tort.95 2
In re Disciplinary Matter Involving Schuler953 involved a district
attorney who was convicted of a misdemeanor when he concealed
merchandise with the intent of leaving a store without paying. Schuler
completed the terms of his probation and the criminal case was

945. Id.
946. Id. at 316-17.
947. 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991).
948. Id. at 1359-60.
949. IM
950. Id. The court noted that post-conviction relief usually, but not always, is taken
under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 or 35.1, which allow correction of an illegal
sentence "at any time." Id. at 1360 n.3, 1362.
951. Id. (citing Carmel v. Lunney, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (N.Y. 1987)).
952. Id at 1361-62.
953. 818 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1991).
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dismissed.9' In 1988, the supreme court entered an order of interim
suspension from the practice of law and referred the matter to the Alaska
Bar Association Discipline Counsel ("Counsel"). 5' The supreme court
subsequently rejected the stipulation accepted by the Counsel in which
Schuler would be suspended from the practice of law for six months and
be required to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Exam ("MPRE"). The court stated that the crime was normally serious
enough to warrant disbarment.
The Counsel presented a revised stipulation to the court that
recommended a two-year suspension from the practice of law and a
requirement that Schuler take and pass the MPRE. Upon the court's
request for information relating to any prior criminal or juvenile
convictions of Schuler, a 1973 conviction for petty larceny was disclosed.
The Counsel considered this information and chose not to modify the
stipulation.
The supreme court approved the revised stipulation.956 The court
found that Schuler violated Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 1-102(A)(3) and (4)
by engaging in conduct involving moral turpitude and dishonesty.9 7 The
court also found that Schuler's conviction demonstrated that he acted with
intent, and that his theft caused serious injury under the relevant ABA
Standards. 958 Although the court concluded that the sanction of
disbarment, rather than suspension, was the appropriate reference point
from which to evaluate any mitigating and aggravating factors,959 the
court found several mitigating factors which prompted its approval of the
revised stipulation. These factors included the absence of any prior
disciplinary record, absence of personal or emotional problems, Schuler's

954. Id. at 139.
955. The court entered the order pursuant to Alaska Bar Rule 26(a). Id.
956. I& at 145.
957. Id. at 140.
958. Id. at 141.
959. Id. at 142. Standard 5.11 of the Model Standards provides:
Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale,
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of
another, or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these
offenses; or
(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness
to practice.
ABA/BNA, supra note 931, at 01:829.
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completion
of probation, and the fact that he lost his job as district
6
attorney.%
C. Negligence
Wassilie v. Alaska Village Electric Cooperative, Inc.961 involved a
negligence action brought against Alaska Village Electric Cooperative, Inc.
("AVEC") by Wassilie, who suffered severe electrical shock when his
citizens' band ("CB") antenna toppled near AVEC's newly installed
overhead transmission lines, and electricity arced through the antenna to the
CB unit. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for
AVEC, finding that AVEC did not have a duty to warn Wassilie of the
dangers because it could not have foreseen that Wassilie would create9 a2
dangerous condition by moving the CB antenna closer to the lines. 6
Additionally, the court concluded that Wassilie had received generalized
warnings and had not demonstrated that the absence of specific warnings
was the proximate cause of his injuries.'
The supreme court disagreed with the trial court, finding that the jury
could have reasonably concluded that AVEC should have been aware of
the danger before the accident occurred. 954 The court noted that a
reasonable jury could have concluded that AVEC negligently failed to warn
and that failure to provide explicit warnings was the proximate cause of the
injury.90 The court reversed and remanded to the9 superior court for a
ruling on the motions for a new trial and remittitur. M
In State v. Willm the State of Alaska and a state trooper appealed
a jury award of damages for the shooting of a mentally impaired
individual. In early September, 1984, Will exhibited symptoms of acute
paranoia, and began acting irrationally, believing that unknown persons
were attempting to kill him. After his boat was found adrift in Icy Strait,
Will's family contacted the Hoonah Police Department ("HPD") and the
state troopers to report Will missing. Will's family and friends also

960. Schuler, 818 P.2d at 143-44.
961. 816 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1991).

962. Id. at 159-60.

963. Id.
964. Id. at 161-62. Since Wassilie presented evidence that the CB antenna was the same
distance from the overhead transmission lines even after it was moved and that the antenna
was moved prior to the energizing of the overhead system, reasonable jurors could differ
on the foreseeability issue. Id

965. Id. at 162.
966. Id. at 162-63.
967. 807 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1991).
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informed the BPD and the troopers that Will was armed, mentally unstable,
and would most likely react unfavorably to the sight of police officers.
Will located and boarded his boat at the Hoonah harbor where it had been
docked after it was found adrift. Responding to a report of a shot fired at
the harbor, the police chief, several officers and troopers surrounded the
boat, but made no attempt to communicate their presence or purpose to
Will. Will left the boat armed with a pistol, and fired two shots in the
direction of the officers. The trooper and an officer fired back, wounding
Will at least five times. Will sued the state, the City of Hoonah, and the
officers involved in the shooting claiming damages
for battery, negligence
969
96
and violations of his constitutional rights. ' The defendants
appealed the trial court's denial of their motions for summary judgment, for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, judgment consistent with the verdict,
new trial and remittitur.97 °
The supreme court first found that the trial court had incorrectly relied
upon the "acting in concert" theory97 in determining as a matter of law
that the state trooper was liable for the negligence of the city and the HPD
chief.'
The jury had found that the trooper did not commit assault or
battery against Will and that he was not negligent.97 However, the trial
court, relying on the "acting in concert" theory set out in Williams v.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,974 determined that the trooper was liable.
The supreme court disagreed, distinguishing Williams from the present case
as Williams involved collective intentional torts. 975 The court found the
theory inapplicable in a case where negligence is alleged, as "[a]n
individual who acts with reasonable care cannot be deemed ' negligent
976
simply because those with whom he cooperates act negligently.
The jury also found that although the state was negligent, its
negligence was not the legal cause of Will's injury.97 7 The trial court
nevertheless held that the state was vicariously liable to Will under a theory

968. Id at 468-69.
969. The City of Hoonah and the two HPD officers settled with Will, leaving the state
and the state trooper as appellants. Id. at 468.
970. Id at 469.
971. The court defined the purpose of the theory as "hold[ing] all individuals engaged
in a joint enterprise with a tortious purpose accountable for the harm any member of the
enterprise may inflict." Id. at 470 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON Tm LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 322-23 (5th ed. 1984)).
972. Id
973. Id
974. 650 P.2d 343, 348 (Alaska 1982).
975. Will, 807 P.2d at 470.
976. Id (citing RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. c (1979)).
977. Id
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of respondeat superior due to the trooper's actions in the shooting."
The supreme court reversed, holding that the state could not be held
vicariously liable as the trial court had incorrectly determined that the
trooper was negligent. 979 The court thus reversed and remanded both the
judgment against the state and the trooper.
Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp.9 s0 arose from the fatal crash of
an aircraft that Croxton was co-piloting as an employee of Puget Sound
Tug and Barge Company ("PST&B"). Croxton's estate sued PST&B and
its parent company, Crowley, for wrongful death, alleging that the chief
pilot of Crowley's aviation department was negligent in assigning the pilotin-command of the flight without first properly training him. 98' The
superior court concluded that the chief pilot was negligent and that the
negligence was the proximate cause of Croxton's death. 9 2 The court
also held, however, that the chief pilot was an employee of PST&B, not of
Crowley, and thus was Croxton's co-employee. 9s3 Consequently, the suit
was barred by the exclusive remedies provision of Alaska Statutes section
23.30.055. 984

The supreme court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment
against Crowley."' The court found that the lower court erred in
allowing Crowley to argue that employment status should be determined
by the substance of employment, rather than its form.98 6 The court noted
that the error stemmed from the superior court's failure to apply the general
rule that a corporation may not evade the consequences of its being a
separate entity when it suits its convenience. 987 The supreme court
rejected Crowley's argument that the chief pilot was actually employed by

978. Id. at 471.
979. l
980. 817 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1991).
981. Id. at 461. The case came to trial with Crowley as the remaining defendant. Id.
The superior court dismissed the claim against PST&B in an earlier proceeding, since an
employer's liability under the workers' compensation statutes is exclusive of all other
liability. Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 758 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1988).

982. Croxton, 817 P.2d at 462.
983. Id.
984. 1& The statute provides:

The liability of an employer prescribed in [Alaska Statutes section] 23.30.045 is
exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer and any fellow employee
to the employee, the employee's legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the
employer or fellow employee at law or in admiralty on account of the injury or
death.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1990).
985. Croxton, 817 P.2d at 467.
986. Id. at 464.
987. Id.
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its subsidiary, the decedent's former employer. The court stated that the
corporate veil should only be pierced when the corporate structure is used
to perpetrate fraud or injustice. 988 Furthermore, an employee is presumed
to be controlled by his formal employer unless the corporate veil is
pierced. 9 9 Since the veil was not pierced and the chief pilot was paid by
Crowley, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation

Act did not apply.'

The court also noted that this decision accords with

a large number of courts that have refused to allow corporations to disavow
991

their forms in workers' compensation contexts.

In Loeb v. Rasmussen,992 the supreme court held that neither
intentional misconduct nor comparative negligence is a defense when a

defendant violates statutes prohibiting persons from selling or furnishing

alcohol to minors. 93 The court held that prior case law and the public
policy behind the statutes reflected the need to protect minors from
themselves, not from liquor salesmen; allowing the defense of contributory
negligence would defeat this purpose. 994 Moreover, the court found that
Alaska Statutes section 09.17.060, which codifies the doctrine of
comparative negligence in Alaska, does not change the impropriety of a
comparative negligence defense in this context. For the same reasons, the

court found that wilful misconduct is similarly not a defense in this

situation. 5
In Hiibschman v. City of Valdez,' the plaintiff sued the city for
injuries she sustained as she went over a ski bump-jump on a beginner run
at a city ski hill.Y The case primarily involved interpreting Alaska's

988. Id. at 466. Nevertheless, the court noted that neither veil-piercing option was
"available to the corporation to pierce its own corporate form," as was the case in Croxton.
Id. at 465 n.9 (citations omitted). For further discussion of veil-piercing in Alaska, see infra
Philip Reed Strauss, Note, Controland/orMisconduct: Clarifying the Test ForPiercing the
Corporate Veil in Alaska, 9 ALASKA L. Rv. 65 (1992).
989. Croxton, 817 P.2d at 466.
990. kL at 467.
991. Id. at 466-67.
992. 822 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1991).
993. Alaska Statutes section 04.16.051 prohibits persons from furnishing alcohol to
minors; Alaska Statutes section 04.16.050 requires liquor licensees to procure proof of age
from a person whom they have reason to believe may be a minor.
994. Loeb, 822 P.2d at 917-18 (citing Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981)).
995. Id. at 920 (citing Morris v. Farley, 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983)). The dissent
argued that the Alaska pure comparative negligence standard as adopted in Kaatz v. State,
540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975), left no room for the "exceptional statute rule" used by the
majority. Loeb, 822 P.2d at 921-22 (Moore, J., dissenting). Justice Moore argued that none
of the legislative history behind Alaska Statutes sections 04.16.051 and 04.21.050 indicated
an attempt to insulate minors completely from all liability simply because alcohol was
involved. Id. at 923-24.
996. 821 P.2d 1354 (Alaska 1991).
997. Id. at 1355. The plaintiff was a beginner skier who watched others take the jump
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Limitations on Claims Arising From Skiing Act ("Ski Act").

99

" The

supreme court affirmed the superior court's determination that a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the jump constituted an inherent

The court began by noting that the Ski Act does not
risk of skiing.'
eliminate a ski area's liability for negligence: "The statute was intended to
bar recovery for those actions which only the skier could control and that
An inherent risk, the court
were beyond the ski operator's control."'
stated, is one that is obvious and necessary.100 ' The court ruled that ski
area operators' protection from liability for artificial conditions should be
and it also found that whether the jump was
narrowly construed,1'
artificially made or a natural part of the terrain was a question for the
03

jury.10

The court further held that the trial court erred in not submitting the
issue of whether the plaintiff was skiing beyond her ability to the

and was told by a friend how to take the jump. The jump threw her straight up in the air,
and she landed on her tail bone, resulting in permanent paralysis from the waist down. Id.
at 1356.
998. Alaska Statutes section 09.65.135 states:
Limitations on claims arising from skiing.
(a) A skier may not recover from a ski area operator for injury resulting from an
inherent risk of skiing unless the injury occurred when the ski area operator was not
providing the information required by (b) of this section.
(b) A ski area operator shall post trail signs at prominent locations within a ski area
which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing and the limitation on liability
of the ski area operator provided by this section.
(c) In this section
(1) "inherent risks of skiing" means the dangers or conditions which are
an integral part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to,
(A) changing weather conditions;
03) variations or steepness in terrain;
(C) snow or ice conditions;
(D) surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest
growth, and rocks;
(E)collisions with lift towers, other structures, and their components
unless the skier is on the lift;
(F) collisions with other skiers; and
(G) a skier's failure to ski within the limits of the skier's ability;
(2) "injury" means a personal injury or property damage or loss;
(3) "skier" means a person in a ski area engaged in the sport of skiing,
sliding downhill on snow or ice on skis, a toboggan, a sled, a tube, a skibob, or other device for recreation in snow;
(4) "ski area" means all ski slopes, trails and other places under the
control of a ski area operator and administered as a single enterprise in the
state;
(5) "ski area operator" means the operator of a ski area.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.135 (1983).
999. Hiibschman, 821 P.2d at 1358.
1000. Id. at 1359.
1001. Id. at 1360.
1002. Id. at 1361.
1003. Id. at 1362.
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In order to be skiing beyond one's ability, one must

subjectively know that he or she is skiing beyond his or her ability. 0°

It is also possible for the skier to voluntarily and unreasonably assume a
negligently created risk.'1 The skier's recovery may be limited by her
comparative negligence as the court interpreted the Ski Act so as not to
nullify Alaska's comparative negligence statute.' "
In Brown v. State,lm a marine engineer was injured while working
on board a ship in the course of his employment as a sailor. Brown was
operating under a union contract at the time of the injury."
His
complaint, based on the Jones Act'0° 0 and the doctrine of
unseaworthiness, was dismissed by the superior court. The supreme court
reversed and remanded.10 ' The court initially noted that a sailor has
three important rights: the maritime law right to maintenance and cure, the

maritime law right to recover damages for injuries caused by
unseaworthiness of a vessel, and the Jones Act right to recover damages
caused by an employer's
negligence. The union contract affected all three
012
of these rights.
After a brief review of the three rights, the court analyzed section 9.03
of the contract in relation to the rights, and concluded that the provision
was invalid."" First, the court held that a sailor's rights to maintenance
and cure could not be abrogated by contract.' 4 The right to

1004. Id. at 1362-63.
1005. Id.
1006. Id. at 1363.
1007. Id. at 1364. Alaska's comparative negligence statute provides:
[i]n an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to a
person or harm to property, contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes
proportionally the amount awarded as compensatory damages for the injury
attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (Supp. 1991).
1008. 816 P.2d 1368 (Alaska 1991).
1009. Section 9.03 of the contract provided: "Employees shall be entitled to Alaska
Workers' Compensation Benefits in lieu of remedies for wages, maintenance and cure,
unseaworthiness, and negligence for illness and injuries incurred while in the service of the
Employer." Ida at 1370.
1010. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
1011. Brown, 816 P.2d at 1370, 1376. Brown received benefits for his injury under the
Alaska Workers' Compensation program. He had brought an action based on the Jones Act
and the doctrine of unseaworthiness in federal court which was dismissed after the Ninth
Circuit held in a similar case that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
bars a state-employed sailor from suing the state in federal court. Id. at 1370. For a
discussion of a sailor's ability to sue the state under the Jones Act in state court, see John
R. Fitzgerald, An Analysis of JurisdictionalIssues PresentedWhen State-Employed Seamen
are Injured and Seek Redress, 8 ALASKA L. REv. 203 (1991).
1012. Brown, 816 P.2d at 1371.
1013. Id. at 1373.
1014. Id. at 1374. Some courts have upheld contracts which set a rate for maintenance
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maintenance and cure is traditionally unconditional, ° 5 and the court
found that section 9.03 impermissibly exchanged Workers' Compensation
coverage for maintenance -- effectively excluding a maintenance right for
the class of sailors who became ill or injured while on duty, but whose
illness or injury was not related to work.
The court next held that
section 9.03 impermissibly altered the state's obligation to provide01 a6
seaworthy vessel by substantially limiting the state's liability.
Finally, the court held that section 9.03 impermissibly allowed the state to
exempt itself from liability under the Jones Act, with the result that injured
sailors would not be fully compensated. 1° 7 Section 5 of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act,'0 18 which limits the ability of the employer to
exempt itself from liability, is incorporated by reference into the Jones Act
and thus limits the state's ability to exempt itself from liability under that
act as well. 1 19
' The dissent argued that the court was willing to sacrifice
state sovereignty to federal supremacy without a clear federal constitutional
requirement to do so.1'0
D. Product Liability
In Colt IndustriesOperating Corp. v. Frank W. Murphy Manufacturer,
Inc.r12 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a settling tortfeasor must not
be included in determining the number of pro rata shares available for the
remaining tortfeasor's individual liability under Alaska Statutes section
09.16.040." ° The case arose from a wrongful death action brought by
the estate of Ralph Howard against Colt (a compressor manufacturer),

and cure, but even those make clear that total abrogation is not permissible. See AI-Zawkari
v. American S.S. Co., 871 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir. 1989); Gardiner v. Sea-Land Service,
Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1986).
1015. Brown, 816 P.2d at 1374.
1016. IM at 1375.
1017. Id
1018. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
1019. Brown, 816 P.2d at 1375.
1020. Id at 1376-77 (Compton, J., dissenting).
1021. 822 P.2d 925 (Alaska 1991).
1022. Id. at 935-36. The statute provides:
When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the
same wrongful death
(1) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury
or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the
others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
(2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983).
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Craig Taylor (Colt's distributor), and Murphy (the manufacturer of a
component part used in the compressor)."
Colt settled and sought
contribution from Murphy.
The supreme court reversed the trial court's directed verdict for
Murphy on the issue of design defect, relying on a strict liability design
defect theory."
Under one of the tests set out in CaterpillarTractor
Co. v. Beck," a product is considered defectively designed if "'the
plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused injury and the
defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design. ' '
The court ruled that Colt had presented sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case that the design defect proximately
caused the injury, and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of
design defect.'0
The court reversed the superior court's ruling that Colt, as a settling
tortfeasor, should be included in calculating the number of pro rata shares
available for the remaining tortfeasors' liability. The court concluded that
Colt and Craig Taylor, the distributor, should have been treated as a single
share for contribution purposes because under a strict liability theory Craig
Taylor is entitled to indemnification and there was no evidence to hold the
distributor liable based upon its own independent conduct. 28 The court
thus reversed the superior court's ruling that there were three pro rata
shares, and stated that if Murphy was found to be a joint tortfeasor, there
would be two pro rata shares.' 9

1023. Colt Industries,822 P.2d at 927-28.
1024. Id. at 931.
1025. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
1026. Colt Industries,822 P.2d at 929 (quoting Beck, 593 P.2d at 886).
1027. Id. at 931. The court also rejected Murphy's argument that the problem should
have been defined as a manufacturing defect. The court noted that the line between design
defects and manufacturing defects is blurry, and rigid delineation between the categories is
unnecessary and undesirable. The court concluded that the theories of manufacturing defect
and design defect can operate simultaneously, and did so in this case. Id. at 930-31.
1028. Id. at 935-36.
1029. Id. Justice Compton's dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority view on
whether settling tortfeasors should be included in calculating the number of pro rata shares.
Id. at 937-38 (Compton, J.,dissenting in part). The dissent argued that former Alaska
Statutes section 09.16.040(2) does not suggest that discharging a tortfeasor from all liability
for contribution means that they cannot be included in the equation to determine the total
number of shares in the entire liability. Id.
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E. Miscellaneous
' the supreme
In Johnson v. State Department of Fish & Game,1030
court held that Alaska Statutes sections 18.80.255(1) ("Human Rights
Act") 103 and 22.10.0201032 together "constitute express legislative
consent for persons to bring particular civil rights actions against the
state."' 0 33 The case involved restrictions on salmon fishing on the Alsek
and East Alsek Rivers imposed against native surf fishermen. The court
found that although the state was not immune from prosecution under the
Alaska Human Rights Act,'t° the state could not be liable for punitive
damages since they were not expressly authorized by the statute. 0 35 The
court did hold, however, that the Human Rights Act established a cause of
action for mental anguish damages, 0 36 opining that the rationale for
concurrent jurisdiction under the Act, in both the superior court and the
Human 0 Rights
Commission, was the radical difference in damage
37

awards.

The court also concluded that the administrative decision of the Human
Rights Commission should have been given collateral estoppel effect. 38
Relying on the test established in Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum
Co.,'03 the court held that the Commission's procedures contained the
"essential elements of adjudication," and thus its adjudication of the critical
issues was "exhaustive." Since the state neither appealed the decision nor
asserted the inadequacy of the adjudication, a preclusive effect should have
been given to the Commission's decision. 40

1030. No. 3778 (Alaska Nov. 29, 1991).
1031. Alaska Statutes section 18.80.255 provides in relevant part: [i]t is unlawful for the
state or any of its political subdivisions (1) to refuse, withhold from, or deny to a person
any local, state, or federal funds, services, goods, facilities, advantages, or privileges because
of race, religion, sex, color, or national origin." ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.255 (1991).
1032. ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.020(i) (1988).
1033. Johnson, slip op. at 15.
1034. Id. at 17.
1035. Id. at 18.
1036. Id. at 37.
1037. Id. at 38.
1038. Id. at 19.
1039. 794 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1990). The three requirements for issue preclusion are:
1) The plea of collateral estoppel must be asserted against a party or one in privity
with a party to the first action;
2) The issue to be precluded from relitigation ... must be identical to that decided
in the first action;
3) The issue in the first action must have been resolved by a final judgment on the
merits.
Id. at 951 (citations omitted).
1040. Johnson, slip op. at 24-25.
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In Kulawik v. ERA Jet Alaska,"'0' the supreme court held that Alaska
Statutes section 09.55.580(c)(1) permits a designated beneficiary to recover
10 42
his or her "prospective inheritance" in a wrongful death suit.

Moreover, the court held that future gross income must be reduced to
reflect future income tax liability, 11 3 and that an estate could not be
interpreted as a "statutory beneficiary" according to the express language

of Alaska Statutes section 09.50.580(a).'4

The court opined that the

income tax rule set forth in Beaulieu v. Elliott"' could not be used "as
a sword to compute future gross income and simultaneously.., as a shield
against reducing future disposable income."'' m
The court noted that prospective inheritance "represents that portion of

the decedent's"probable accumulations' which a survivor could reasonably
expect to inherit."', 47 Such an award is warranted by the legislature's
liberal approach to wrongful death recoveries."' 8 The court held that
Alaska Statutes section 09.55.580 was intended to provide beneficiaries
with pecuniary damage awards representing loss-to-the-beneficiaries rather
than loss-to-the-estate amounts."' Moreover, the court noted that its
interpretation of the statutory language as a "substantive directive against
exclusively using the loss-to-the-estate measure of damages," rather than
a limitation on the type of evidence admissible to prove damages' 050 was
consistent with its prior decisions."' 5s The court awarded the decedent's

1041. 820 P.2d 627 (Alaska 1991).
1042. Iai at 634; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(c)(1) (1983).
1043. Kulawik, 820 P.2d at 634.
1044. Id. at 635. Alaska Statutes section 09.55.580(a) provides:
[t]he amount recovered, if any, shall be exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's
spouse and children when the decedent is survived by a spouse or children or other
dependents. When the decedent is survived by no spouse or children or other
dependents, the amount recovered shall be administered as other personal property
of the decedent but shall be limited to pecuniary loss.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(a) (1983).

1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.

434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
Kulawik, 820 P.2d at 630.
Id. at 631.
The 1955 amendment to Alaska Statutes section 09.55.580 provided that:
the court . . . shall consider . . . . [d]eprivation of the expectation of pecuniary
benefits to the beneficiary or beneficiaries, without regard to the age thereof, that
would have resulted from the continued life of the deceased and without regard to
probable accumulations or what the deceased may have saved during his lifetime.
Id. at 633 n.14 (quoting Ch. 153, § 1, SLA 1955).
1049. Id. at 633. Additionally, the court justified its result by noting that allowing
prospective inheritances is the majority rule. Id. at 634-35. Justice Burke, however, opined
in his dissent that the plain words of the statute ("without regard to . . .") absolutely

precluded recovery of prospective inheritance. Id. at 642 (Burke, J., dissenting).
1050. Id. at 634.
1051. Id. (citing Horsford v. Estate of Horsford, 561 P.2d 722, 728-29 (Alaska 1977)
(holding that this language is "simply a substantive directive against precluding recovery for
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beneficiaries all of their probable accumulations based on the theory that
the designated beneficiaries should recover the entire loss, whether to the
estate or the beneficiaries, rather than only their personal losses.1052
In Kissick v. Schmierer,0 53 the court construed an exculpatory clause
as permitting a wrongful death action, since the clause did not "consciously
and unequivocally" cover such an action. The case arose from a plane
crash which killed the pilot, a major in the United States Air Force, and
three passengers."0 5 All three passengers signed an agreement not to
bring a claim against "the US Government and/or its officers, agents, or
employees, or [the Air Force Elmendorf] Aero Club members.., for any
loss, damage, or injury to my person or my property which may occur
from any cause whatsoever .... "0 In defense to the wrongful death
claims, the pilot's estate claimed that the covenant not to sue barred all
claims, and
additionally, that Air Force regulations preempted any state tort
05 6
claims.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the claims were
not barred by federal preemption and that the covenant did not bar
wrongful death actions. 057 The court reviewed case law in other states
which held that covenants not to sue promulgated by the federal
government should be evaluated according to state law as though the
parties were private individuals.' 8 The court also stated that "[i]n the
absence of a direct conflict, state law is only preempted 'when Congress
intends that federal law occupy a given field."' 1059 The court concluded
that there was no evidence that Congress intended the Air Force regulations
requiring the signing of the covenant not to sue to preempt state tort law,
and therefore, that the covenant had to be evaluated under state law as an
agreement between private parties.'m
Turning to the covenant, the court noted that "ambiguities in a prerecreational activity exculpatory clause will be resolved against the party
seeking exculpation, and that to be enforced the intent to release a party
from liability for future negligence must be conspicuously and

adult-aged beneficiaries" and not a limitation on admissible evidence)).
1052. Id. at 637-38.
1053. 816 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1991).
1054. Id.
1055. Id. at 189.
1056. Id.
1057. Id.

1058. Id.
1059. Id. at 190 (quoting California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989)).

1060. Id.
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unequivocally expressed."'0' The court decided that the covenant was
ambiguous as to whether the term "injury" included death,1 62 and thus
concluded that the covenant did not bar the claims.1°63
The dissent assumed that the majority's preemption decision was
correct and that the covenant should be construed according to state law,
but disagreed with the conclusion that the covenant was ambiguous. °
The dissent argued that any "reasonable construction" of the covenant
would not exclude death."m5 In addition, the dissent argued that even
if the covenant were ambiguous, it should only be strictly construed against
the United States government, the party that prepared it, and not against the
1
pilot. 06
Barber v. National Bank of Alaska'° 67 involved an action brought
against the National Bank of Alaska ("NBA") for misrepresenting the
postponement of the foreclosure on Barber's property. NBA suggested to
Barber that, since he could not make his mortgage payments, he should
apply for refinancing through the Home Owner's Assistance Program
("HOAP") in order to avoid foreclosure.1 68 NBA repeatedly assured
Barber that foreclosure would be postponed while his HOAP application
was pending, but nevertheless pursued foreclosure. Further, although the
foreclosure sale took place while Barber's HOAP application was still
being processed,"° 9 NBA did not inform Barber of the sale, telling him
instead that the sale had been postponed until the next month.'' 7
The supreme court affirmed the directed verdict for NBA on the claim
of breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. °7' The
court also rejected Barber's appeal from the grant of summary judgment
on his claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act'0 72 because the
statute's definition of "debt collector" does not include collection of
mortgage debt by a bank"' ° 3 and because the legislative history states

1061. Id. at 191.
1062. Id. at 191-92.
1063. Id. at 192.
1064. Id. (Compton, J., dissenting).
1065. I (Compton, L, dissenting).
1066. Id (Compton, J., dissenting).
1067. 815 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1991).
1068. Id. at 859-60.
1069. Id. at 860.
1070. Id
1071. Id. at 864. The court stated that Barber's contract was with the mortgagee, not with
NBA, and even if there were a contractual relationship with NBA, Barber did not allege
sufficient facts to show a breach with respect to the servicing of the loan. Id.
1072. Id. at 859 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988 & Supp. 1989).
1073. Id. at 860 & n.5 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) (1988)).
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that those who service debt for others are not debt collectors for purposes
of the Act.' 74
Finally, the supreme court reversed and remanded Barber's claim for
negligence, one of5the misrepresentation claims, and the related punitive
damages claims.10
Regarding Barber's argument that NBA was negligent in failing to
postpone the mortgage sale, the court reversed and remanded the issue for
retrial.' 76 The court found that a fair-minded juror could conclude that
Barber had detrimentally relied on the promised postponement by failing
to file for bankruptcy prior to the foreclosure, thereby incurring increased
federal tax liability."'" The court also reversed the directed verdict
against Barber regarding NBA's misrepresentation of the postponement of
the foreclosure."7 8 The court applied the test set out in Bevins v.
Ballard"79 of a "'duty to provide accurate information,' once one
undertakes to speak."' o° 8 The court then remanded the issue of punitive
damages on the claims of negligence and misrepresentation with respect to
the postponement of the foreclosure.1 8 1 In doing so, the court directed
the superior court "to consider the public policy implications of the conduct
at issue," noting that "[fjinancial institutions must handle such dealings in

a scrupulous fashion taking care to disclose and explain all relevant matters
to the parties.""'

2

1074. Id. at 860-61 (citing S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1701). The court then rejected Barber's appeal from the grant of
summary judgment on his claim under the state counterpart to the Act. Id. at 861. Barber
claimed that the Alaska act applied in his situation because the mortgage service was a
"good" or, alternatively, a "service." The court, following State v. O'Neill Investigations,
Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980), held that since NBA's principal business is not debt
collection, and thus NBA is not an independent debt collector, the mortgage service is not
a "service" under the statute. Following State v. First National Bank of Anchorage, 660
P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982), the court held that Barber's loan was not a "good" and that the sale
of real property is not governed by the state act. Barber,815 P.2d at 861.
1075. Barber, 815 P.2d at 859.
1076. Id. at 862.
1077. Id. at 861-62.
1078. Id. at 863.
1079. 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982). The test for determining whether a duty to "speak
carefully" exists is the following:
(a) whether the defendant had knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information was
desired for a serious purpose and that the plaintiff intended to rely upon it;
(b) the foreseeability of harm;
(c) the degree of certainty that plaintiff would suffer harm;
(d) the directness of causation; and
(e) the policy of preventing future harm.
Id. at 760.
1080. Barber,815 P.2d at 862 (quoting Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982)).
1081. Id. at 864.
1082. Id.
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XII. CRIMINAL LAW
The criminal law cases decided in 1991, the bulk of which were
decided by the Alaska Court of Appeals, will be broken down into four
categories: evidence, general criminal law, procedure, and sentencing.
A. Evidence
The Alaska Court of Appeals considered a wide range of evidentiary
issues in 1991. Four cases involved defendants' motions to suppress
evidence and two dealt with the validity of police search warrants. Other
issues included the propriety of allowing jurors to blow into a breathalyzer
machine and the admissibility of an expert witness' prior misstatement of
his credentials.
In State v. Lewis, 108 3 the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the
superior court's suppression of evidence upon a finding that (1) exigent
circumstances present were not substantial enough to support the police
entry into Lewis' apartment without a warrant, and (2) the independent
The police entered
source doctrine was inapplicable to this case.'0°
Lewis' apartment approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after they had
heard from an uncorroborated source that a drug deal was in process in the
during a
The police then used items that they noticed
apartment.'
08 6
visual search of the apartment to obtain a search warrant.
The court of appeals declared that under the standard presented in
Johnson v. State,""8 the superior court did not err in concluding "that
there was a substantial likelihood that the drug transaction would have been
completed during the fifteen- to twenty-minute gap when the police did not
observe Lewis' apartment," and thus the circumstances were not sufficient
to justify police entry into the apartment. 088 In addition, the court of
appeals refused to extend the independent source doctrine 9 established

1083. 809 P.2d 925 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1084. Id. at 929.
1085. Id. at 926-27.
1086. Id. at 927.
1087. 662 P.2d 981, 985-86 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (asking "in light of the totality of the
circumstances was there a compelling need for official action and an insufficient time to
obtain a warrant?").
1088. Lewis, 809 P.2d at 928-29.
1089. This doctrine "allows the state to admit evidence when the evidence was obtained
through information which was wholly independent of the illegal police conduct." Ma. at
929.
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in Segura v. United States 90 to the facts of Lewis.10 91 The court
opined that true "independence" did not exist in this case because the state
used "information which they obtained after illegally entering Lewis'
apartment to obtain the search warrant."10 92 Furthermore, the court held
that use of the doctrine was inappropriate because the police did not have
probable cause to arrest Lewis, and thus police entry into his apartment
constituted a substantial invasion of privacy 0 93 Furthermore, the court
of appeals speculated in dicta that the Alaska Supreme Court would most
likely adhere to the Segura dissent which criticized the use of the
independent source doctrine in situations where, as here, "avoiding a risk
of loss of evidence
. . . motivated the agents
Constitution. '' "

. . . to violate the

In Marcy v. State095 the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's
conviction and sentence for first-degree murder, first-degree sexual assault,
and first-degree burglary. In the defendant's first confession to police
officers investigating the case, the defendant admitted being in the victim's
residence but denied the murder and the sexual assault. In the second
confession, the defendant admitted to the murder. The defendant argued
that the jury should not have been allowed to hear the confessions because
the first confession was involuntary and tainted the second
confession.'1
The defendant stated that the police officer lied to him to get him to
confess the first time by telling him that they had seen the defendant's
truck at the victim's residence and that they had found his
fingerprints." The court of appeals noted that trickery alone will not
render a confession inadmissible so long as the tricks will not produce an
untruthful confession. 9 ' The court of appeals upheld the trial court on
the grounds that the defendant failed to raise the voluntariness issue in a
timely manner, and consequently, the most review to which the defendant
was entitled was for plain error.' °

1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.

468 U.S. 796 (1984).
Lewis, 809 P.2d at 930.
Id.
Id.

1094. Id. at 930 (quoting Segura, 468 U.S. at 836-37). The concurring justices in Lewis
found it "unnecessary to determine whether the dissenting view in Segura should be
followed as a matter of state constitutional law" but joined in the remainder of the opinion.
Id. at 931 (Bryner, C.J., concurring).
1095. 823 P.2d 660 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1096. Id. at 662.
1097. Id. at 664.
1098. Id. at 665.

1099. Id.
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In addition to affirming the conviction, the court affirmed the sentence
and parole restriction. The defendant received consecutive sentences of
ninety-nine years for murder, ten for burglary, and thirty for sexual
assault."'
After his probation was revoked on earlier cases, the
defendant was sentenced to a total of 146 and one-half years with a parole
restriction of ninety-seven years.110' The court affirmed, holding that the
sentencing judge could have properly concluded that Marcy "was a
defendant from whom society may never be safe if released from custody,"
and consecutive sentences exceeding ninety-nine years are appropriate in
those circumstances."02
In Billingsley v. State," °3 the defendant was convicted of robbery in4
the first degree after he turned himself in and confessed to the police.1"
At trial he denied committing the robbery and said that he had lied to the
police because he wanted to be locked up in order to get help for his
alcohol problem." 5 On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction based
on Harrisv. State," °6 where the court rejected a per se suppression rule
for unrecorded confessions."' ° The defendant next requested counsel
in order to help him with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
and
08
the court appointed the Office of Public Advocacy ("OPA").1
The supreme court subsequently reversed Harris in Stephan v.
State," °9 ruling that unrecorded confessions were to be suppressed.
OPA filed a petition for post-conviction relief on Billingsley's behalf based
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel but did not request any relief
based on suppression of the unrecorded confession."' 0 After this
petition was denied, the defendant hired independent counsel who filed a
claim seeking application of the Stephan decision to this case."" On
remand, the trial court denied the application, holding that Billingsley was
not entitled to retroactive application of Stephan."' 2 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded and the trial court subsequently held that

1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.
1107.
1108.
1109.
1110.
llil.
1112.

Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 669-70.
807 P.2d 1102 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1104.
678 P.2d 397 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Billingsley, 807 P.2d at 1104 (citing Harris,678 P.2d at 404).
Id.
711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
Billingsley, 807 P.2d at 1104-05.
Id. at 1105.
Id.
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the admission
of the confession was harmless error beyond a reasonable
1 1 13
doubt.

On this appeal, the court of appeals first held that Billingsley did not
waive his right to raise the Stephan issue because OPA had only been
appointed to investigate the ineffective assistance claim." 4 Addressing
the harmless error question, the court further held that in order to find
harmless error, the error must be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 5 The court concluded that since the evidence against the
defendant without the custodial confession was strong, but not
overwhelming enough to find harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt,11 6 Bilingsley was entitled to a new trial.
The defendant in McLaughlin v. State"' 7 challenged the validity of
the search warrant that led to his conviction for misconduct involving a
controlled substance in the third degree."' McLaughlin also challenged
the superior court's joinder of two charges against him and its subsequent
failure to sever the charges and declare a mistrial on the second count after
granting a judgment of acquittal on the first count."' 9 The evidence
obtained in the second search led to the second charge of possession with
intent to deliver.
McLaughlin moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search on
the ground that the warrant hearing did not adequately establish the
background and reliability of the informant. Applying the "clearly
erroneous" standard, the court of appeals affirmed the superior court's
finding that the officers did not recklessly or intentionally omit or misstate
any pertinent information, the only grounds for invalidating a warrant
based on inaccurate or incomplete information.""
McLaughlin also challenged the lack of corroborative evidence as to
the informant's veracity. The court found the United States Supreme
Court's Aguilar/Spinelli test".' inapplicable since the informant

1113. Id.
1114. Id. at 1106.
1115. Id. In determining whether error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, "'[t]he
question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction."' Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967)).
1116. Id. at 1106-07.
1117. 818 P.2d 683 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1118. Id. at 685.
1119. Id. at 686-87.
1120. Id. at 685-86 (citing State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986)).
1121. Id. at 686. The court reasoned that the Aguilar/Spinelli test is meant to apply in
Alaska only when information provided by a confidential informant is communicated to the
issuing magistrate in the form of hearsay. Id.; see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964);
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See infra note 1130.
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personally appeared before the magistrate, submitted to an oath, and was
available for questioning."'
The court further held that it was proper for the state to allow the grand
jury to consider evidence on the first count, the sale of cocaine, when
deciding whether to return an indictment on the second count, possession
with intent to sell."' The court found that the grand jury issued two
"plainly separate charges" and was not confused by being allowed to
consider one indictment in order to arrive at another. 4 The court also
upheld joinder of the similar charges under Alaska Rules of Criminal
Procedure 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). z
McLaughlin argued on appeal that because the state was unable to call
the informant as a witness, the charges should have been severed when the
court ordered an acquittal on the first count. The court stated that
[t]he fact that the state's evidence of the . . . sale was insufficient to
establish McLaughlin's guilt on Count I beyond a reasonable doubt does
not altogether deprive that evidence of probative value. To be relevant,
evidence need not be conclusive; it need only have some tendency to
advance the proposition for which it is offered." 6
The court's failure to sever the charges did not prejudice the defendant
because the evidence of the sale would have been admissible on the second
count even if the first count were never prosecuted. 1 27
In Kvasnikoff v. State,1 8 the court of appeals reversed the
defendant's convictions on the ground that the search warrant was
improper. At issue in the case was the reliability of out-of-court statements
on which the search warrant was issued and
whether these statements
29
established probable cause for the warrant."
The court of appeals held that the Aguilar/Spinelli test"3 applies to
all levels of hearsay testimony when multiple levels exist." 3' Because

1122. McLaughlin, 818 P.2d at 686.
1123. Id.
1124. Id.
1125. Id.
1126. Id. at 687 (citing ALASKA R. EVID. 401; Byrne v. State, 654 P.2d 795 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1982); Denison v. Anchorage, 630 P.2d 1001 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981)).
1127. Id.
1128. 804 P.2d 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1129. Id. at 1303.
1130. The test, as applied in Alaska, consists of two prongs: "hearsay may be relied on
to support a finding of probable cause when sufficient evidence is presented to ...
determine the veracity and reliabilityof the hearsay." Id. at 1306 (citing State v. Jones, 706
P.2d 317, 324-25 (Alaska 1985)) (emphasis added). For purposes of this case, the court
assumed the veracity of Vinberg's statements. Id. at 1306-07.
1131. Id. at 1306 (citing Resek v. State, 644 P.2d 877, 878-79 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)).
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"the magistrate must be able to find that the hearsay declarant's statements
were truthful and based on personal knowledge, 113 2 the court found
problems with the testimony on which the search warrant was based; the
person testifying, Merrigan, did not differentiate between that which
Vinberg, a third party, actually told him and that which he concluded from
her statements." 33 Moreover, the court found that Merrigan's testimony
indicated that Vinberg's statements actually were based on information
received from another person, Jennifer Clark."'M The court noted that
since Clark's information comprised another level of hearsay testimony, the
Aguilar/Spinelli test must be applied to those additional statements to
determine whether evidence supported "the conclusion that Clark gave
V'mberg reliable information about [the defendant]." 3 5 The court found
that Merrigan's testimony never asserted that Vinberg recieved the
information from direct conversations with Clark, and thus there was a
possibility that Vinberg's statements about Clark were purely
speculation. 3 6 The court concluded that since the state had failed to
adequately corroborate the evidence implicating the defendant, the sum of
the evidence
did not sufficiently establish probable cause for the search
1 37
warrant.

3
In Swain v. State,"1
the court of appeals held that an objective,
rather than subjective standard should be used to determine the influence
of prejudicial extrinsic information and related juror misconduct on a
juror's vote. After his conviction for burglary and robbery, the defendant
moved for a mistrial on the basis that one of the jurors, Darcella Perry, had
been exposed to extrinsic prejudicial information about a similar burglary
that they had committed at the residence of one of Perry's babysitting
clients." 3 9 Perry insisted that her acquaintance and discussions with her
client, Schmelzer,"' 4 did not influence her vote and that she never
discussed it with any other jurors. In denying the motion for mistrial, the
trial judge relied on Perry's
assurances that the information from Schmelzer
41
did not affect her vote."

1132. Id.
1133.
1134.
1135.
1136.
1137.
1138.
1139.
1140.
1141.

Id. at 1307.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1308-09.
817 P.2d 927 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 929.
An affidavit disclosed that Schmelzer did not describe the robbery in detail. Id.
Id. at 929-30.
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The court of appeals discussed two lines of cases, the first dealing with
situations in which jurors are exposed to extrinsic prejudicial matter, and
the second dealing with jury misconduct threatening the integrity of the
verdict.11 42 Regarding the first line of cases, the court held that,
although the trial judge had properly applied the fact-specific test
developed in Ciervo v. State,"43 that test wrongly suggested a subjective
standard for determining the influence of extrinsic prejudicial information
on a juror's vote."' Relying heavily on American Bar Association
Standard 8-3.7, Alaska Rule of Evidence 606(b), and authority from other

jurisdictions, the court held that an objective test should have been
used."4 5 Rule 606(b) in particular establishes that a juror should only
be questioned as to what extra information he or she was exposed to, not
the effect that information had on his or her vote."46 The court also
found an objective standard required under the second line of cases
involving47jury misconduct, specifically Fickes v. Petrolane-Alaska Gas
Service.
The court of appeals indicated that the trial judge's mistaken reliance
on Perry's subjective assurances would have been harmless error if it were
objectively clear that Perry's acquaintance and discussions with Schmelzer
had no influence on Perry's vote." 48 However, it was not clearly
established exactly what information Schmelzer told Perry about the

defendant's involvement in the burglary/robbery at the Schmelzer
residence. This question was of "crucial significance"' 4 since such
information might have affected her vote by suggesting that the defendant
had a habit of committing this type of crime.

1142. Id. at 930.
1143. 756 P.2d 907 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
1144. Swain, 817 P.2d at 931.
1145. Id. at 931-32.
1146. Id. at 932 (citing ALASKA R. EviD. 606(b) commentary).
1147. 628 P.2d 908 (Alaska 1981). In Fickes the Alaska Supreme Court reiterated the
two-prong standard developed in West v. State:
Whether tho verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered rests in the sound
discretion of the trial judge, but generally the verdict should stand unless the
evidence clearly establishes a serious violation of the juror's duty and deprives a
party of a fair trial.
409 P.2d 847, 852 (Alaska 1966) (emphasis added). Regarding the second prong of the
West test, the Fickes court announced three relevant criteria:
Three considerations provide guidelines for making this determination. First, if the
party asserting prejudice had known the true facts, is it probable that it would have
challenged the juror? Second, did the improper comment merely go toward a
collateral matter, e.g., the general credibility of a witness or did it go to the essence
of a claim or defense? Third, viewed objectively, was the probable effect of the
comment prejudicial?
Fickes, 628 P.2d at 911 (citations and footnotes omitted).
1148. Swain, 817 P.2d at 933.
1149. Id. at 934.
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The court of appeals held that under either the Ciervo standard for
cases in which jurors are exposed to extrinsic prejudicial matter or the
Fickes standard for cases involving jury misconduct, the need for a mistrial
depended on what information Schmelzer told Perry about the second
burglary/robbery."" 0 The court of appeals remanded the case to the
superior court for a finding on this point, and held that a mistrial should be
declared unless the superior court found that Schmelzer did not tell Perry
of the defendant's part in the Schmelzer robbery."5
In Bowlin v. State, 5 2 the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's
conviction of refusal to submit to a breath test despite the fact that the trial
court allowed jurors to blow into the mechanism to gain personal3
knowledge of the amount of air necessary to trigger the machine.1
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention that a jury view
is improper if it produces "new evidence," i.e., evidence that is more than
illustrative of a witness' testimony." 4 The court noted that the jury
simply observed the workings of the machine, which was an accepted part
of evidence."5 Furthermore, the participation of the jurors did not, as
the defendant claimed, turn each juror into a witness against her."56 The
issue was simply how much breath was needed to trigger the machine, and
the jurors' participation did not implicate any due process rights,
confrontation rights, or rights of cross-examination.""
In Snyder v. Foote,n1 s the supreme court held that both a doctor's
misstatement of his credentials at a prior judicial proceeding as well as the
judge's finding at that proceeding were collateral and inadmissible evidence
of prior acts under Alaska Rule of Evidence 608. During a medical
malpractice suit, the superior court judge allowed Foote to present evidence
that the plaintiff's expert witness had misstated his credentials at a previous

1150. Id. at 935.
1151. Id. at 935-36.
1152. 823 P.2d 676 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1153. Id. at 676-77. Bowlin contended at trial that her asthma rendered her incapable of
blowing enough air into the machine to trigger the register. At trial, the judge, both
attorneys, Bowlin, and the jurors went as a group to the local police station where each juror
was allowed to blow into the machine. Id. at 677.

1154. Id.
1155. The court noted that the traditional concerns associated with "jury views" were not
present. First, the test was narrowly and similarly executed to limit any conclusions to "the
amount of air necessary to trigger the machine." The test therefore would not lead to blind
speculation. Second, the presence of the judge and attorneys eliminated any concerns with
"out of court" jury views. Id. at 678.

1156. Id.
1157. Id. at 678-79.
1158. 822 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1991).
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trial." 9 The supreme court reversed, opining that the expert witness'
earlier misstatement did not pertain to his actual credentials, and that it
therefore affected his testimony only insofar as it implied that he might
commit other acts of this nature." t' The court further held that, while
cross-examination of character evidence pertaining to the truthfulness of
statements is admissible under Rule 608, "the absence of the admissibility
predicate for this type of evidence" rendered the evidence in the instant
case inadmissible.1 " Nor was the evidence admissible under a bias
theory of Alaska Rule of Evidence 613(a).11 62
The court also ruled that prior civil judgments are not admissible under
Alaska Rule of Evidence 803(8), the public records exception to the
hearsay rule, because of the explicit wording of subsection (b)(iv)." 63
Finally, the court found that, since the inadmissible evidence played a
"dominant role" in the trial, the evidence was prejudicial.' 16
The
plaintiff was therefore granted a new trial.'
B. General Criminal Law
In this area, the Alaska Supreme Court decided only two cases dealing
with witness immunity and dram-shop liability. On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals decided various cases regarding controlled substances,
parole violations, sexual offenses and alcohol-related offenses.
In Closson v. State,"' the Alaska Supreme Court vacated Tyoga
Closson's conviction of second-degree theft based on the state's
anticipatory breach of an immunity agreement. Closson stole a pistol
which was later used by John Bright in a murder-for-hire shooting." 67
During his interrogation, Closson and the Assistant District Attorney
reached an agreement whereby Closson agreed to aid the state's
investigation by wearing a concealed wire and testifying in further

1159. Id. at 1356.
1160. Id. at 1357-58.
1161. Id. at 1359.
1162. Id. Alaska Rule of Evidence 613(a) provides that: "evidence of bias or interest on
the part of the witness... [is] admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of
a witness." ALASKA R. EvID. 613(a).
1163. Id. at 1359-60. This subsection excludes "factual findings resulting from special
investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident..." from the public records
exception. ALASKA R. EVID. 803(8)(b)(iv).
1164. Snyder, 822 P.2d at 1361.
1165. Id. at 1361-62.
1166. 812 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1991).
1167. Id. at 967.
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proceedings against the suspected murderer." 6 In return, the state
arranged to have the Municipality of Anchorage drop a pending assault
charge against Closson and promised not to prosecute him for his theft of
the pistol.1 69 Closson was also promised state protection and
confidentiality."" Closson's name and involvement in the investigation
were revealed in the charging instrument and press coverage,1 7 ' and
Closson subsequently refused to wear a wire or testify or appear before the
grand jury indictment of the murder case. Believing that Closson
materially breached the immunity agreement, the state charged Closson
with second-degree theft and the grand jury indicted him."7 2
The supreme court overturned Closson's conviction, reasoning that a
reasonable person in Closson's circumstances would interpret the state's
promise of confidentiality to mean that his name would not be disclosed
publicly until absolutely necessary -- at trial.1 73 The court found that,
after the public disclosure of Closson's identity, the state's subsequent
request to have Closson wear a wire was an anticipatory breach of the
immunity agreement."7 4
Relying on contract principles,"75 the court held that Closson was
entitled to specific performance based on the fact that the state's
anticipatory breach prevented Closson from returning to the same position
he would have been in absent the agreement." 76 Moreover, the court
held that fundamental fairness concerns weighed substantially in Closson's
favor because Closson cooperated with the police at all times up until the
state needlessly breached the confidentiality agreement, and because the
state handled the situation poorly after the breach occurred."'
The
court thus vacated Closson's second-degree theft conviction,
holding
the
78
state to specific performance of the immunity agreement.1

1168. Id.
1169. Id.
1170. Id. at 971 n.6.
1171. Id. at 968.
1172. Id.
1173. Id. at 970-73.
1174. Id. at 973-74.
1175. Id. at 970. The court analyzed the immunity agreement under contract principles
based on United States v. Irvine, 756 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1985), United States v. Carrillo,
709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1983), and United States v. Brown, 801 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1986).
1176. Closson, 812 P.2d at 974.
1177. Id. at 975. The state "simply threatened Closson with prosecution if he did not
comply with their demand." Id.
1178. Id. at 976.
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In Lord v. Fogcuuer Bar,179 the supreme court ruled that one's own
criminal conduct precludes recovery for any cause of action based on that
conduct. In -this case, a bartender served Robert William Lord more than
fourteen drinks over a period of several hours at the Fogcutter Bar, after
which he left with a woman whom he subsequently kidnapped, raped and
assaulted."80 Lord filed a complaint against the Fogcutter Bar and its
bartender alleging that the bar owed him damages resulting from his
imprisonment, as the bar had sold him liquor in violation of Alaska's dram
shop statute. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for Fogcutter and its award of attorneys' fees to the
defendant on the basis that Lord's claims were frivolous."" Assuming
for purposes of summary judgment review that Fogcutter actually did
violate Alaska's dram shop statute by selling a drunken person alcohol, the
court nevertheless affirmed the trial court on the grounds that "Lord's
criminal conduct preclud[ed]
his recovery for any cause of action based on
118 2
his criminal conduct."
The court reasoned that the dram shop statute was not meant to protect
people from the consequences of their own intentional, criminal
conduct." 8 3 The court stated that this principle is "grounded in public
policy"' 84 and noted that it affirmed summary judgment in this case for
the same reasons it did so in Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co.1 85 In
Adkinson, the court held that a person convicted of manslaughter could not
sue the manufacturer or the seller
of a shotgun for direct personal losses
18 6
shooting.
a
from
resulted
which
In Tuckfield v. State," 87 the court of appeals affirmed the
defendants' felony convictions under Alaska Statutes section
04.16.200(b) 81 for the distribution of alcohol in violation of the results
of a local option election. Although local option elections are now
conducted under Alaska Statutes sections 04.11.490 to 04.11.500, the local

1179. 813 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1991).
1180. Id. at 661.
1181. Lord, 813 P.2d at 662.
1182. Id.
1183. Id.at 663.
1184. Id.
1185. 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983).
1186. Lord, 813 P.2d at 663. The court noted that "allowing a criminal defendant, who
has been convicted of an intentional killing, to impose liability on others for the
consequences of his own anti-social conduct runs counter to basic values underlying our
criminal justice system." Id. (citing Adkinson, 659 P.2d at 1240).
1187. 805 P.2d 982 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1188. ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.200(b) (Supp. 1991). Alaska Statutes section 04.11.010
requires anyone who sells alcohol to have a license or permit. ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.010
(1986).
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option at issue here was put in place in 1977 under former Alaska Statutes
section 04.10.430(a). l"8 9 At the time of this election, violation of a local
option law was only a misdemeanor.1n g The defendants argued that the
legislature intended that communities hold new local option elections any
time penalties were increased. After a review of the legislative history, the
court of appeals held that the legislature intended to redesignate former
Alaska Statutes section 04.10.430 as Alaska Statutes section 04.11.490 and
to include it in the new legislation.1 91 The court found no indication
that the legislature intended that the communities hold new elections after
the passage of new legislation."' Finally, the court noted that anyone
who could come up with as sophisticated a legal argument as the
defendants in this case could certainly be charged with the knowledge that
"provisions of an original act which are repeated in an amendment are
considered as a continuation of the original act.""t 9 3 The court affirmed
the defendants' convictions. 1194
In Chambers v. State,"95 the court of appeals addressed the first
impression issue of whether converting cocaine into crack qualifies as
"manufacturing" under Alaska Statutes section 11.71.900(13)(A)."96 The
defendant argued that converting cocaine into crack does not amount to
"manufacture" under Alaska law because the cocaine molecule remains
unchanged during the process of converting cocaine hydrochloride to crack
cocaine." 97 The court disagreed and affirmed the defendant's conviction
for possession with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance. 9 8
In State v. Thronsen,"99 the court of appeals affirmed an order
dismissing an indictment of the defendant for possession of cocaine "in the
body.""' The court held that a person who has cocaine in his or her

1189. Tuckfield, 805 P.2d at 984.
1190. Id. at 983.
1191. Id. at 986.
1192. Id.
1193. Id.
1194. Id. at 987.
1195. 811 P.2d 318 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1196. Id.at 321. Alaska Statutes section 11.71.900(13)(A) provides that "manufacture":
[m]eans the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, growing,
or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction
from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis,
or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis; however, the growing of
marijuana for personal use is not manufacturing.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.900(13)(A) (Supp. 1991).
1197. Chambers, 811 P.2d at 319.
1198. Id. at 321.
1199. 809 P.2d 941 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1200. Id. at 964.
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body has no control over the cocaine and therefore may not be convicted
for possession.O'°
The court in Jordan v. State" 2 reversed the defendant's conviction
for possession of cocaine,'2 3 on the basis of the trial court's error in
refusing to give his proposed jury instructions. Jordan attempted to
establish at trial that he abandoned the drugs.' 2° He also argued that he
could not be convicted of possession because under both Adams v.
State" 5 and Moreau v. State,"W6 "momentary or passing control of
drugs for purposes of disposal does not amount to unlawful
possession.' '12°7 The trial court refused, however, to give an instruction
on passing control.'
On appeal, the state characterized passing control
as an affirmative defense, thereby requiring the defendant to produce
evidence supporting his theory.12 0 The court of appeals rejected this
characterization, noting that "[t]he more relevant inquiry here is whether,
under the totality of the evidence, an instruction on passing control was
necessary to allow the jury to properly decide the issue of Jordan's
guilt.' ' 2 1 Since the evidence allowed a finding of abandonment, the
court found that the instruction was necessary and reversed the
conviction.""
In Marion v. State,21 2 the court of appeals reversed Marion's
conviction for cocaine possession because "a defendant's mere presence in
a car containing drugs is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of
knowing possession.
The court held that under Alaska Rules of
Criminal Procedure 6(q) and 6(r) the grand jury did not have enough
evidence to indict Marion because the only evidence linking Marion to the

1201. Id. at 943. The court noted that the state could have avoided this problem by
charging the defendant with possession of cocaine at the time and place of ingestion, rather
than possession of cocaine "in the body." Id. at 942-43.
1202. 819 P.2d 39 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1203. Witnesses saw Jordan place something into the wheel well of a nearby parked car.
After learning this information, the police checked under the wheel and found a package of
cocaine. They arrested Jordan and charged him with possession. Id. at 40.
1204. Id.
1205. 706 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
1206. 588 P.2d 275, 286 (Alaska 1978).
1207. Jordan, 819 P.2d at 40.
1208. Id. The court noted that the "passing control doctrine presumes that a defendant's
temporary control over drugs is for the sole purpose of disposal or abandonment. The
doctrine thus has no application when a person secretes drugs with intent to reassert control
over them at a later time, or as a means of transferring them to others." Id. at 42 n.2.
1209. Id. at 41.
1210. Id
1211. Id at 43.
1212. 806 P.2d 857 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1213. Id. at 860.
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cocaine other than his proximity to it was inadmissible hearsay
evidence." 4 The court stated that "evidence of proximity to contraband
cannot in itself establish knowing possession..'.2 ..
In Castillo v. State,121 6 the defendant successfully appealed his
conviction for misconduct involving a controlled substance on the basis
that he was deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict. At trial, the state
argued that Castillo could be convicted as a principal for possession of
cocaine, or, in the alternative, he could be convicted as an accomplice.
The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. The court of appeals reversed
the conviction,
holding that a general verdict form in this case was
217
insufficient.
1219
2 The court distinguished State v. James " and Ward v. State,
noting that in both of those cases "the defendant was charged with
violating two alternative sections of the same statute."'2'
In the present
case, the state's two theories of liability described two different criminal
events, not two different theories by which Castillo could be convicted of
the same criminal act. The general verdict was insufficient because it did
not indicate whether the jury unanimously agreed on which act Castillo
was guilty of committing.'2'
The jury could have been divided on
which criminal act Castillo committed and still returned a verdict of guilty
due to the verdict form. The court of appeals held that "Castillo was
deprived of' ' M
his right to a unanimous verdict on what criminal act he
commuitted. 2
In State v. Stores,'m the court of appeals held that Alaska's criminal
escape statute applies in cases of parole arrests. 224 The defendant,

1214. Id. at 859-60. Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(q) provides in part: [t]he grand
jury shall find an indictment when all the evidence taken together, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction of the defendant." ALASKA R. CIuM. P. 6(q).
Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(r)(1) provides in part: "[H]earsay evidence shall not
be presented to the grand jury absent compelling justification for its introduction." ALASKA
R. CRIM. P. 6(r)(1).
1215. Marion, 806 P.2d at 859.
1216. 821 P.2d 133 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1217. Id. at 135-37.
1218. 698 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1985).
1219. 758 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1988).
1220. Castillo, 821 P.2d at 137.
1221. Id.
1222. Id.
1223. 816 P.2d 206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1224. Id. at 210.
Alaska's criminal escape statute, Alaska Statutes section
11.56.310(a)(1)(B), provides:
(a) One commits the crime of escape in the second degree if, without lawful
authority, one
(1) removes oneself from...
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Stores, ran away from a police officer who was arresting him on a felony
warrant for parole violations. The court noted that a parolee remains, for
all intents and purposes, a convict or a prisoner because the correctional
system retains its grasp and power over the parolee. 22 5 Moreover, the
court held that both the plain language of the statute 2 26 and its
legislative history exhibited an intention to encompass a parolee's
underlying conviction. 227 Finding that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague, the court further opined that the language of the
statute was broad enough for someone to understand
that running away
22
from a police officer after arrest is prohibited.1 1
In State v. Staael"2 9 the court of appeals reviewed the lower court's
revocation of defendant's parole for violating two standard conditions of
parole. 230 At issue were three findings made by the trial court at a
hearing for post-conviction relief. The trial court found that "defendant
should have been granted a hearing on the special conditions of
parole,"' 23' that "parole was unlawfully revoked,"'' 232 and
that the
233
defendant "did not have a right to refuse mandatory parole."'
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that Staael had no
right to a hearing before the standard conditions were imposed, and thus
that his parole was properly revoked after he broke the two standard
conditions."
The court did not reach the issue of whether a hearing
is required before imposition of special conditions because the issue was
irrelevant to Staael's situation.123 5

(B) official detention for a felony or for extradition
ALASKA

STAT. § 11.56.310(a)(1)(B) (1989).

1225. Stores, 816 P.2d at 209.
1226. The court referred to Webster's New World Dictionary definition of "for" as "with
regard to." Id. at 210.
1227. Id. at 210-11 n.4.
1228. Id. at 212.
1229. 807 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1230. Id. at 514. Parole can consist of general, standard, and/or special conditions under
Alaska Statutes section 33.16.150(a). The general condition requires that the parolee refrain
from conduct punishable by imprisonment. The standard conditions are 12 conditions
routinely imposed. The two standard conditions which were broken by Staael were: (1) the
parolee must report to his parole officer the next working day after being released; and (2)
the parolee must obtain permission to travel out of state. Special conditions are other
restrictions imposed at the discretion of the board on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 514 n.I.
1231. Id. at 514.
1232. Id.
1233. Id.
1234. Id. at 519.
1235. Id. at 516. In addition, the court noted that they were notified at oral argument of
the adoption of new Parole Board regulations and were hopeful that the new regulations will
make "this particular scenario unlikely to be repeated." Id.
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The court also affirmed the lower court's holding that Staael did not
have a right to refuse mandatory parole. 6 Staael argued that because
probation may be refused if the conditions are more onerous than serving
the sentence, then parole may also be refused under similar
circumstances.'3 7 The court rejected the argument. First, a parolee is
subject to a variation on the sentence imposed, while a probationer agrees
to an alternative punishment." 8 Second, the court noted that when12 3a9
parolee is released from prison he is given his liberty back.
Therefore, he is always better off than he was while he was in prison, no
matter what the conditions of parole1 240
the court of appeals affirmed Lepley's
In Lepley v. State,'
conviction of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor because he failed to
prove that fellatio was among the least serious offenses included in the
definition of the crime.'242 Alaska Statutes section 11.81.900(b)(53)
includes fellatio as a form of sexual penetration, 1243 and the court noted
that "when the Legislature has defined several methods of committing the
same crime, each method is deemed of equal seriousness with the
others." 244 Moreover, the court stated that a defendant convicted of
first-degree sexual assault or first-degree sexual abuse of a minor cannot
nature because "he inflicted little or
claim his offense is of a less serious1245
no physical injury upon his victim."'
In Bibbs v. State," the court of appeals reversed a conviction for
sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. The court held that evidence
critical to showing the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in the
victim's age1247 should have been reviewed in camera pursuant to

1236. Id. at 519.
1237. Id. at 516.
1238. Id. at 518.
1239. Id.
1240. Id. at 518-19.
1241. 807 P.2d 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1242. Id. at 1098-99.
1243. Lepley asserted that fellatio was less serious than other crimes defined in Alaska
Statutes section 11.81.900(b)(53) because no physical penetration occurred. Id. at 1097.
Alaska Statutes section 11.81.900(b)(53) provides: "sexual penetration' means (A) genital
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio .... ." ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(53) (1989).
1244. Lepley, 807 P.2d at 1097 (citing Adams v. State, 718 P.2d 164 (Alaska Ct. App.
1986); Walsh v. State, 677 P.2d 912 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984)).
1245. Id. at 1098.
1246. 814 P.2d 738 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1247. A reasonable belief that the victim was over sixteen years of age is an affirmative
defense to sexual abuse of a minor in Alaska. See id. at 740 n.3; ALASKA STAT. §
11AI.445(b) (1989).
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Alaska's rape shield statute.'
The court decided that the trial court
should have permitted an in camera examination of the victim, a thirteen
year old girl, concerning24the
information she gave the defendant during a
9
telephone conversation.
In Echols v. State, 50° the court of appeals overruled its decision in
Bowell v. State,"' concluding that Alaska's accomplice liability statute
requires a showing of intentional rather than reckless conduct. The
defendant was charged based on an incident where her husband beat their
daughter with an extension cord." 2 The husband was convicted of
assault under Alaska Statutes section 11.41.200(a)(1). 1 3 Echols argued
that Alaska Statutes section 11.16.110(2), the accomplice liability statute,
required the state to prove that she intended her daughter to suffer serious
physical injury."
The superior court, relying on Bowell,155 rejected
this argument,5 finding
that she needed only to have acted recklessly, not
6
intentionally.1
The court of appeals overruled its holding in Bowell and reversed the
defendant's conviction." 57 Based on the plain language of the statute
and the legislative history, the court found that Alaska Statutes section
11.16.110 requires that the state show the defendant intended to promote
the offense; merely showing recklessness toward the possibility of the
offense is insufficient."' 58 The concurrence noted that the defendant
could have been charged and convicted of first-degree assault as a

1248. Bibbs, 814 P.2d at 740-41; see ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (1990).
1249. Bibbs, 814 P.2d at 741.
1250. 818 P.2d 691 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1251. 728 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), overruledby 818 P.2d 691 (Alaska Ct. App.
1991).
1252. Id
1253. Id. The statute provides: "(a) A person commits the crime of assault in the first
degree if (1) that person recklessly causes serious physical injury to another by means of
a dangerous instrument." ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.200(a)(1) (1989).
1254. Echols, 818 P.2d at 693. The statute provides that one is legally accountable for
the conduct of another if "with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense,
the person (A) solicits the other to commit the offense; or (B) aids or abets the other in
planning or committing the offense." ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110(2) (1989).
1255. 728 P.2d at 1220.
1256. Echols, 818 P.2d at 693.
1257. Id.at 695.
1258. Id. at 694-95.
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26
principal, not an accomplice, 2 59 since Alaska's assault statute'
1261
injury.
physical
serious
causes
that
encompasses reckless conduct
In J.R.N. v. State, 262 the court of appeals reversed the superior
court's waiver of juvenile jurisdiction due to a failure to comply with
Alaska Delinquency Rule 7(b). 263 Upon J.R.N.'s arrest, the police
detained him for over four hours, and eventually obtained a confession
from him, but failed to notify his parents pursuant to Rule 7(b).6
Relying on Copelin v. State,2 6 5 the court noted the clear and
unambiguous language of Rule 7(b), stating that "'immediately' means just
that."' 1266 The court also held that Rule 7(b) should be construed
analogously to similar rules in other states which indicate that "a
fundamental purpose of immediate parental notice requirements is to
maximize the opportunity for parental presence during custodial
interrogation of juveniles."'" 7 While this requirement is not absolute,
but instead subject to reasonability and flexibility, 26' the court found no
conflict between Rule 7(b) and the investigative needs of the police in this
case. Thus,
the court suppressed the evidence obtained in violation of Rule
9

7(b).

26

In Noblit v. State, 270 the court of appeals held that under the crime
of hindering prosecution, a defendant is strictly liable regarding the "legal
classification of the crime committed by the assisted person."' 2 71 The
court noted that pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 11.56.770, the
"requirement of a specific intent to hinder the prosecution of a person who
has committed a crime necessarily presupposes the defendant's knowledge
that the underlying crime has been committed."'' 22 Nevertheless, the
statute "dispense[s] with any requirement of awareness as to the legal

1259. Id. at 695 (Bryner, C.J., concurring).
1260. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.200(a)(1) (1989); see also supra note 1253.
1261. Id.
1262. 809 P.2d 416 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991), on appeal, No. S-4528 (argued Feb. 11,
1992).
1263. Id. at 421. Rule 7(b) provides in part: "[i]f a juvenile is arrested .... The
arresting officer shall immediately notify the parents ....
" ALASKA DELINQUENcY R. 7(b).

1264. Id. at 417.
1265. 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983), appeal after remand,676 P.2d 608 (Alaska Ct. App.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984).
1266. J.R.N., 809 P.2d at 418 (quoting Copelin, 659 P.2d at 1211).
1267. Id. (citations omitted).
1268. Id. at 420.
1269. Id. at 420-21.
1270. 808 P.2d 280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991), reh'g granted, (May 31, 1991).
1271. Id. at 282; see ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.770 (1989).
1272. Noblit, 808 P.2d at 282.
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classification of the crime committed by the assisted person."12 73 The
court found this construction to be compatible with the intent of the Alaska
Legislature, Model Penal Code section 242.3, and decisions of other
courts.1274 Furthermore, the court held that due process concerns were
satisfied since Alaska Statutes section 11.56.770 required a finding that
Noblit intentionally hindered prosection with knowledge of
wrongdoing."275 It distinguished the statute in question, which imposed
strict liability as to an element of the crime, from precedent indicating that
"the imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of strict liability"
violated due process." 6 Concluding that "Noblit's guilt should not
depend on his own knowledge of the potential legal consequences
stemming from [the felon's] conduct,"'127 7 the court affirmed his
conviction. 1278
In Patterson v. Municipality of Anchorage,1279 the court of appeals
held that a defendant can only be convicted of refusal to submit to a breath
test if the prosecution proves that he was actually driving."
The
defendant in this case was originally charged with driving while
intoxicated, driving while license revoked and refusal to submit to a
chemical test of his breath.'
The defendant was an occupant of a van
that hit another car. Since the occupants got out of the van before the
police arrived, it was impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had actually been driving. 2 12 Thus, the prosecution
dismissed the charges,
and the defendant was tried and convicted solely on
1283
the refusal charge.
The court of appeals noted that the trial court had correctly recognized
that an arrest for DWI based on probable cause needed to be shown before
12 4
evidence of refusal to submit to the breath test could be admitted. M
The trial court erred, however, in ruling that the question of whether the

1273. Id.
1274. Id. at 283-84 (citing People v. Young, 555 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1976) (en banc);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.3 commentary at 239 (1980) (noting that "it is not necessary
that the defendant know the law of the crime for which the other is sought").
1275. Id. at 284.
1276. Id.
1277. Id. at 286.
1278. Id.
1279. 815 P.2d 390 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1280. Id. at 394. The court distinguished its decision from Brown v. State, 739 P.2d 182
(Alaska Ct. App. 1987), on the grounds that in Brown the defendant had acknowledged his
control of the vehicle. Patterson, 815 P.2d at 393.
1281. Id. at 391.
1282. Id.
1283. Id.
1284. Id. at 392.
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defendant was actually driving needed
to be considered only in connection
12 5
with the probable cause question.
Peterson v. State1286 involved clarification of the "informer's
privilege." The defendant was charged with three counts of misconduct
involving a controlled substance. 128 7 The first count was for delivering
a package of marijuana to an airport cargo office. Two airport employees
became suspicious, opened the package, and called the police. After a
"controlled delivery" to the addressee, the police obtained the name and
address of the defendant, and arranged a sale to undercover officers. This
sale resulted in the second and third counts, delivery of marijuana and
possession with intent to deliver.
The defendant moved to compel discovery of the names and addresses
of the employees who opened the package at the airport.12 8 After an'2in9
camera hearing, the judge overruled the state's "informer's privilege'
objection and held that disclosure of the identities was required if the state
continued to pursue the first count, but not for the second and third counts.
The state then dismissed the first count,129 and129 1the defendant was
subsequently found guilty on the latter two counts.
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the
informer's privilege did not encompass airline personnel performing their
work-related duties. 2 9' Based on the plain language of the rule and its
commentary, the court concluded that "a governmental agency may protect
'
any informant who perceives a need for anonymity. 293
In determining
the extent of the informer's privilege, the court of appeals held that the trial
court must employ a balancing test that weighs the public's interest in
effective 294
law enforcement against the individual's "right to prepare a
defense.'

1285. Id. The court discussed that criminal liability hinges on implied consent to submit
to a breath test; implied consent arises from actually operating the vehicle. Id. at 392.
1286. 813 P.2d 685 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1287. Id. at 686-87.
1288. Id. at 687.
1289. The informer's privilege is found in Alaska Rule of Evidence 509(a). The rule
provides:
The United States, the State of Alaska and sister states have a privilege to refuse to
disclose the identity of a person who has furnished information relating to or
assisting in an investigation of a possible violation of law to a law enforcement
officer or member of a legislative committee or its staff conducting an investigation.
ALAsKA R. EviD. 509(a).
1290. Peterson, 813 P.2d at 687.
1291. Id. at 688.
1292. 1. at 689.
1293. l
1294. Id. at 688.
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The court of appeals upheld the trial court's in camera hearing to
preserve the informants' anonymity, but allowed the defendant to see the
transcript of the in camera hearing with the identities of the employees
redacted."295 The court stated that the informer's privilege protects only
the identity of informers, but does not protect the contents of the
information. 29
In O'Brannon v. State,1297 the defendant, who was charged with
multiple counts of criminal contempt, first argued that the trial judge erred
in allowing the Assistant Attorney General to sit at the counsel table with
the District Attorney who was prosecuting the case. 298 The trial judge
ruled that the Assistant Attorney General could testify in the case and
remain in the courtroom, but that he could not "argue, advocate, question
or perform" any of the functions of trial counsel.12 9 The court of
appeals relied on the California case of People v. Superior Court"'° in
upholding the trial court. In that case the appellate court held that the trial
court erred in recusing the entire prosecutorial office of the district attorney
because one district attorney might be called as a witness. It was clear,
however, that a prosecutor conducting a trial could not be called as a
1 30
witness. 1
The Alaska Court of Appeals also rejected the defendant's argument
that the assistant's participation in the case biased the prosecution of the
case against her, noting that
the jury was aware of the assistant's role as a
3 2
witness, not a prosecutor. 0
The court in De Nardo v. State 30 3 affirmed De Nardo's conviction
of carrying a concealed weapon, holding that the defendant's act 3of4
carrying a knife in his briefcase constituted a violation of the statute.1 0
The court reasoned that the statutory phrase "on the person" could
encompass weapons concealed in a briefcase or purse for several reasons:
the phrase had been so interpreted by other states using the phrase in

1295. Id. at 690.
1296. Id.
1297. 812 P.2d 222 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1298. Id. at 226.
1299. Id.
1300. 150 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
1301. O'Brannon, 812 P.2d at 226-27.
1302. Id. at 227.
1303. 819 P.2d 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1304. Id. at 908. The statute provides: "A person commits the crime of misconduct
involving weapons in the third degree if [he] ... knowingly possesses a deadly weapon,
other than an ordinary pocket knife, or a defensive weapon that is concealed on the person."
ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220(a)(1) (Supp. 1991).
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similar statutes,130 5 the Alaska definition of "on the person" was
sufficiently broad to yield the same result as "about the person," 1306 and
the legislative history and intent clearly supported the interpretation of "on
the person" to include purses, briefcases, backpacks, and other containers

that can be carried in contact with the body or were "readily available for
, , 13 0 7

use.

In Perotti v. State"'8 the court of appeals held that, where a victim

is placed in fear of serious physical injury during a struggle for control of
a rifle, actual possession of the rifle is not a prerequisite to commission of

an assault "by means of" a dangerous instrument. 139

During an

attempted escape from the Fairbanks Correctional Facility, Perotti
unsuccessfully tried to take a rifle away from a correctional officer....0
Perotti was charged with attempted escape in the first degree and assault
31
in the second degree under Alaska Statutes section 11.41.220(a)(1).1 1
Although Perotti argued that he could not have placed the officer in
imminent fear of injury without first gaining control of the rifle, the court
found the officer's fear that Perotti might gain control of the rifle

statutorily sufficient.1 1 21 313The court of appeals thus affirmed Perotti's
conviction and sentence.

1305. DeNardo, 819 P.2d at 905-06 (citations omitted).
1306. La-at 906.
1307. l at 906-07 (citations omitted).
1308. 818 P.2d 700 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1309. Id at 701-02.
1310. Perotti actually gained control of the officer's pistol, but the state did not base the
assault charge on this because the officer knew the pistol was unloaded and was not in fear
of injury by means of it. Id. at 701 n.1.
1311. Alaska Statutes section 11.41.220(a)(1) provides:
(a) A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if that person
recklessly
(1) places another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of
a dangerous instrument[.]
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.220(a)(1) (1989).
1312. Perotti, 818 P.2d at 702. The court was persuaded by the construction of similar
statutes in State v. Lewis, 184 Neb. 111, 165 N.W.2d 569 (1969) and State v. Hill, 298 Or.
270, 692 P.2d 100, 105 (1984).
1313. Perotti argued that his consecutive sentence of three and one-half years for the
attempted escape and one and one-half years for the assault was excessive. In upholding
the sentence, the court applied the "clearly mistaken" standard developed in Upton v. State,
749 P.2d 386, 388 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), and McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14
(Alaska 1974). Perotti, 818 P.2d at 703-04.
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C. Criminal Procedure
The following fifteen cases summarize the Alaska Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals' decisions concerning criminal procedure in 1991. The
bulk of the cases deal with a defendant's right to counsel and Miranda
rights. This section begins with a self-incrimination case; it continues
through proceedings pro se, right to counsel and Miranda cases; it ends
with cases involving miscellaneous procedural issues.
In State v. Hofseth, 3 t4 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of the defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence on the ground
that it was obtained through the state's release of incriminating financial

information in violation of Alaska Statutes section 18.85.120.315

Hofseth was charged with various offenses relating to his alleged collection
of insurance on an automobile falsely reported stolen. 31 6 The
challenged evidence, a DeLorean automobile, which Hofseth had reported
stolen in 1987, was discovered after the state released incriminating
information fTom Hofseth's Pre-Trial Services ("PTS") file. 317 The file
had been compiled when Hofseth sought court-appointed counsel for
unrelated matters on the basis of indigency. 131 1 In moving to suppress
the discovered DeLorean, Hofseth relied primarily on the language of
Alaska Statutes section 18.85.120, stating that the district court violated the
1314. 822 P.2d 1376 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1315. The statute provides in part:
(b) In determining whether a person is indigent and in determining the extent
of the person's inability to pay, the court shall consider such factors as income,
property owned, outstanding obligations, and the number and ages of dependents.
Release on bail does not preclude a finding that a person is indigent. In each case,
the person, subject to the penaltiesfor perjury, shall certify under oath, and in
writing or by other record,materialfactors relative to the person's ability to pay
that the courtprescribes.
(d) As a condition of receiving services under this chapter, a person shall affirm
indigency under oath to the court and execute a general waiver authorizing the
release to the court of income information regarding any income source the person
had for a period of three years immediately preceding the person's first court
appearance in connection with each cause. At the conclusion of all services by the
public defender to the person, the court shall upon request release to the attorney
general all information received under this subsection except information that might
incriminate or tend to incriminate the person.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.120 (1991) (emphasis added).
1316. Hofseth, 822 P.2d at 1379.
1317. Id.
1318. Hofseth was denied court-appointed counsel for an unrelated matter in January of
1988, but the trial judge indicated that he would reconsider the denial if Hofseth agreed to
answer questions about his financial condition. Id. at 1378-79. Hofseth then testified that
he did not own any vehicles or property, and that all property was in Brodsky's name, to
whom he had been remarried in 1985. Id. at 1379. In April of 1988, Hofseth again
requested court-appointed counsel on an unrelated matter, which led to a PTS check and
eventually to the discovery of the DeLorean on Brodsky's property. Id.
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terms of the statute by releasing incriminating information. Additionally,
he argued that reading the statute to allow the release of the information
would violate his right against self-incrimination." 9
In affirming the trial court's suppression order, the court of appeals
discussed the state's arguments in turn. The court first addressed the
state's argument that Hofseth's statements were not "compelled" as they
were false, and therefore not entitled to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.13 2 The court initially
noted that the state was not barred by the statute or the Fifth Amendment
from prosecuting Hofseth for perjury. 3
In order to prosecute any
crimes based on the revelation of subsidiary information in the indigency
application, however, the state must first show that the basic claim of
indigency was untruthful. If it is so shown, then the defendant could not
be considered to have been compelled to reveal information supporting the
application as he was not compelled to declare indigency in order to obtain
counsel." 22 In this case, where the defendant himself was uncertain as
to whether he qualified for court-appointed counsel, and the state never
demonstrated that Hofseth fraudulently applied for assistance knowing
himself to be unqualified, the state's argument failed. 1323
The court of appeals next rejected the state's argument that even if the
release of the financial information was improper under the statute, the
relationship between the disclosure and the seizure of the DeLorean was
too attenuated for the seizure to be illegal.132 4 The court noted however,
that if, in the course of aperjury investigation, the state discovered a crime
unrelated to the information in the PTS files, 13the attenuation doctrine
would apply and the crime could be prosecuted. 1
In Evans v. State,1 326 the court of appeals reversed the conviction of
the defendant, holding that he did not knowingly and intelligently
relinquish his right to counsel.132 7 The court of appeals determined that
the record of the superior court did not satisfy the minimum requirements
of James v. State, 328 which held that before a court may grant a

1319. lI at 1380.
1320. Id. at 1381 (citing United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178 (1977)).
1321. Id.
1322. Id. at 1381-82.
1323. Id. at 1382.
1324. Id. at 1384.
1325. Id. at 1384-85.
1326. 822 P.2d 1370 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1327. Id. at 1371.
1328. 730 P.2d 811, modified on reh'g, 739 P.2d 1314 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), appeal
after remand,754 P.2d 1336 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). James reiterated the well-established
requirement that a waiver of counsel be "knowing and intelligent." See Faretta v.
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defendant's request to proceed pro se, the court must "first establish that
the defendant can represent himself in a 'rational and coherent manner' and
then determine whether 'the prisoner understands precisely what he is
giving up by declining the assistance of counsel." '3 29 The record
revealed that, in an attempt to replace his court-appointed attorney, the
defendant indicated that if he could not get another attorney, he would "just
go ahead and represent himself."'3 30 At the hearing to determine the
defendant's competency to proceed without counsel, the judge asked why
he thought he could represent himself. 3 3 1 The defendant indicated that
he did not believe he could adequately represent himself, but that he could
33 2
do a better job than his attorney who wanted him to plead guilty.'
After further questioning, the judge gave Evans the choice of either
representing himself or using the appointed
attorney. Evans chose to
334
represent himself, 333 and was convicted.1
Finding the record wholly inadequate, the court of appeals noted that
it is possible in some cases to infer a valid waiver circumstantially, but
distinguished this situation from that addressed in James, in which the
defendant had extensive prior experience with counsel, was fully apprised
33 5
of the functions of an attorney, and demanded to represent himself.
The defendant in Evans was not familiar with the judicial process in such
a way and his waiver was equivocal. 336 As the record did not indicate
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver3 3of
the right to counsel, the
7
court of appeals reversed Evans' conviction.
In Abdullah v. State, 33 1 the court of appeals affirmed the trial
judge's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment and suppress

California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
1329. James, 730 P.2d at 813-14 (quoting McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91 (Alaska
1974)).
1330. Evans, 822 P.2d at 1372.
1331. Id. The judge also inquired into Evans' educational and vocational background.
Id.
1332. Id.
1333. Id. at 1373. Notwithstanding the defendant's choice, the judge directed the
appointed attorney to remain present at trial. Id.
1334. Id. The jury sent a note to the judge stating that they "fe[lt] the defense was not
adequate, that Mr. Evans was not competent to represent himself, and that he had a difficult
time communicating his point of view. Should that play a significant part in the basis of
our decision?" Id. The judge answered that it should not. Id.
1335. Id. at 1374-75.
1336. Id. at 1375.
1337. Id. at 1376. The court further suggested that the circumstances required a higher
level of scrutiny by the trial court assessing the defendant's competency to proceed pro se.
As a result, the court of appeals indicated that the trial court had to make the defendant
aware of the disadvantages of a pro se defense. Id.
1338. 816 P.2d 1386 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
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evidence of defendant's statements to Anchorage authorities. 339 The
defendant already was formally charged with possession of cocaine when
the police caught him selling drugs to an undercover officer.' 34 The
court rejected Abdullah's argument that his right to counsel for the prior
charge extended to his ongoing drug-dealing activities, since these activities
were distinct from the possession charge and were not a "critical stage" of
the proceedings when the undercover officer contacted him.' t The
court explained that "[t]he fact that Abdullah had counsel appointed to
represent him on the charge of possession of cocaine that arose in Kodiak
did not serve to shield him so that he could sell drugs in Anchorage
without fear of police interference."' 342 As no right to counsel had been
violated, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court acted properly in
refusing to
suppress defendant's statements and to dismiss the drug-dealing
1 343
charges.
In Babb v. Municipality of Anchorage, 344 the court of appeals held
that denying a DWI arrestee his request to confer with counsel before an
independent blood-alcohol test is conducted does not violate Alaska
Statutes section 12.25.150(b), when the arrestee has previously been given
a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney.1345 The court opined
that an independent blood-alcohol test did not constitute a "critical stage"
of the proceedings and thus was not protected by the constitutional right to
counsel.'4 Consequently, the court found that only a statutory right to
counsel exists before the test, and once the reasonable time and opportunity
elements of Alaska Statutes section 12.25.150 are satisfied, the overriding
concern is to avoid delay in the administration of the test. 347
In Lively v. State,'348 the court of appeals affirmed the defendant's
conviction for refusal to take a breath chemical test. Relying on its

1339. 1I at 1386.
1340. I& at 1387.
1341. Id. The trial court and appeals court based their decisions on Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159 (1985) and McLaughlin v. State, 737 P.2d 1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
1342. Abdullah, 816 P.2d at 1387.
1343. Iaat 1386.
1344. 813 P.2d 312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1345. Id. at 313-14. Alaska Statutes section 12.25.150(b) provides:
[i]mmediately after an arrest, a person shall have the right to telephone or otherwise
communicate with the prisoner's attorney and any relative or friend, and any attorney
at law entitled to practice in the courts of Alaska shall, at the request of the prisoner
or any relative or friend of the prisoner, have the right to immediately visit the
person arrested.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(b) (1990).
1346. Babb, 813 P.2d at 313.
1347. Id. at 313-14.
1348. 804 P.2d 66 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
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decision in Anderson v. State,' 9 the court held that an arresting officer
has no duty to inform the arrestee of his right to have counsel present prior
to taking a breathalyzer test, as it is not350a "critical stage" of a proceeding
at which the right to counsel attaches.
Relying on Graham v. State, 35' the defendant argued that the officer
erroneously did not inquire into his reasons for refusing to take the test.
The defendant in Graham was read her Mirandarights and then was asked
to submit to a breathalyzer test. The defendant refused and later
successfully argued that she had been confused about her rights and
whether she had to respond to the request to take the test. There, the
supreme court held that in that situation, the arresting officer "'must inquire
into the nature of the refusal and advise.., that the rights contained in the
135 2
Miranda warning do not apply to the breathalyzer examination.'
The court of appeals in the instant case held that Graham did not apply
because the defendant had not been read his Miranda rights at the time he
was asked to take the breathalyzer test. Since no Miranda warnings had
been given, the officer did
not need to ask if those warnings had confused
353
rights.
his
to
as
Lively
Finally, the defendant argued that he had an affirmative defense of
subsequent consent.13- Reviewing the authority in other states, the court
noted a split of authority on the question of whether subsequent consent
can cure an initial refusal. A minority of the courts allow subsequent
consent in some circumstances 35 5 on the basis that the rule is fair to the
arrestee and furthers the purpose of the implied consent statutes by
encouraging chemical tests in as many cases as possible. 35 6 In contrast,
a majority of states do not allow subsequent consent in any
circumstance 1357 due to concerns about the reliability of the test as time
passes, and the unreasonableness of having the arresting officer remain
available for an undetermined amount of time.1 35" After considering the
opposing positions, the court of appeals adopted the minority view

1349. 713 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
1350. Lively, 804 P.2d at 68.
1351. 633 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1981).
1352. Lively, 804 P.2d at 68 (quoting Graham, 633 P.2d at 215).
1353. Id. at 68-69.
1354. Id. at 69. About ten minutes after the arresting officer had brought the defendant
to the jail, and after the defendant spoke with his brother and smoked a cigarette, the
defendant asked if he could take the breathalyzer test. Id. at 67.
1355. Id. at 69 (citations omitted).
1356. Id. at 69-70.
1357. Id. (citations omitted).
1358. Id.
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allowing subsequent consent in certain circumstances.1 35 9 The court,
however, did not allow the defense to be used in this
case because of the
36
overly broad manner in which Lively proposed it1 0
The court in Kochutin v. State136 1 ruled that once a defendant
invokes the right to consult with counsel, the police may not initiate
contact unless defendant's counsel is present. The defendant, who had
already been incarcerated for unrelated offenses,1361 came under
suspicion for murder and sexual abuse of a minor, and was transferred to
a more secure prison facility. Aware of the reason behind his transfer, he
spoke with his attorney, who subsequently advised the district attorney that
the defendant was not interested
in speaking with authorities about the
363
homicide investigation.
The case remained unresolved and a year later the district attorney
advised the police officers to contact the defendant and attempt to interview
him without first notifying his attorney.136 The police advised the
defendant of his Miranda rights, reminded him that he had an attorney, and
interviewed him in jail without notifying his attorney.3 65 Over the
course of five separate days and as many interviews, the defendant
confessed to the sexual abuse and murder of the3 victim along with the
sexual abuse of another boy in an unrelated case. 6
The defendant invoked the rule of Edwards v. Arizona,1367 in which
the United States Supreme Court expanded Miranda v. Arizona1368 by
holding that once a suspect invokes his Miranda right to consult with
counsel, the police are barred from any subsequent effort to initiate further
interrogation until the suspect has been given the opportunity to consult
with counsel. 369 The Alaska Court of Appeals noted that "under the per
se rule of Edwards, police-initiated reinterrogation is prohibited even when
the suspect, upon being recontacted, expressly waives his Miranda
rights.' 370

1359. Id.
1360. Id. at 70-71.
1361. 813 P.2d 298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
1362. Id. at 300.

1363. Id.
1364. Id. at 301.
1365. Id.
1366. Id. at 302.

1367. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
1368. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1369. Kochutin, 813 P.2d at 303.

1370. Id.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

The state argued that Edwards was inapplicable because once a
defendant is given the opportunity to consult with counsel, the Edwards
prohibition does not apply anymore, and the police may again initiate
contact. 137 1 The court of appeals rejected the state's argument, expressly
relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Minnick v.
Mississippi,1372 which held that once a suspect invokes the right to
consult with counsel, the police may not initiate any contact unless the
person's attorney is present. 373 The court also rejected the state's
argument that Edwards did not apply because the defendant had been in
custody for unrelated offenses. In determining that the defendant had been
in continuous custody, the court found it immaterial that he was being
detained for unrelated offenses. Additionally, the court found no reason
why the
Edwards rule should be affected by the mere passage of
74
13

time.

The second part of the court's holding emphasized that even if
Edwards were not applicable, the totality of the circumstances indicated
that the defendant's Miranda waivers were not voluntary. 375 The court
qualified this aspect of its decision by refusing to hold that in all cases a
person who requests counsel may never afterward voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights; rather, the court limited its137determination
that the waiver
6
was not voluntary to the facts of this case.
The dissent in this case argued that the state did not violate the
Edwards rule,'13 1 since the defendant's confinement in prison did not
necessarily establish that he was in continuous custody for Miranda
purposes. 1378 Because the defendant was confined solely as a sentenced
prisoner with no charges pending against him, the "anxiety and uncertainty
379
that support Miranda's finding of inherent coercion" did not exist.'
The dissent suggested that the defendant's Miranda custody ended when
the authorities transferred him to a less secure facility before the
interrogations occurred. 3 0" Additionally, the dissent failed to see how

1371. Id. at 303-04.
1372. 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990).
1373. Kochutin, 813 P.2d at 304.
1374. Id. at 304-05.
1375. Id. at 305.
1376. Id. at 306. Additionally, the court noted that the prosecutor violated the Alaska
Code of Professional Responsibility by knowingly bypassing the defendant's attorney. The
court considered this violation significant in determining the voluntariness of the waiver.
l at 306-07; see ALASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1).
1377. Kochutin, 813 P.2d at 308 (Bryner, J., dissenting).
1378. Id. at 309 (Bryner, J., dissenting).
1379. Id. (Bryner, J., dissenting).
1380. Id. at 310 (Bryner, L, dissenting).
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the state had acted improperly when it took advantage of the defendant's
known propensity to waive his Miranda
rights in the absence of counsel
381
and then confess to unrelated crimes.
In McCollum v. State, 3 2 the court of appeals held that statements
McCollum made to a police officer were admissible despite the absence of
Miranda warnings. 3
Consistent with Alaska Supreme Court and
United States Supreme Court precedent, 1384 the court held that Miranda
warnings were not required in this case because the "circumstances
surrounding the stopping, in their totality, were [not] substantially more
coercive than those of a typical
traffic stop,' ' 38 and there was no
"'actual indication of custody.' ' ' 138
The defendant in Moss v. State13 17 contended, and the court of
appeals agreed, that he was in "custody" during the time the police
searched his trailer for drugs, and therefore the police were required to
inform him of his Miranda rights before questioning him. 3 8 Ten
officers served the warrant wearing marked raid gear and entered the trailer
13 9
with weapons drawn, pursuant to their usual procedure in drug cases.
The police found four people present, including Moss, and directed them
to sit on a couch while they searched the trailer. A uniformed officer was
stationed at the door, but the officer in charge later stated that he would
have given anyone permission to leave during the search.' 390 The officer
told the people that they were not under arrest, and that as soon as they
finished searching the trailer, the police would be gone.13 1' The officer
in charge spoke with Moss several times in private, during which Moss
confessed that there was cocaine on the premises and that a 2piece of paper
the police found had notations of drug transactions on it.1
Relying on the Alaska Supreme Court's standard of the objective,
reasonable person's perspective for determining custody, 1393 the court of

1381. Id. at 311 (Bryner, J., dissenting).
1382. 808 P.2d 268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1383. Id. at 269.
1384. Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Blake v. State, 763 P.2d
511 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)).
1385. l
1386. Id. at 269-70 (quoting Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)).
1387. 823 P.2d 671 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1388. Id. at 673, 675.
1389. Id. at 672.
1390. Id.
1391. Id.
1392. Id.
1393. Id. at 673. The standard was set out in Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska

1979).
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appeals found that, despite the fact that Moss was told he was not under
arrest, the force with which the police entered and maintained control of
the trailer would indicate to a reasonable person that he was in police
custody. 3" The court therefore reversed the trial court's denial of
Moss' motion and remanded the case to the superior court. 3 95 Judge
Bryner dissented, noting that:
Moss was in his own home, all weapons initially displayed by the police
had been put away, and Moss had been expressly told that he was not
under arrest, that the sole purpose of the police presence was to perform
a search of the premises pursuant to a warrant,
396 and that the police would
depart as soon as the search was completed
In Tagala v. State,139' the defendant argued that his conviction for
first-degree murder and tampering with physical evidence should be
overturned because he was not advised of his Miranda rights. 3 98 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the defendant was not
in custody during the first interview and need not have been advised of his
rights. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered whether a
reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to
leave.1 399 The events surrounding the interview indicated that the
defendant was not in custody: the defendant was not physically restrained;
he voluntarily agreed to come to the police station; he entered the station
unaccompanied
by an officer; and he was told that he was free to leave at
40
any time.'
At a second interview later in the day a police officer read the
defendant his Miranda rights.' 40' The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's restriction of the use of the statements concerning the sale of drugs
after the defendant requested counsel in response to a question about his
sale of drugs.140
The court held that a defendant may make an
unambiguous and limited assertion of the right to counsel. Any subsequent
statements about the specific matter within the scope of the assertion will
then be suppressed. 4 3

1394.
1395.
1396.
1397.
1398.
1399.
1400.
1401.
1402.
1403.

Id. at 674.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 676 (Bryner, C.J., dissenting).
812 P.2d 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 606-07.
Id. at 608-09.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 610.
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The defendant also challenged the prosecutor's use of the law
enforcement computer system to run criminal background checks on
prospective jurors,"4° arguing that the use of the system for this purpose
violated Alaska Statutes section 12.62.030(a)." 5 The court noted that
this was the first time the issue had been raised in Alaska and held that
since the records may be used to challenge for cause, the prosecutor did not
violate the statute. 1406 Nonetheless, the court concluded that, upon
request, the prosecutor should disclose the criminal records of jurors in
cases where the prosecutor intends to rely on them.14 7
In Bostic v. State,' 4°8 the supreme court disagreed with the court of
appeals as to which party should bear the burden of showing prejudice to
a defendant who was not notified that a particular witness would be called.
The court held that a party violating Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(b)(1)(i) t ° "has the burden of showing that the non-offending party
has not been prejudiced in the manner he specifically claims."14t
At
Bostic's trial for allegedly sexually abusing his daughter, the state called
Bostic's psychiatric social worker as a rebuttal witness. The defendant
objected, claiming that the state had violated Rule 16(b)(1)(i) by not
The defendant
notifying him that the witness would be called. 4 1'

1404. Id. at 611.
1405. Id. Alaska Statute section 12.62.030(a) provides in part:
Except as provided in (b) and (c) of this section and in [Alaska Statutes section]
12.62.035, access to specified classes of criminal justice information in criminal
justice information systems is available only to individual law enforcement agencies
according to the specific needs of the agency under regulations adopted by the
commission under [Alaska Statutes section] 12.62.010. Criminal justice information
may be used only for law enforcement purposes or for those additional lawful
purposes necessary to the proper enforcement or administration of other provisions
of law as the commission may prescribe by regulations adopted under [Alaska
Statutes section] 12.62.010.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.030(a) (1990).
1406. Tagala, 812 P.2d at 611-12.
1407. Id. at 612.
1408. 805 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1991).
1409. The rule provides:
(b) Disclosure to the Accused.
(1) Information Within Possession or Control of Prosecuting Attorney. Except
as is otherwise provided as to matters not subject to disclosure and protective orders,
the prosecuting attorney shall disclose the following information within his
possession or control to defense counsel and make available for inspection and
copying:
(i) The names and addresses of persons known by the government to have
knowledge of relevant facts and their written or recorded statements or summaries
of statements.
ALASKA R. CRai. P. 16(b)(1)(i).
1410. Bostic, 805 P.2d at 345.
1411. Id. The state admitted on appeal that Bostic should have been notified of the
witness' appearance under Rule 16(b)(1)(i), after initially claiming that the rule did not
apply to rebuttal witnesses. Id. at 346.
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moved the court either to preclude the witness' testimony or to grant a
mistrial, claiming that he was irrevocably committed to a planned defense
and could not change his strategy in mid-trial as a response to the surprise
witness."" The defendant did not request a continuance, his alternative
motions were denied, and he was convicted. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that Bostic had failed to show that the violation of the
rule prejudiced his defense. 4 13
The supreme court reversed, finding that the state's violation of Rule
16(b)(1)(i) thwarted each of the purposes of Rule 16: to "'provide adequate
information for informed pleas, expedite trial, minimize surprise, afford
opportunity for effective cross-examination, and meet the requirements of
due process.", 41 4 The court further found that it would be "manifestly
unjust" to burden the non-offending party with proving that the violation
was prejudicial to him. 41 s The court held that the intent of the party
violating Rule 16 was irrelevant and concluded that a violation of Rule
46
16(b)(1)(i) is "presumptively prejudicial to the non-offending party.'
While a continuance is normally the appropriate remedy for a
discovery violation, the court held that a mistrial would be proper if the
state failed to meet the burden of showing that the defendant was not
prejudiced and the state could not proceed without the witness'
testimony.4 17 The case was remanded to the superior court to determine
whether the state overcame the
presumption of prejudice resulting from its
1418
violation of Rule 16(b)(1)(i).
In State v. Jeske,141 9 the court of appeals held that, for the purposes
of Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 45, a judge setting a trial date for a
continuance may rely on the fact that the rule is tolled during the
continuance until "it is clear that the defendant has not consented and will
not consent to the continuance." At this point, the Rule 45 stopwatch
should be restarted.141 The court interpreted this situation in light of
Snyder v. Stat'e,142 in which the supreme court held that Rule 45 rights
were not fundamental, and that a judge therefore was entitled to grant
continuances upon requests from the defendant's attorney when the

1412.
1413.
1414.
1415.
1416.
1417.
1418.
1419.
1420.
1421.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 347 (quoting ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 16(a)).
Id.
Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 345.
l at 349.
823 P.2d 6 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 19.
524 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1974).
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defendant was absent.' 4' Accordingly, in Jeske, the court found that the
defendant's lack of consent to the continuance remained subjective until it
was brought to the attention of the court, and thus Rule 45 remained
tolled. 1423 The court noted that any other application of the rule would
"give rise to an unacceptable potential for manipulation of the rule," since
defendants could otherwise wait to voice their1424
lack of consent to a
continuance until the Rule 45 period had expired.
In Cox v. State,1 42s the court of appeals reversed Cox's sexual abuse
conviction based on the trial court's failure to allow the defendant
surrebuttal. 1426 One of the state's expert witnesses, Dr. Turner, testified
that since the alleged victim related her story consistently and with detail,
she was telling the truth. 142 7 Following this testimony, the trial judge
denied Cox's request for surrebuttal, the essence of which would
428 have been
testimony that "children can and do lie about sexual abuse."'
The court of appeals found that Turner's testimony was prejudicial, and
that Cox should have been given a chance to rebut this testimony with the
use of another expert witness. 142 9 The court held that although Turner
should have been able to testify whether the victim's statements were
consistent with the kinds of reports of other abuse victims, his testimony
inferring that the victim's statements were factual were clearly
prejudicial.1430 Specifically, the court noted that this case turned on the
credibility of the witnesses and that Dr. Turner's testimony clearly
improved the victim's credibility, thus having "a significant impact on the
case."' 43' The court stated, "we believe that the trial court was under a
duty to give
counsel every opportunity to combat the improper
1432
testimony.'
In Evans v. State,1433 the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's
denial of the defendant's habeas corpus petition contesting his extradition
1422. Id. at 664.
1423. Jeske, 823 P.2d at 9.
1424. Id. at 10.
1425. 805 P.2d 374 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1426. Id. at 379.
1427. Id. at 377. Turner in fact never examined the victim. Id. at 376.
1428. Id. at 377.
1429. Id. at 379.
1430. Id. at 378-79.
1431. Id.
1432. Id. at 379. Chief Judge Bryner wrote a concurring opinion in which he urged that
the outcome should not hinge on Turner's testimony being plain error. Id. (Bryner, C.J.,
concurring). Bryner explained that since Turner's testimony was important, Cox should
have been allowed to offer his own expert unless some compelling reason prevented
rebuttal. Id. (Bryner, CJ., concurring).
1433. 820 P.2d 1098 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
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to Montana.1 434 Pursuant to Montana's petition under the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act,1 435 the governor of Alaska issued a warrant for
Evans' arrest and extradition to Montana. Upon denial of his habeas
corpus action in superior court, Evans appealed, arguing that the Montana
extradition
documents failed to comply with Alaska's extradition
1 436
statute.

The court of appeals rejected Evans' first argument that the documents
were inadequate for not showing that any judicial officer of Montana found
probable cause to believe that Evans was in the state at the time of the
offense. The court noted that the statute does not require a finding of
probable cause, but only an allegation. Once the governor issued the
extradition warrant, a presumption arose that Evans was present in
Montana when the crime was committed. 437 Furthermore, the court
stated that even if the presumption was not created by law, the extradition
request from Montana included a document signed by Evans waiving his
right to a preliminary examination to determine probable cause on the
charges. These documents, the court found, would satisfy any requirement
of showing probable cause for
believing that Evans was in Montana at the
43
time of the alleged offense.
Evans also argued that the extradition request was invalid under the
second subsection of the statute as the information filed against him was
not supported by an affidavit sworn in front of a magistrate. 439 The
court rejected this interpretation of the statute, noting that courts have
interpreted this section of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act "in the
disjunctive: the three types of supporting documentation'4 4 0 are

1434. Id. at 1099.
1435. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 12.70.010-.290 (1990). The Alaska statute was derived from the
Uniform Extradition Act.
1436. IA The statute setting forth the required form of the extradition request for a
person who has been accused but not yet convicted of a crime in the requesting state reads
in part:
Form of Demand. (a) No demand for the extradition of a person accused but
not yet convicted of a crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor of
this state unless made in writing and containing the following:
(1) an allegation that the accused was present in the demanding state at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter the accused fled
the demanding state... [and]
(2) a copy of an indictment found or an information supported by affidavit in
the state having jurisdiction of the crime or by a copy of a complaint, affidavit,
or other equivalent accusation made before a magistrate there ....
ALASKA STAT. § 12.70.020(a) (1990).
1437. Evans, 820 P.2d at 1099.
1438. Id. at 1099-1100.
1439. Id.
1440. Subsection (2) of the Alaska Statutes section 12.70.020(a) provides three alternative
methods of supporting an extradition request: (1) by a copy of an indictment from the state
having jurisdiction; (2) by a copy of an information supported by an affidavit from the state
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independent of each other, each sufficient to support extradition."''144
Montana's extradition request was valid as it sent an information supported
by an affidavit, thereby meeting the second type of supporting
documentation.'" 2 Additionally, the court noted that under Montana law
an information cannot be filed unless there is a finding of probable cause
that the defendant committed the crime charged.144 3 The court
concluded that Evans' waiver of a determination of probable cause "must
be given conclusive effect on the limited issue of whether, for purposes of
proceedings under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, there is probable
cause to believe that the charge pending against him in Montana is wellfounded."'" 4
D. Sentencing
The Alaska Supreme Court and Court of Appeals issued several
opinions regarding sentencing in 1991. The supreme court emphasized that
sentences should be imposed only with consideration of the particular facts
of each case. Furthermore, it reaffirmed that such sentences can be
modified only with proper respect for the statutory scheme and only under
a "clearly mistaken" standard of review.
In State v. Wentz,'" the defendant was convicted of first-degree
assault for beating his wife severely while he was in a state of
intoxication," and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison with three
years suspended. The defendant appealed the sentence as too severe. The
trial court had considered two aggravating factors in sentencing Wentz: the
offense was committed against his spouse, and the defendant knew that his
spouse was particularly vulnerable to his attack as she had a heart condition
and was deaf.'" 7
The Alaska Court of Appeals, relying on the ten-year rule in Pruettv.
State, 448 reversed the trial court's sentence and remanded for imposition
having jurisdiction; or (3) by a copy of a complaint, affidavit or other equivalent "accusation
from a state having jurisdiction and executed before one of its magistrates." Id. (citing
ALASKA STAT. § 12.70.020(a) (1990)).
1441. Id. (footnote added) (citations omitted).
1442. Id.
1443. Id. at 1100-01.
1444. l at 1102.
1445. 805 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1991).
1446. Id. at 962-63.
1447. Id. These factors were included in Alaska's aggravating factors statute. See
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(18)(A), (5) (Supp. 1991).
1448. 742 P.2d 257 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987). In Pruett, the court of appeals held that for
class A felonies, sentences of more than ten years should be given only to offenders who
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of a new sentence "not exceeding fifteen years with five years, rather than
three, suspended." 1" 9 The supreme court reversed, holding that the
court of appeals' ten-year rule set out in Pruett "is both inconsistent with
the statutory scheme established by the legislature and contrary to our prior
decisions concerning the proper role of the appellate courts in reviewing
sentencing decisions."'"45
While the court noted that it was not
categorically prohibiting the court of appeals from adopting sentencing
standards,' 45' the supreme court did emphasize that "[tihe court of
appeals... has no authority to promulgate general rules of practice and
procedure 145
in2 [the lower] courts. Only [the supreme] court has such
authority."'

The supreme court also found that the court of appeals' reversal was
"at odds with the 'clearly mistaken' standard of review established long
ago by [the supreme] court ....)$" The "clearly mistaken" standard
implies that there exists a permissible range of sentences that will not be
modified on review." 5 By following the ten-year rule, the court of
appeals undercut the principle that the imposition of a sentence requires
consideration of the particular facts of the case. 455 The court cited with
approval the court of appeals' "Austin rule," which provides that "first
felony offenders convicted of offenses for which no presumptive term is
specified should normally receive more favorable sentences than the
presumptive term for second felony offenders convicted of like
crimes.' 456 The supreme court applied this rule to the facts before it,
and found the circumstances exceptional enough to justify imposing a
sentence on Wentz more severe than the presumptive sentence for a second

either have "a proven record of recidivism, or those whose conduct involved premeditated
attempts to kill or seriously injure." Id at 264.
1449. Wentz 805 P.2d at 964 (citing Wentz v. State, 777 P.2d 213, 216-17 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1989), rev'd, 805 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1991)). The court of appeals concluded that
Wentz did not fall under either exception to the ten-year limitation set out in Pruett. Wentz,
777 P.2d at 216.
1450. Wentz, 805 P.2d at 965. The court also noted that the court of appeals' limitation
of aggravating factors to the two set out in Pruet directly conflicted with the legislature's
enumeration of twenty-six aggravating factors. Id. at 965 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125
(1990); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(1)-(26) (1991)).
1451. Wentz, 805 P.2d at 965.
1452. Id at 966 n.6 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
1453. Id
1454. Id (citing McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974)).
1455. Id at 966.
1456. Id. at 967 (citing Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657, 657-58 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981)).
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time offender. 45 7 The court thus reversed
and remanded for
45 8
reinstatement of the trial court's sentence.1
In Williams v. State,'4 9 the court of appeals reversed Williams'
sentence of forty-one years unsuspended time because the term was not
justified under Alaska Statutes section 12.55.005(1).141
Williams'
sentence, based on his rape conviction, was brought before the court for
reconsideration in light of State v. Wentz.' 461
The court of appeals approved of the trial court's use of the forty-year
benchmark pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 12.55.005(1). However, the
court of appeals went on to conclude that although the sentencing court had
considered five of the six factors of Alaska Statutes section 12.55.005, the
court's analysis did not justify the imposition of a sentence which
"significantly exceeded" those sentences received by many prior similarly
situated offenders. 461
Moreover, the sentencing court seemed to
overlook the absence of aggravating factors which were apparent in cases
imposing similar sentences. 146'
The court of appeals found that the
legislature's expansion of the maximum sentence for sexual assault and
abuse most likely affected only kidnapping cases because of the "constancy
of the maximum penalty for the more serious offense of kidnapping...
$$1464

In State v. Bumpus, 465 the supreme court held that the reduction of
a jail sentence from twenty-three years to a maximum of fifteen years was
unjustified because the court of appeals did not "indicate in what way the
aggravating factors justified fifteen years, but no more."' 466 The trial
court had sentenced Bumpus to an unsuspended term of twenty-three years,

1457. Id. The court considered, among other things, the fact that the victim was
particularly vulnerable, that she was injured so severely that she spent 112 days in the
hospital, that Wentz failed to obtain medical attention for his wife until seven hours after
he beat her, and that Wentz previously had been convicted of alcohol-related offenses that
included beating his wife. Id. at 967-68.
1458. Id. at 968.
1459. 809 P.2d 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1460. The court of appeals initially ruled that Williams' sentence was excessive because
it was greater than 40 years unsuspended time. Id. at 932. Alaska Statutes section
12.55.005(1) provides: "[i]n imposing sentence, the court shall consider (1) the seriousness
of the defendant's present offense in relation to other offenses. ALASKA STAT. §
12.55.005(1) (1990).
1461. 805 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1991). Wentz discouraged the use of benchmarks, instead of
adhering to the notion that every sentence should be based on case-specific facts and
considerations.
1462. Id. at 935.
1463. Id. at 936 & n.5.
1464. Id. at 937.
1465. 820 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1991).
1466. Id. at 304.
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a time period well within the guidelines of Alaska Statutes section
12.55.125(d).1 467 The court of appeals reversed, finding that the goals
of "rehabilitation, deterrence, and reaffirmation of societal norms" did not
justify a sentence of twenty-three years."" 8 The supreme court, in turn,
reversed,69 holding reduction of the sentence improper under State v.
Wentz.1
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' limitation on
sentencing because it was "not moored to any principle." 14 0 The court
found that the fifteen-year limitation was not justified because: (1) it was
fifty percent longer than the sentence given to Bumpus' leader and coconspirator; (2) it did not consider the fact that Bumpus aided the police
in apprehending his co-conspirators; and (3) it was not based on a
psychiatric evaluation of Bumpus.147 1 The court noted that the
"'permissible range of reasonable sentences"' mentioned in McClain v.
"'
State47
was a function of "the presence of aggravating factors, the
psychological make-up of the defendant, the need for isolation, and the
sentences imposed in comparable cases . . . ." The court stated that
"[w]ithout articulated findings concerning the factors that determine the
range of reasonable sentences, a sentence of fifteen years
is as arbitrary and
1473
unsupportable as a sentence of twenty-three years.
In Buoy v. State,1474 the defendant pleaded no contest to a count of
criminally negligent homicide, a class C felony punishable by a maximum
sentence of five years. 47 As he was a first offender, the defendant was
not subject to presumptive sentencing. The case did, however, fall under
the Austin rule."476 The court noted that this rule should only be
deviated from in exceptional circumstances.' 477 Exceptional
circumstances were delineated in Brezenoff v. State1478 as significant
479
aggravating factors from Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155(c).
1467. Id. at 301 n.4; see ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d) (1990).
1468. Bumpus, 820 P.2d at 302.
1469. 805 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1991). The court held in Wentz that "it is no longer
appropriate for courts to rigidly define the length of sentence that can be justified by any
particular criterion, provided that the sentence is ultimately within the range allowed by the
legislature." Bumpus, 820 P.2d at 302.
1470. Id. at 303.
1471. Id. at 304.
1472. 519 P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 1974).
1473. Bumpus, 820 P.2d at 305.
1474. 818 P.2d 1165 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1475. Id. at 1166.
1476. Id. at 1166. See supra note 1456 and accompanying text.
1477. bI
1478. 658 P.2d 1359 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
1479. Buoy, 818 P.2d at 1166. According to Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155(c), an
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The trial judge found that Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155(c)(10)
applied, and as the defendant's conduct amounted to manslaughter, which
is a more serious class of crime, the judge sentenced Buoy to five years
with three suspended, thus exceeding the two-year presumptive term for an
offender convicted of a second class C felony."" 0 In vacating the
sentence, the court of appeals held that the standard of evidence necessary
to find an exception to the Austin rule is clear and convincing evidence,
rather than a preponderance of the evidence. 4 "' The court noted that a
lesser standard would undermine the purpose of the Austin rule, as "it
would inevitably allow some first offenders to receive sentences more
severe than would have been permissible had they been subject to
presumptive sentencing by virtue of a prior felony conviction."' 48 2
In Harlow v. State,t48 3 the defendant was convicted of two class C
felonies 4 '" and treated as a second felony offender for purposes of
presumptive sentencing on the basis of two previous class C felony
convictions in Oregon for unauthorized use of a vehicle. 48" Harlow
argued on appeal that the Oregon offense does not have "elements similar
to those of a felony defined as such under Alaska law" as required by
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.145(a)(2),148 6 and thus, that his Oregon
convictions should not count as prior felonies for the purposes of
presumptive sentencing.'
The court of appeals agreed, finding that "where the Oregon statute did
not require the state to prove a prior offense and the Alaska statute required

aggravating factor may be found when "the conduct constituting the offense was among the
most serious conduct included in the definition of the offense." ALASKA STAT. §
12.55.155(c)(10) (1990 & Supp. 1991).
1480. Buoy, 818 P.2d at 1166.
1481. Id at 1167.
1482. Id.
1483. 820 P.2d 307 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1484. Harlow was convicted of theft in the second degree under Alaska Statutes section
11A6.130 and misconduct involving weapons in the first degree under Alaska Statutes
section 11.61.200. Id at 307.
1485. Id. at 308.
1486. The statute provides in part:
(a) For purposes of considering prior convictions in imposing sentence under
[the presumptive sentencing provisions of the revised criminal code]
i2)'a conviction in this or another jurisdiction of an offense having elements
similar to those of a felony defined as such under Alaska law at the time the offense
was committed is considered a prior felony conviction ....
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(2) (1990).
1487. Harlow, 820 P.2d at 308. The defendant argued that in order for joyriding to
qualify as a felony under Alaska law, an additional element not found in the Oregon law
is required: the defendant must have been previously convicted within seven years of a
similar joyriding offense. Id

270
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the state to prove a prior offense, we cannot conclude that the Oregon and
Alaska offenses have similar elements."'488 The court relied on its
reasoning in Garroutte v. State'489 in focusing on the elements of the
prior conviction.1490 The court recognized that the former version of
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.145, under which Garroutte was decided,
required a strict standard of "substantial identity" between the elements of
the offenses, but nevertheless found that the elements of the offense in this
case did not meet the standard of "similarity" required in the current
version of the statute. The491court therefore reversed the sentence and
remanded for resentencing.1
In Collins v. State,' 41 the court of appeals held that judges are
bound by the rule in Hartley v. State1493 when considering aggravating
or mitigating factors in non-presumptive sentencing cases involving the
Austin rule. 4 9 4 The Hartley rule requires the court to permit
introduction of evidence concerning aggravating factors when those factors
are raised sua sponte by the court. 495 The court noted that although
most aggravating factors raised by the court are known to the defendant
and are therefore foreseeable, 149 the Hartley rule should be extended
497
because of the possibility of differing interpretations and perceptions.
Upon remand, the court also found that the defendant should be allowed
to present evidence "on the issue of whether a defendant's experience of
being sexually abused as a child149might
provide insight into his sexually
8
assaultive behavior as an adult."'
In Wiley v. State, 499 the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of no contest.
The defendant argued that the judge who heard the defendant's change of
plea hearing erred in indicating to him that the presumptive sentence in the
case would be eight years instead of ten years. 5' He argued that the
1488.
1489.
1490.
1491.
1492.
1493.
1494.

It at 309.
683 P.2d 262 (Alaska CL App. 1984).
Harlow, 820 P.2d at 309.
Id
816 P.2d 1383 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
653 P.2d 1052 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
Collins, 816 P.2d at 1384. See supra note 1456 and accompanying text.

1495. Id. at 1385.

1496. In this case, the aggravating factors of sexual assault with a knife and the
defendant's past criminal record were well known to the defendant since in his plea of no
contest he expressly stated he used a knife and he was aware of his own prior record. Id.
1497. Id.
1498. Id. at 1385 n.1.
1499. 822 P.2d 940 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1500. Id. at 941. The eight-year sentence was the standard presumptive sentence for a
first offender of first-degree sexual assault and ten years was the presumptive term for a
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court breached its duty to inform him "'of the mandatory minimum
punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the
statute defining the offense . . ."' prior to accepting his plea of no
contest. 5 °1 The court of appeals disagreed, holding that while the rule
does require the court to advise the defendant of any "mandatory minimum
or statutory maximum term applicable," it does not explicitly mandate that
the court give information concerning the specific presumptive term."'
The court also stated that having a system of presumptive sentencing does
not make the presumptive term equivalent to a mandatory minimum
sentence because the presumptive term is subject to adjustment in light of
aggravating and mitigating factors. 50 3
After a change of plea hearing held prior to sentencing, it is often
impossible for the court to give specific information about any presumptive
sentence because several mitigating or aggravating factors are typically
50 4
resolved after the change of plea hearing, but prior to sentencing.
The court explained, however, that if a defendant is misinformed or
inadequately advised about the "overall workings" of presumptive
sentencing, he may have a fair and just reason for withdrawing a plea 05
and that such misinformation might, in some instances, amount to manifest
injustice requiring a post-sentence plea withdrawal.' 5 6 The court
concluded that in the present case there was no evidence of the existence
of such circumstances. 5 '
The defendant in Graybill v. State 511 was convicted of fish and
game violations and sentenced to seven years with five and one-half
suspended, fined, and, pursuant to the judge's oral pronouncement, placed
on probation for five years."5 9 The written judgments issued a few days
later indicated that the defendant was on probation until February 25,
1987."50 The judge stayed the "jail time" portion of the sentence while
Graybill appealed his conviction and sentence.'"

first offender who used a dangerous instrument or caused serious injury. Id.
1501. Id. (quoting ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 11(c)(3)(i)).
1502. Id. at 942.
1503. Id.
1504. Id. at 942-43.
1505. Id. at 943 (citing ALASKA R. CUM. P. 11(h)(2)).
1506. Id. (citing ALASKA R. CRlM. P. 11(h)(1)).
1507. Id. at 943-45.
1508. 822 P.2d 1386 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1509. Id. at 1387. Additionally, the defendant had his hunting license revoked for fortytwo years. Id.
1510. Id.
1511. Id. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence. Graybill
v. State, 672 P.2d 138, 143-44 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). The supreme court reversed the
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Although his sentence was reduced on remand, the judgment papers
continued to designate February 25, 1987 as the end of his probation
despite the judge's oral pronouncement. On September 30, 1988, however,
the state filed a petition to revoke Graybill's probation, alleging he had
violated one of the specified conditions, 51 2 and to correct the written
judgments indicating that Graybill's probation expired on February 27,
1987, contending that the defendant's original sentence had been stayed
pursuant to Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 206(a)(3) while he
appealed his case. 1 3 The state argued that the court could amend the
judgments under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to show that the
defendant's probation expired five years after the reduction of his sentence,
i.e., pursuant to the judge's oral pronouncement, instead of on February 25,
1987, as indicated in the written record.151 4 The lower court granted the
state's motion and amended the probation termination date to reflect the
trial judge's original oral pronouncement.1 1 5 Graybill appealed, arguing
that the amendment violated his due process and double jeopardy rights
and that the order staying his jail sentence pursuant to appeal did not stay

the running of his probation116

The court of appeals rejected these arguments, noting that probation
does not begin to run until the defendant has served the unsuspended
portion of his sentence. 7 Furthermore, when a conflict arises between
an oral pronouncement of sentence and a written judgment, it is well
settled that the oral pronouncement governs.' s Thus the five-year
probation given by the lower court controlled over the inconsistent written

date. 1519
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that, because he
believed he was on probation and complied with the conditions of
probation, he should be awarded probationary credit. The court noted that
there was no formal state action to suggest to Graybill that he was on

court of appeals and reinstated the original sentence. State v. Graybill, 695 P.2d 725, 731
(Alaska 1985).
1512. Graybill, 822 P.2d at 1387.
1513. Id. The rule provides: "[a]n order placing the defendant on probation shall be
stayed if an appeal is taken." ALASKA R. APP. P. 206(a)(3).
1514. Graybill, 822 P.2d at 1387. The rule provides that "[c]lerical mistakes in
judgments, orders or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from
oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders." ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 36.
1515. Graybill, 822 P.2d at 1387.
1516. Id. at 1387-88.
1517. Id. at 1388.
1518. Id. (citing Burrell v. State, 626 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981)).
1519. Id.
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probation.'
Moreover, "his unilateral decision to comply with the
conditions of probation did not automatically entitle him to receive credit
against his probationary term," since such conditions were only "minimally
restrictive."' 52' The court thus affirmed the trial court's extension of the
defendant's522probationary term, as well as the subsequent order revoking

probation.

In Capwell v. State," the court of appeals held that the term
"maximum sentence" means maximum term of imprisonment, regardless
of whether parole eligibility is restricted.15 4 Although defendant's prior
conviction for attempted sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree' 5
was completely unrelated to the appellee's current offenses, the prior
offense was more serious than the appellee's current negligent homicide
conviction, and therefore was properly considered by the sentencing judge
as an aggravating factor under Alaska Statutes section
12.55.155(c)(7).152 Moreover, the court reaffirmed that although "use
of a dangerous instrument is not a necessary element of negligent
homicide,"'5 7 rare instances do exist in which a defendant can be held
liable for a homicide absent the use of a dangerous instrument. Thus, a car
could be properly considered a dangerous instrument the use of which was
an aggravating factor in negligent homicide cases under Alaska Statutes
section 12.55.155(c)(4).' s
In Johnson v. State,1529 the court of appeals held that Alaska Rule
of Appellate Procedure 2151530 and the supreme court's decision in
Wharton v. State53 permit sentence appeals only for defendants that
receive a sentence of forty-five days or greater.53 2 Additionally, the

1520. Id. at 1387-88. Graybill was never assigned a probation officer, was never required
to report to the probation office, and was never formally supervised. Id.
1521. Id. at 1388.
1522. Id.
1523. 823 P.2d 1250 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1524. Id. at 1256.
1525. See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.434 (Supp. 1991).
1526. Graybill, 823 P.2d at 1255.
1527. Id.
1528. Id.
1529. 816 P.2d 220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1530. Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 215(a) provides:
At the time of imposition of any sentence of imprisonment of 45 days or more, the
[sentencing] judge shall inform the defendant . . . [t~hat the sentence may be
appealed on the ground that it is excessive ....
ALASKA R. App. P. 215(a).
1531. 590 P.2d 427 (Alaska 1979).
1532. Johnson, 816 P.2d at 222. Although the court declined to reconcile Alaska Rule
of Appellate Procedure 215(a), Wharton, and chapter 12 of the 1980 Alaska Session Laws,
it did note that Rule 215(a) should not be interpreted to refer only to defendants that must
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court found that unless the defendant could show "surprise or injustice"
pursuant to Appellate Rule 521, the court could not review a sentence of
under forty-five days' imprisonment.5 3
Applying a different reading
of Wharton, Judge Coats dissented, arguing that the supreme court and
court of appeals have jurisdiction to hear any sentence appeal. 5" Judge
Coats opined that the language of Rule 215 only requires a judge to notify
a defendant of the right to appeal his sentence, and does not limit appellate
review to sentences of forty-five days or more. 535
53 6 the defendant was convicted of two counts of
In Allain v. State,1
sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree.5 3 7 The court of appeals
held that the two counts should have been merged into one because the
conduct involved was closely related, arising from a single criminal
episode. 5 8 In addition, the court stated that neither double jeopardy nor
due process would bar resentencing on the second count after the first
s 9 The court
count was vacated and deemed to merge with count .15
explained that the dismissal of the first count due to its merger with the
second count would not impugn the legitimacy of the jury decision that the
defendant was guilty of the conduct in count I: "[c]ount II now
comprehends the totality of the conduct for which Allain was originally
sentenced."''
Additionally, the sentencing judge clearly had asserted
that his use of consecutive sentences was appropriate because he viewed
the episode as a single instance of criminal misconduct.'5' The court
held that the superior court could resentence the defendant as long as the
new sentence did not exceed the original total sentence; there would
be no
2
appearance of vindictiveness if the sentence were the same.15

be notified of their right to appeal. Id.
1533. Id. Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 521 provides:
These rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be
relaxed or dispensed with by the appellate courts where a strict adherence to them
will work surprise or injustice.
ALASKA R. APP. P. 521.
1534. Johnson, 816 P.2d at 222-23 (Coats, J., dissenting).
1535. Id.
1536. 810 P.2d 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
1537. Id. at 1020. Count I involved touching the minor with his hand and count II
involved touching the minor's genitals with his genitals. Id. at 1021.
1538. Id.
1539. Id.
1540. Id.
1541. Id. at 1022.
1542. Id.
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In DeGross v. State,"'3 the court of appeals held that: (1) a young
first-time offender could be classified as a worst offender; 1" but that (2)
a composite sentence of fifty years of unsuspended time was clearly
unjustified because the sentencing judge did not consider sentences of
"'offenders convicted of like crimes, '""5 and gave too much emphasis
to the expert witness' finding that DeGross' antisocial personality disorder
prevented successful rehabilitation. 1
The court stated that although
DeGross could properly be classified as a worst offender because of the
significant violence evident in the commission of his crimes, this alone
would not justify the fifty-year sentence.1 47 Likewise, the court held
that DeGross' antisocial personality disorder was also not enough to justify
the excessive term because although this disorder may prevent his
rehabilitation, it has relatively little effect on the sentence's deterrent
effect."' 8 Moreover, the court held that "the diagnosis of an antisocial
personality disorder is in itself an unreliable and inaccurate predictor of
future behavior." 159
Subsequently, the court determined that a thirty-year composite
sentence in this case was justifiable under prior sentencing cases that
suggested a twenty-year sentence, but from which DeGross' case was
distinguishable due to its extreme violence.5 5 0
Anne M. Lindner
Jeanne M. Meyer
Alison T Wachterman

1543. 816 P.2d 212 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (appealing remand of DeGross v. State, 768
P.2d 134 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989)).
1544. Id. at 217-18.
1545. Id. at 219 (quoting DeGross,768 P.2d at 141). The court found that the sentencing
judge had not followed the direction of the prior appellate court to consider sentences for
like crimes. Id. The court noted further that the consideration of like-crime sentences was
relevant for uniformity reasons. Id. at 219; see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005(1) (1990).
1546. DeGross 816 P.2d at 218. DeGross' fifty-year sentence was based on his twice
being convicted for first-degree robbery and third-degree assault. Id. at 215.
1547. Id. at 218.
1548. Id.
1549. Id.
1550. Id. at 220.
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APPENDIX B
CURRENT COURT OF APPEALS CAsES GRANTED CERTIORARI IN THE
ALASKA SUPREME COURT

J.R.N. v. State, 809 P.2d 416, on appeal, No. S-4528 (argued Feb. 11,

1992).

